The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
To counteract the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford 10 denying
citizenship not just to Dred Scott, a slave, but to all African-Americans, whether slave or
free, the Congress proposed and the states ratified the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which specifies: “All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.”11 It is today routinely believed that, under the Clause, mere
birth on U.S. soil is sufficient to confer U.S. citize nship. Legal commentator Michael
Dorf, for example, noted recently: “Yaser Esam Hamdi was born in Louisiana. Under
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, he is therefore a citizen of the United States,
10 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
11 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.
6
even though he spent most of his life outside this country.”12 What Dorf’s formulation
omits, of course, is the other component of the Citizenship Clause. One must also be
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States in order constitutionally to be entitled to
citizenship.
To the modern ear, Dorf’s formulation nevertheless appears perfectly sensible.
Any person entering the territory of the United States—even for a short visit; even
illegally—is considered to have subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the United States,
which is to say, subjected himself to the laws of the United States. Indeed, former
Attorney General William Barr has even contended that one who has never entered the
territory of the United States subjects himself to its jurisdiction and laws by taking
actions that have an effect in the United States.13 Surely one who is actually born in the
United States is therefore “subject to the jurisdiction” of the Unites States, and entitled to
full citizenship as a result.
However strong this interpretation is as a matter of contemporary common
parlance, is simply does not comport with either the text or the history surrounding
adoption of the Citizenship Clause, nor with the political theory underlying the Clause.
Textually, such an interpretation would render the entire “subject to the jurisdiction”
clause redundant—anyone who is “born” in the United States is, under this interpretation,
12 Michael C. Dorf, Who Decides Whether Yaser Hamdi, Or Any Other Citizen, Is An Enemy Combatant?
FindLaw (Aug. 21, 2002) (emphasis added).
13 See, e.g., The Legality as a Matter of Domestic Law of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities that
Depart from International law: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) (statement of William Barr, U.S. Assistant
Attorney General); William J. Tuttle, The Return of Timberlane? The Fifth Circuit Signals a Return to
Restrictive Notions of Extraterritorial Antitrust, 36 Vanderbilt J. Transnat’l L. 319, 348 (Jan. 2003) (noting
that in April 1992 then-Attorney General William Barr revised Department of Justice antitrust enforcement
guidelines to permit lawsuits against foreign corporations who acted exclusively outside the United States
if their operations were detrimental to U.S. exporters); see also United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206
(11th Cir. 1997).
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necessarily “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States—and it is a well-established
doctrine of legal interpretation that legal texts, including the Constitution, are not to be
interpreted to create redundancy unless any other interpretation would lead to absurd
results.14
Historically, the language of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, from which the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (like the rest of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment) was derived so as to provide a more certain constitutional
foundation for the 1866 Act, strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to provide for
such a broad and absolute birthright citizenship. The 1866 Act provides: “All persons
born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”15 As this formulation
makes clear, any child born on U.S. soil to parents who were temporary visitors to this
country and who, as a result of the foreign citizenship of the child’s parents, remained a
citizen or subject of the parents’ home country, was not entitled to claim the birthright
citizenship provided in the 1866 Act.
Of course, the jurisdiction clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is somewhat
different from the jurisdiction clause of the 1866 Act. The positively-phrased “subject to
the jurisdiction” of the United States might easily have been intended to describe a
broader grant of citizenship than the negatively-phrased language from the 1866 Act, one
more in line with the contemporary understanding accepted unquestioningly by Dorf that
birth on U.S. soil is alone sufficient for citizenship. But the relatively sparse debate we
14 See, e.g., Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 Case. W. Res. L. Rev. 179 ?? (1989); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 562
(1995) (“this Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant”).
15 Chapter 31, 14 Stat. 27 (April 9, 1866).
8
have regarding this provision of the Fourteenth Amendment does not support such a
reading. When pressed about whether Indians living on reservations would be covered
by the clause since they were “most clearly subject to our jurisdiction, both civil and
military,” for example, Senator Lyman Trumbull, a key figure in the drafting and
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, responded that “subject to the jurisdiction” of
the United States meant subject to its “complete” jurisdictio n; “[n]ot owing allegiance to
anybody else.” And Senator Jacob Howard, who introduced the language of the
jurisdiction clause on the floor of the Senate, contended that it should be construed to
mean “a full and complete jurisdiction,” “the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as
applies to every citizen of the United States now” (i.e., under the 1866 Act). That meant
that the children of Indians who still “belong[ed] to a tribal relation” and hence owed
allegiance to another sovereign (however dependent the sovereign was) would not qualify
for citizenship under the clause. Because of this interpretative gloss, provided by the
authors of the provision, an amendment offered by Senator James Doolittle of Wisconsin
to explicitly exclude “Indians not taxed,” as the 1866 Act had done, was rejected as
redundant.16
The interpretative gloss offered by Senators Trumbull and Howard was also
accepted by the Supreme Court—by both the majority and the dissenting justices—in The
Slaughter-House Cases. The majority correctly noted that the “main purpose” of the
Clause “was to establish the citizenship of the negro,” and that “[t]he phrase, ‘subject to
its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls,
16 Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2892-97 (May 30, 1866). For a more thorough discussion of
the debate, see Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the
American Polity 72-89 (Yale Univ. Press 1985).
9
and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.”17 Justice Steven
Field, joined by Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley in dissent from the
principal holding of the case, likewise acknowledged that the Clause was designed to
remove any doubts about the constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which
provided that all persons born in the United States were as a result citizens both of the
United States and the state in which they resided, provided they were not at the time
subjects of any foreign power.18
Although the statement by the majority in Slaughter-House was dicta, the position
regarding the “subject to the jurisdiction” language advanced there was subsequently
adopted by the Supreme Court in the 1884 case addressing a claim of Indian citizenship,
Elk v. Wilkins.19 The Supreme Court in that case rejected the claim by an Indian who had
been born on a reservation and subsequently moved to non-reservation U.S. territory,
renouncing his former tribal allegiance. The Court held that the claimant was not
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States at birth, which required that he be “not
merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but
completely subject to their political jurisdiction, and owing them direct and immediate
allegiance.”20 John Elk did not meet the jurisdictional test because, as a member of an
Indian tribe at his birth, he “owed immediate allegiance to” his tribe and not to the United
States. Although “Indian tribes, being within the territorial limits of the United States,
were not, strictly speaking, foreign states,” “they were alien nations, distinct political
17 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73 (1872).
18 Id. at 92-93.
19 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
20 Id. at 102.
10
communities,” according to the Court.21 Drawing explicitly on the language of the 1866
Civil Rights Act, the Court continued:
Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of,
and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes, (an alien
though dependent power,) although in a geographical sense born in the
United States, are no more “born in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof,” within the meaning of the first section of the
fourteenth amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign
government born within the domain of that government, or the children
born within the United States, of ambassadors or other public ministers of
foreign nations.22
Indeed, if anything, Indians, as members of tribes that were themselves dependent to the
United States (and hence themselves subject to its jurisdiction), had a stronger claim to
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment merely by virtue of their birth within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States than did children of foreign nationals. But the
Court in Elk rejected that claim, and in the process necessarily rejected the claim that the
phrase, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States, meant merely territorial
jurisdiction as opposed to complete, political jurisdiction.
Such was the interpretation of the Citizenship Clause initially given by the
Supreme Court. As Thomas Cooley noted in his treatise, The General Principles of
Constitutional Law in America, “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States “meant
full and complete jurisdiction to which citizens are generally subject, and not any
qualified and partial jurisdiction, such as may consist with allegiance to some other
government.”
21 Id. at 99.
22 Id. at 102.
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III. The Supreme Court’s 1898 Misreading of the Citizenship Clause
The clear (and as I contend, correct) holding of Elk v. Wilkins, and the equally
correct dicta from Slaughter-House, was rejected by the Supreme Court in 1898, thirty
years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the case of United States v.
Won Kim Ark,23 decided by the same court, with nearly the same line- up, that had given
its sanction to the ignominious separate-but-equal doctrine less than two years earlier in
Plessy v. Ferguson.24
In Won Kim Ark, the Supreme Court held that “a child born in the United States,
of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth were subjects of the emperor of
China, but have a permanent domicile and residence in the United States,” was, merely
by virtue of his birth in the United States, a citizen of the United States as a result of the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Horace Gray, writing for the
Court, correctly noted that the language to the contrary in The Slaughter-House Cases
was merely dicta and therefore not binding precedent.25 He found the Slaughter-House
dicta unpersuasive because of a subsequent decision, in which the author of the majority
opinion in Slaughter-House had concurred, holding that foreign consuls (unlike
ambassadors) were “subject to the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, of the courts of the
country in which they reside.”26 Justice Gray appears not to have appreciated the
distinction between partial, territorial jurisdiction, which subjects all who are present
23 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
24 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
25 169 U.S. at 678.
26 Id. at 679 (citing, e.g., 1 Kent, Comm. 44; In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 424 (1890)).
12
within the territory of a sovereign to the jurisdiction of its laws, and complete, political
jurisdiction, which requires as well allegiance to the sovereign.
More troubling than his rejection of the persuasive dicta from Slaugher-House
was the fact that Justice Gray also repudiated the actual holding in Elk v. Wilkins, which
he himself had authored. After quoting extensively from the opinion, including the
portion, reprinted above, noting that the children of Indians owing allegiance to an Indian
tribe were no more “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment than were the children of ambassadors and other public
ministers of foreign nations born in the United States, Justice Gray simply held, without
any analysis, that Elk “concerned only members of the Indian tribes within the United
States, and had no tendency to deny citizenship to children born in the United States of
foreign parents of Caucasian, African, or Mongolian descent, not in the diplomatic
service of a foreign country.”27
By limiting the “subject to the jurisdiction” clause to the children of diplomats,
who neither owed allegiance to the United States nor were (at least at the ambassadorial
level) subject to its laws merely by virtue of their residence in the United States as the
result of the long-established international law fiction of extraterritoriality by which the
sovereignty of a diplomat is said to follow him wherever he goes, Justice Gray simply
failed to appreciate what he seemed to have understood in Elk, namely, that there is a
difference between territorial jurisdiction and the more complete, allegiance-obliging
jurisdiction that the Fourteenth Amendment codified.
27 Id. at 681-82.
13
Justice Gray’s failure even to address, much less appreciate, the distinction
between territorial jurisdiction and complete, political jurisdiction was taken to task by
Justice Fuller, joined by Justice Harlan, in dissent. Drawing on an impressive array of
legal scholars, from Vattel to Blackstone, Justice Fuller correctly noted that there was a
distinction between two sorts of allegiance—“the one, natural and perpetual; the other,
local and temporary.” The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment referred
only to the former, he contended. He contended that the absolute birthright citizenship
urged by Justice Gray was really a lingering vestige of a feudalism that the Americans
had rejected, implicitly at the time of the Revolution, and explicitly with the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Quite apart from the fact that Justice Fuller’s dissent was logically compelled by
the text and history of the Citizenship Clause, Justice Gray’s broad interpretation led him
to make some astoundingly incorrect assertions. He claimed, for example, that “a
stranger born, for so long as he continues within the dominions of a foreign government,
owes obedience to the laws of that government, and may be punished for treason.”28
And he necessarily had to recognize dual citizenship as a necessary implication of his
position, 29 despite the fact that, ever since the Naturalization Act of 1795, “applicants for
naturalization were required to take, not simply an oath to support the constitution of the
United States, but of absolute renunciation and abjuration of all allegiance and fidelity to
every foreign prince or state, and particularly to the prince or state of which they were
before the citizens or subjects.”30 That requirement still exists though it no longer seems
28 Id. at 693.
29 Id. at 691.
30 Id. at 711 (Fuller, J., dissenting) (citing Act of Jan. 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414, c. 20)
14
to be taken seriously. Hopefully this Committee will, as a result of these hearings, begin
to address that fundamental contradiction in our naturalization practice.
Finally, Justice Gray’s position is simply at odds with the notion of consent that
underlay the sovereign’s power over naturalization. What it meant, fundamentally, was
that foreign nationals could secure American citizens hip for their children unilaterally,
merely by giving birth on American soil, whether or not their arrival on America’s shores
was legal or illegal, temporary or permanent.
Justice Gray held that the children of two classes of foreigners were not entitled to
the birthright citizenship he thought guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. First, as
noted above, were the children of ambassadors and other foreign diplomats who, as the
result of the fiction of extraterritoriality, were not even considered subject to the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Second were the children of invading armies
born on U.S. soil while it was occupied by the foreign army. But apart from that, all
children of foreign nationals who managed to be born on U.S. soil were, in his
formulation, citizens of the United States. Children born of parents who had been offered
permanent residence but were not yet citizens and who as a result had not yet renounced
their allegiance to their prior sovereign would become citizens by birth on U.S. soil. This
was true even if, as was the case in Wong Kim Ark itself, the parents were, by treaty,
unable ever to become citizens.
Children of parents residing only temporarily in the United States on a work or
student visa, such as Yaser Hamdi’s parents, would also become U.S. citizens. Children
of parents who had overstayed their temporary visa would also become U.S. citizens,
even though born of parents who were now here illegally. And, perhaps most troubling
15
from the “consent” rationale, children of parents who never were in the United States
legally would also become citizens as the direct result of the illegal action by their
parents. Finally, to return to my opening reference to the Iranian hostage crisis, this
would be true even if the parents were nationals of a regime at war with the United States
and even if the parents were here to commit acts of sabotage against the United States, at
least as long as the sabotage did not actually involve occupying a portion of the territory
of the United States. The notion that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, when
seeking to guarantee the right of citizenship to the former slaves, also sought to guarantee
citizenship to the children of enemies of the United States who were in our territory
illegally, is simply too absurd to be a credible interpretation of the Citizenship Clause.
IV. Reviving Congress’s Constitutional Power Over Naturalization
This is not to say that Congress could not, pursuant to its naturalization power,
choose to grant citizenship to the children of foreign nationals. But thus far it has not
done so. Instead, the language of the current naturalization statute simply tracks the
minimum constitutional guarantee—anyone born in the United States, and subject to its
jurisdiction, is a citizen. With the absurdity of Hamdi’s claim of citizenship so recently
and vividly before us, it is time for the courts, and for the political branches as well, to
revisit Justice Gray’s erroneous interpretation of that language, restoring to the
constitutional mandate what its drafters actually intended, that only a complete
jurisdiction, of the kind that brings with it a total and exclusive allegiance, is sufficient to
qualify for the grant of citizenship to which the people of the United States actually
consented.
16
Of course, Congress has in analogous contexts been hesitant to exercise its own
constitutional authority to interpret the Constitution in ways contrary to the
pronouncements of the Courts. Even if that course is warranted in most situations so as
to avoid a constitutional conflict with a co-equal branc h of the government, it is not
warranted here for at least two reasons. First, as the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly
acknowledged, Congress’s power over naturalization is “plenary,” while “judicial power
over immigration and naturalization is extremely limited.”31 While that recognition of
plenary power does not permit Congress to dip below the constitutional floor, of course,
it does counsel against any judicial interpretation that provides a broader grant of
citizenship than is actually supported by the Constitution’s text.
Second, the gloss that has been placed on the Wong Kim Ark decision is actually
much broader than the actual holding of the case. This Committee should therefore
recommend, and Congress should then adopt, a narrow reading of the decision that does
not intrude on the plenary power of Congress in this area any more than the actual
holding of the case requires. Wong Kim Ark’s parents were actually in this country both
legally and permanently, yet were barred from even pursuing citizenship (and renouncing
their former allegiance) by a treaty that closed that door to all Chinese immigrants. They
were therefore as fully subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as they were legally
permitted to be, and under those circumstances, it is not a surprise that the Court would
extend the Constitution’s grant of birthright citizenship to their children. But the effort to
read Wong Kim Ark more broadly than that, as interpreting the Citizenship Clause to
confer birthright citizenship on the children of those not subject to the full and sovereign
31 See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 455 (1998); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-770 (1972); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954).