USS John S. McCain collides with merchant vessel in Singapore.

Your Military: Maybe today’s Navy is just not very good at driving ships

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-navy/2017/08/27/navy-swos-a-culture-in-crisis/

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[SUP]A sailor from the transport dock ship San Diego stands watch on the bridge wing. Former officers are voicing their concerns over the inability of today's SWOs to display knowledge of basic operations and mariner skills. (MC2 Stacy M. Atkins Ricks/Navy)[/SUP]


In the wake of two fatal collisions of Navy warships with commercial vessels, current and former senior surface warfare officers are speaking out, saying today’s Navy suffers from a disturbing problem: The SWO community is just not very good at driving ships.

The two collisions — and a total of 17 sailors lost at sea this summer — have raised concerns about whether this generation of surface fleet officers lack the basic core competency of their trade.

The problem is years in the making. Now, the current generation of officers rising into command-level billets lacks the skills, training, education and experience needed to operate effectively and safely at sea, according to current and former officers interviewed by Navy Times.

“There is a systemic cultural wasteland in the SWO community right now, especially at the department head level,” said retired Navy Capt. Rick Hoffman, who commanded the cruiser Hue City and the frigate DeWert and who, after retirement, taught SWOs ship handling in Mayport.

“We do not put a premium on being good mariners,” Hoffman said. “We put a premium on being good inspection takers and admin weenies.”

The series of accidents this year — and specifically the Aug. 20 collision of the destroyer John S. McCain — has shaken the Navy to its core.

Pacific Fleet boss Adm. Scott Swift sent an internal message to his commanders saying the accidents occurred while conducting “the most basic of operations,” according to a copy of the message obtained by Navy Times.

Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson ordered a worldwide halt to Navy operations, a one-day “pause” that aims to get the fleet back on track.

Yet many current and former officers say the problem dates back to 2003, when the Navy made severe cuts to SWO’s initial training under the belief the young officers would just learn their trade at sea.

At the same time, the Navy’s growing reliance on technology has eroded basic seamanship skills, former officers say.

Another factor is the timing of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, when the surface warfare community was hit hard by the demand for individual augmentees to support those ground operations, further robbing these officers of shipboard training and experience.

“There is a growing suspicion among a small circle of current and former COs that chickens may be coming home to roost,” retired Capt. Kevin Eyer, who commanded three Aegis cruisers, wrote in Proceedings Magazine online after the McCain collision.

The growing problem has festered in a SWO culture that many believe is notoriously toxic. Competition and careerism make officers afraid to voice concerns and create an “everyone for themselves” mentality.

“Most department heads I had were afraid to go to the captain with anything that might look bad for them — they did everything they did to protect their own reputations and wanted nothing to hamper them from eventually getting in the CO seat themselves,” said former Lt. Jonathan Parin, who served onboard the destroyer James E. Williams.

“We’re fostering an environment that is counter to becoming a competent professional mariner and instead it’s about looking out for yourself,” Parin told Navy Times.

Hoffman says he and his fellow SWO alumni are speaking out now in an attempt to get the Navy to make a full rudder correction and get back to the basics when it comes to driving ships and training junior surface warfare officers.

TRAINING IN A BOX

For nearly 30 years, all new surface warfare officers spent their first six months in uniform at the Surface Warfare Officer’s School in Newport, Rhode Island, learning the theory behind driving ships and leading sailors as division officers.

But that changed in 2003. The Navy decided to eliminate the “SWOS Basic” school and simply send surface fleet officers out to sea to learn on the job. The Navy did that mainly to save money, and the fleet has suffered severely for it, said retired Cmdr. Kurt Lippold.

“The Navy has cut training as a budgetary device and they have done it at the expense of our ability to operate safely at sea,” said Lippold, who commanded the destroyer Cole in 2000 when it was attacked by terrorists in Yemen.

After 2003, each young officer was issued a set of 21 CD-ROMs for computer-based training — jokingly called “SWOS in a Box” — to take with them to sea and learn. Young officers were required to complete this instructor-less course in between earning their shipboard qualifications, management of their divisions and collateral duties.

“The elimination of SWOS Basic was the death knell of professional SWO culture in the United States Navy,” Hoffman said. “I’m not suggesting that … the entire surface warfare community is completely barren of professionalism. I’m telling you that there are systemic problems, particularly at the department head level, where they are timid, where they lack resolve and they don’t have the sea time we expect.”

In recent years, there’s been a push to re-energize SWO training. And on paper, they’ve got a course for every level of SWO — all the way up to the commanding officer level.

Young SWOs now get about nine weeks in fleet concentration area classrooms. Generally, these new officers report to their ship first and then get a seat in school within the first couple of months on board.

But, Parin said, “only a couple of days are dedicated to navigation and mariner skills. The rest is damage control and other material division officer-specific training.”

Another eight weeks of school comes between an officer’s first and second division officer tours. They are taught more advanced skills, but still, the professional mariner instruction isn’t what it should be, Hoffman said.

That’s still just a fraction of the original training.

In response to questions from Navy Times, Richardson said the fleet-wide review of Navy operations that he initiated after the McCain collision “will take a hard look at individual training and professional development, to include Surface Warfare Officer School.

“It is the Navy’s responsibility to ensure that our SWOs receive the training they need before they go to sea, and we take that responsibility very seriously,” said Richardson.

These criticisms began to surface years ago. In 2010, then Lt. Cmdr. Marc A. Drage, then a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, wrote an article titled “Transforming the Surface Warfare Officer Training Curriculum,” hoping at the time to spark some discussion and correction of the issue.

“The elimination of [SWOS Basic] has been detrimental to the education of SWO [division officers],” Drage wrote. “The necessity for practice in a ship handling simulator has and will remain to be a priority throughout the development of SWOs as professional mariners.”

Decisions made for saving money have now “posed more leadership, logistical and administrative problems,” Drage wrote.

Now for the first time, almost 15 years after that major change in surface warfare training, that first generation of officers who received “SWOS in a Box” are now senior department heads and will soon assume command-level assignments aboard warships.

Hoffman says that some officers have been fortunate to serve under good COs who took the time to teach them, but more often, mentoring never occurred. The result is that ships at sea today are skippered by officers who lack of a fundamental understanding of what being a competent mariner truly is.

“The bottom line is that we don‘t train our junior officers well and we now have department heads without the training and experience they really need.”

TOO MUCH TECHNOLOGY

As the search-and-rescue effort to find 10 missing sailors was underway in the South China Sea in late August, the Navy’s top officer said one option for addressing concerns about Navy seamanship and readiness was to look to the defense industry for help.

“We’re always operating systems, right? And those systems are provided by our industrial partners,” Richardson said. “So, we want to make sure we’re looking as compressively as possible in terms of optimizing or improving the way we use those systems.”

But Hoffman said that’s a symptom of a larger ill: The Navy has grown too dependent on technology.

“The CNO is suggesting that there is a technical solution and we are looking to industry to provide a solution,” Hoffman said. “I say this is about basic mariner skills and we need to put a premium on being good mariners, training and maintaining proficiency.”

A Navy official told Navy Times that the CNO’s comments were made in the context of a greater partnership in industry, and that the Navy isn’t looking to industry to help them solve basic seamanship issues.

Still, too much reliance on technology is an easy crutch, and not a substitute for good-old ship driving skills, he said.

“They didn’t run aground, they hit another moving object,” he said, referring to the two major collisions this summer. “If I am staring at my radar, nav chart, phone or other watch standers, then I am not looking out the window,” Hoffman said.

There’s no substitute for using your own eyes, he added.

“A radar can tell you something is out there, but it can’t tell you if it’s turning,” Hoffman said. “Only your eyes can tell you that. You have to put your eyes on the iron.”

GROUND WARS

The training of today’s SWOs was further eroded by the Pentagon’s focus on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before 2010, many Navy officers who were expected to learn on the job were not on ships at all.

During critical times in their professional development, they were taken away from their ships and sent to serve as individual augmentees with soldiers and Marines fighting in land-based operations.

A 2011 study by the Center for Naval Analyses identified SWOs as one of the six hardest hit officer designators by IA requirements. The cost, the study said, was the loss of hundreds of “man-years” in the fleet.

“The Navy did nothing to help them make up for that lost time, professionally. They never gave them the chance to get back what they lost,” Lippold said.

“That year went away and when they came back, they were expected to pick up and move on as if they’d been driving ships the whole time.”

CULTURE

Parin said today’s Navy culture rewards checking the box on qualifications, passing inspections and stacking resumes with career-minded assignments.

Officers spend very little time learning basic navigation skills or other essential seamanship. That results in a feeling, he said, of never really knowing what you are doing.

“We moved around jobs so much that you would just start to get the hang of what you were doing and you‘d be moved on,” he said. “You never really got to know anything well, and the pressure to qualify was and is intense so it’s about qualifying and not learning.”

Too much busy work drains the energy of the officers who are responsible for the ship and its safety. Often, those officers are simply exhausted from lack of sleep. It’s probably not a coincidence, Hoffman says, that both of the collisions happened in the wee hours of the morning, when already fatigued sailors and officers are standing watches with little or no sleep under their belts.

“When we do go to sea, we have a huge requirement to do engineering drills, combat systems training, etc., which will take precedence over the need for rested and alert watch standers,” Hoffman said.

“If the CO is focused on the next inspection or assessment, he is not focused on his real mission — to safely go from place to place and be prepared to deliver ordnance when required.”
 
“We do not put a premium on being good mariners,” Hoffman said. “We put a premium on being good inspection takers and admin weenies.”
 
Sextants, paper charts, lead-lines, compasses and a seaman's eye cannot be hacked.

But what do I know, I'm a technophobic Luddite...



U.S. Navy Investigating If Destroyer Crash Was Caused by Cyberattack

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/14...if-destroyer-crash-was-caused-by-cyberattack/

BY ELIAS GROLLSEPTEMBER 14, 2017 - 5:25 PMELIAS.GROLL@ELIASGROLLfacebooktwittergoogle-plusredditLinkedIn email

U.S. Navy Investigating If Destroyer Crash Was Caused by Cyberattack
The military is examining whether compromised computer systems were responsible for one of two U.S. Navy destroyer collisions with merchant vessels that occurred in recent months, Vice Admiral Jan Tighe, the deputy chief of naval operations for information warfare, said on Thursday.

Naval investigators are scrambling to determine the causes of the mishaps, including whether hackers infiltrated the computer systems of the USS John S. McCain ahead of the collision on Aug. 21, Tighe said during an appearance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Trending Articles

Heckuva Job, Donnie!
In responding to his first natural disasters, President Trump deserves credit where credit is due — but no more than…

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Investigators are not, however, considering the possibility that the USS Fitzgerald collision, which took place on June 17, was the result of hacking.

“With the McCain incident happening so close to the Fitzgerald,” questions immediately arose about whether computer manipulation could have been the cause of the crash, Tighe said. The Navy has no indication that a cyberattack was behind either of the incidents, but is dispatching investigators to the McCain to put those questions to rest, she said.

Tighe said the Navy plans to use the results of the McCain probe to include a look at cybersecurity in future investigations.

The two collisions left a total of 17 sailors dead and the Navy humiliated. Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson ordered a halt to operations after the second collision and called on the service to review safety protocols for its global fleet.

While the idea of a cyberattack causing a collision remain purely speculative, U.S. intelligence officials have warned in recent years that this sort of digital threat could pose a major problem for the Navy’s sprawling armada. Tighe said on Thursday that the service has already set aside $1.5 billion between fiscal years 2014 and 2023 to improve defenses.

The Fitzgerald and the McCain, both Arleigh Burke-class destroyers outfitted with a suite of advanced sensors and weapons, represent two of the most capable ships in the Navy’s arsenal. The collisions have raised troubling questions about the readiness of the American Pacific fleet at a time when it faces a number of threats in the region, from North Korean missile tests to China’s territorial claims over disputed islands.

Early assessments of the two incidents have blamed crew training and growing demands on the Navy’s fleet of warships. Following the McCain collision in August, the Navy relieved the commander of the 7th Fleet, Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin, citing a “loss of confidence in his ability to command.” The skipper of the Fitzgerald has also been dismissed, along with several of the ship’s officers, for losing situational awareness ahead of the June collision.

If hackers breached the McCain’s digital defenses, it would represent a startling development in naval warfare. American intelligence officials have theorized that hackers working on behalf of an enemy state could conceivably hack into a ship’s computer systems and blind its commander by, for example, displaying an inaccurate location of the ship on its charts.

Such a deception could conceivably result in a night-time crash, such as the one suffered by the McCain. The merchant vessel Alnic MC struck the ship’s left, or port, side and left a huge gash in its hull.

Tighe said the Navy is preparing for potential digital warfare and said the service has to be able to “be able to fight through” a cyber attack. Ships must monitor their own computer systems, she said, and if one method of communication is knocked out, naval forces have to be able to rely on other methods to relay commands and information.

“Semaphores” — the system of communicating by hand-held flags — “ are going to be really hard to hack,” Tighe said.

“That’s a joke,” she quickly added.
 
Sextants, paper charts, lead-lines, compasses and a seaman's eye cannot be hacked.

But what do I know, I'm a technophobic Luddite...



U.S. Navy Investigating If Destroyer Crash Was Caused by Cyberattack

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/14...if-destroyer-crash-was-caused-by-cyberattack/

BY ELIAS GROLLSEPTEMBER 14, 2017 - 5:25 PMELIAS.GROLL@ELIASGROLLfacebooktwittergoogle-plusredditLinkedIn email

U.S. Navy Investigating If Destroyer Crash Was Caused by Cyberattack
The military is examining whether compromised computer systems were responsible for one of two U.S. Navy destroyer collisions with merchant vessels that occurred in recent months, Vice Admiral Jan Tighe, the deputy chief of naval operations for information warfare, said on Thursday.

Naval investigators are scrambling to determine the causes of the mishaps, including whether hackers infiltrated the computer systems of the USS John S. McCain ahead of the collision on Aug. 21, Tighe said during an appearance at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Trending Articles

Heckuva Job, Donnie!
In responding to his first natural disasters, President Trump deserves credit where credit is due — but no more than…

Powered By
Investigators are not, however, considering the possibility that the USS Fitzgerald collision, which took place on June 17, was the result of hacking.

“With the McCain incident happening so close to the Fitzgerald,” questions immediately arose about whether computer manipulation could have been the cause of the crash, Tighe said. The Navy has no indication that a cyberattack was behind either of the incidents, but is dispatching investigators to the McCain to put those questions to rest, she said.

Tighe said the Navy plans to use the results of the McCain probe to include a look at cybersecurity in future investigations.

The two collisions left a total of 17 sailors dead and the Navy humiliated. Chief of Naval Operations John Richardson ordered a halt to operations after the second collision and called on the service to review safety protocols for its global fleet.

While the idea of a cyberattack causing a collision remain purely speculative, U.S. intelligence officials have warned in recent years that this sort of digital threat could pose a major problem for the Navy’s sprawling armada. Tighe said on Thursday that the service has already set aside $1.5 billion between fiscal years 2014 and 2023 to improve defenses.

The Fitzgerald and the McCain, both Arleigh Burke-class destroyers outfitted with a suite of advanced sensors and weapons, represent two of the most capable ships in the Navy’s arsenal. The collisions have raised troubling questions about the readiness of the American Pacific fleet at a time when it faces a number of threats in the region, from North Korean missile tests to China’s territorial claims over disputed islands.

Early assessments of the two incidents have blamed crew training and growing demands on the Navy’s fleet of warships. Following the McCain collision in August, the Navy relieved the commander of the 7th Fleet, Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin, citing a “loss of confidence in his ability to command.” The skipper of the Fitzgerald has also been dismissed, along with several of the ship’s officers, for losing situational awareness ahead of the June collision.

If hackers breached the McCain’s digital defenses, it would represent a startling development in naval warfare. American intelligence officials have theorized that hackers working on behalf of an enemy state could conceivably hack into a ship’s computer systems and blind its commander by, for example, displaying an inaccurate location of the ship on its charts.

Such a deception could conceivably result in a night-time crash, such as the one suffered by the McCain. The merchant vessel Alnic MC struck the ship’s left, or port, side and left a huge gash in its hull.

Tighe said the Navy is preparing for potential digital warfare and said the service has to be able to “be able to fight through” a cyber attack. Ships must monitor their own computer systems, she said, and if one method of communication is knocked out, naval forces have to be able to rely on other methods to relay commands and information.

“Semaphores” — the system of communicating by hand-held flags — “ are going to be really hard to hack,” Tighe said.

“That’s a joke,” she quickly added.
 
The United States Navy has relieved two additional senior officers of command following fatal collisions that took place earlier in the summer.
7th Fleet Commander, Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer, announced Monday the decision to relieve Rear Adm. Charles William, commander of Task Force 70, and Capt. Jeffrey Bennett, commander of Destroyer Squadron 15, ABC News reported.
William was replaced by the commander of Task Force 76, Rear Adm. Marc Dalton. Bennet was replaced by Capt. Jonathan Duffy, deputy commander of Destroyer Squadron 15.

More at: http://freebeacon.com/national-secu...avy-officers-relieved-deadly-pacific-crashes/
 
The United States Navy has relieved two additional senior officers of command following fatal collisions that took place earlier in the summer.
7th Fleet Commander, Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer, announced Monday the decision to relieve Rear Adm. Charles William, commander of Task Force 70, and Capt. Jeffrey Bennett, commander of Destroyer Squadron 15, ABC News reported.
William was replaced by the commander of Task Force 76, Rear Adm. Marc Dalton. Bennet was replaced by Capt. Jonathan Duffy, deputy commander of Destroyer Squadron 15.

More at: http://freebeacon.com/national-secu...avy-officers-relieved-deadly-pacific-crashes/

So funny. th buck stopped at the ships command. Were any superiors to blame? The buck stops there so that it will never get here, mentality?
 
The United States Navy has relieved two additional senior officers of command following fatal collisions that took place earlier in the summer.
7th Fleet Commander, Vice Adm. Phil Sawyer, announced Monday the decision to relieve Rear Adm. Charles William, commander of Task Force 70, and Capt. Jeffrey Bennett, commander of Destroyer Squadron 15, ABC News reported.
William was replaced by the commander of Task Force 76, Rear Adm. Marc Dalton. Bennet was replaced by Capt. Jonathan Duffy, deputy commander of Destroyer Squadron 15.

More at: http://freebeacon.com/national-secu...avy-officers-relieved-deadly-pacific-crashes/

This is one thing that bugged me when I was in the military. A squadron (or wing) can have one accident and it has nothing to do with the leadership. But they always have to fire somebody.
 
Navy Directed Exhausted Crews to Sail With ID Beacons Off US Navy warships have been involve

Navy Directed Exhausted Crews to Sail With ID Beacons Off

US Navy warships have been involved in four major accidents in the Asia-Pacific this year …

First in January the guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam ran aground while trying to anchor in Tokyo Bay.

Then in May the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain was struck by a South Korean fishing boat off the coast of Korea.

Next month the destroyer USS Fitzgerald was struck by a gigantic container ship in crowded waters off the coast of Japan. 7 US sailors were killed and the ship seriously damaged.

Finally last month the destroyer USS John S. McCain was struck by a massive tanker near Singapore port, killing 10 sailors aboard the American vessel. …

as Singapore investigators first pointed out days ago, the Americans had been sailing in crowded waters with their Automatic Identification System switched off so that unlike commercial ships they were sending out no information on their position, speed and heading.

17 deaths later the Navy has announced a policy change. From now on in busy waters US warships will switch on their AIS beacons, which commercial ships are required to have enabled at all times. No wonder Navy ships have had so many collisions. Turns out they had been operating without ID systems turned on! http://n.pr/2xWEWTN

uss-mccain-gty-3-er-170821_12x5_992.jpg


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That's been SOP for military and cop craft for years now, in fact, since the introduction of AIS, our betters have not been required to operate the Big Brother Broadcast Boxes, like us Mundane Mariners have. (I do have the authority to shut it off if I perceive it to be contributing to a threat to the vessel's safety)

But while having AIS off may have contributed to the confusion of heavy traffic maneuvering, it does necessarily mean that the vessels could not be tracked by other means, and effective collision avoidance accomplished.

They fucked up, the Navy craft in particular.
 
That's been SOP for military and cop craft for years now, in fact, since the introduction of AIS, our betters have not been required to operate the Big Brother Broadcast Boxes, like us Mundane Mariners have. (I do have the authority to shut it off if I perceive it to be contributing to a threat to the vessel's safety)

But while having AIS off may have contributed to the confusion of heavy traffic maneuvering, it does necessarily mean that the vessels could not be tracked by other means, and effective collision avoidance accomplished.

They fucked up, the Navy craft in particular.
 
[h=1]Another US Navy Warship Crashes[/h]
Over the summer there were two accidental collisions involving the 7th fleet, and a total of 4 similar incidents this year... until today as yet another US Navy warship collided with a Japanese tug boat during exercises.

SputnikNews.com reports the incident occurred off the east coast of Japan. The boat was on its way to the port in Yokosuka, where the US Navy is stationed.


More at: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-11-18/another-us-navy-warship-crashes
 
The former commanding officer of the USS John S. McCain pleaded guilty Friday to dereliction of duty for a crash in 2017 that killed 10 sailors. Under the plea deal, Navy Cmdr. Alfredo Sanchez was issued a punitive letter of reprimand and was ordered to forfeit $6,000 in wages. Sanchez also agreed to submit a letter of resignation.

"I am ultimately responsible and stand accountable," he said during a court-martial. "I will forever question my decisions that contributed to this tragic event."

More at: https://www.upi.com/https:/www.upi....S-McCain-pleads-guilty-retires/1961527295948/
 
The former commanding officer of the USS John S. McCain pleaded guilty Friday to dereliction of duty for a crash in 2017 that killed 10 sailors. Under the plea deal, Navy Cmdr. Alfredo Sanchez was issued a punitive letter of reprimand and was ordered to forfeit $6,000 in wages. Sanchez also agreed to submit a letter of resignation.

"I am ultimately responsible and stand accountable," he said during a court-martial. "I will forever question my decisions that contributed to this tragic event."

More at: https://www.upi.com/https:/www.upi....S-McCain-pleads-guilty-retires/1961527295948/

"Damn it...I should have pursued a career in law enforcement instead!" - Cmdr. Alfredo Sanchez
 
Its unlucky isn't it? Naming the tub after a traitor, a POW, and career politician, then she's wrecked and patched up... Not only are there women aboard, but to be named McCain...

To be fair, it wasn't named after that McCain, it was named after his pappy and grandpappy.

"Damn it...I should have pursued a career in law enforcement instead!" - Cmdr. Alfredo Sanchez

Think positive instead:

"It's all good, now I can pursue my next career, in law enforcement" - Cmdr. Alfredo Sanchez
 
Boy howdy! I seem to have found that "basket of deplorables" that Killary was ranting about last year...

 
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