And for the gazillionth time I'm gonna list a few applicable fallacies you protectionist suffer from...
Statist Economic Fallacies: Breaking Through the Nonsense (Part I)
http://www.campaignforliberty.com/blog.php?view=41436
4. Tariffs that limit imports, and policies that encourage exports, are good ideas
The fallacy that government is a better judge of the most profitable modes of directing labor and capital than individuals is well illustrated by exporting policies. In the twentieth century, the federal government has sought to promote exports in various ways. The first was by forcing open foreign markets through a combination of diplomatic and military pressure, all the while keeping our own markets wholly or partially closed. The famous "open door" policy, formulated by Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 was never meant to be reciprocal (after all, he served in the McKinley administration, the most archly protectionist in American history), and it often required a gun boat and a contingent of hard charging marines to kick open the door.
A second method was export subsidies, which are still with us. The Export-Import Bank was established by Roosevelt in 1934 to provide cash grants, government-guaranteed loans, and cheap credit to exporters and their overseas customers. It remains today-untouched by "alleged" free market Republican administrations and congresses.
A third method was dollar devaluation, to cheapen the selling price of American goods abroad. In 1933, Roosevelt took the country off the gold standard and revalued it at $34.06, which represented a significant devaluation. The object was to allow for more domestic inflation and to boost exports, particularly agricultural ones, which failed; now Bush is trying it.
I'd just like to point out, FDR's agriculture policies caused the "soup lines" or "bread lines" we always hear so much about. He had 10 million acres of crops destroyed and 6 million farm animals killed in order to boost domestic food prices for producers. This raised the price of food. His subsidies to export made exporting the food more profitable than selling it domestically. The combination of the two led to food shortages. So, next time some liberal claims that stimulus and bailouts prevented "soup and bread lines", remind them those were the fault of FDR and bad economics. It doesn't even matter that stimulus and bailouts don't work (or work well), it's enough the Obama administration isn't as dull on economics as their Roosevelt predecessors. We simply don't have these "soup and bread lines" because no one is repeating FDR's mistakes, which caused them to begin with.
A fourth method, tried by the Reagan administration, was driving down farm prices to boost exports, thereby shrinking the trade deficit. The plan was that America would undersell its competitors, capture markets, and rake in foreign exchange. (When others do this it is denounced as unfair, as predatory trade.) What happened? Well, it turned out that the agricultural export market was rather elastic. Countries like Brazil and Argentina, depending on farm exports as one of their few sources of foreign exchange, which they desperately needed to service their debt loads, simply cut their prices to match the Americans. Plan fails.
But it got worse: American farmers had to sell larger quantities (at the lower prices) just to break even. Nevertheless, although the total volume of American agricultural exports increased, their real value (in constant dollars) fell - more work, lower profits. Furthermore, farmers had to import more oil and other producer goods to expand their production, which worsened the trade deficit. Then, there were the unforeseen and deleterious side-effects. Expanded cultivation and livestock-raising stressed out and degraded the quality of the soils, polluted watersheds, and lowered the nutritional value of the expanded crop of vegetables, grains, and animal proteins.
The author says "worsened" trade deficits, in italics, for a reason. Trade deficits are not negative, and the fact people think trade deficits are negative is itself a fallacy. We will cover this fallacy here, after we have finished with this part.
Finally, the policy of lower price/higher volume drove many small farmers, here and abroad, off the land, into the cities, and across the border, our border. Here is an economic policy that not only failed in its purpose but worsened the very problem it was intended to alleviate, and caused a nutritional, ecological, and demographic catastrophe.
I wished the author would have also italicized "problem", as to further drive home the point that trade deficits are not negative. So, let's address this fallacy now.
•The instinctive reaction of politicians is that if one country places a tariff barrier on our exports, we should respond by doing the same. However economic theory suggests that placing a tariff barrier on imports leads to a loss of economic welfare. It is better to not retaliate.
Time and time again, trade restrictions like tariffs have hurt our country's economy, not helped it.
The Embargo Act of 1807 and the subsequent Nonintercourse Acts were American laws restricting American ships from engaging in foreign trade between the years of 1807 and 1812. They led to the War of 1812 between the U.S. and Britain.
Despite its unpopular nature, the Embargo Act did have some limited, unintended benefits, especially as entrepreneurs and workers responded by bringing in fresh capital and labor into New England textile and other manufacturing industries, lessening America's reliance on the British merchants.[8] (Since the damage that was caused was so widespread and severe, you can liken this to 'stepping over dollars, to pick up pennies')
The Embargo was in fact hurting the United States as much as Britain or France. Britain, expected to suffer most from the American regulations, found consolation in the development of a South American market, and the British shipowners were pleased that American competition had been removed by the action of the U.S. government.
The attempt of Jefferson and Madison to resist aggression by peaceful means gained a belated success in June 1812 when Britain finally promised to repeal her Orders in Council. The British concession was too late, for by the time the news reached America the United States had already declared the War of 1812 against Britain.
The entire series of events was ridiculed in the press as Dambargo, Mob-Rage, Go-bar-'em or O-grab-me ('Embargo' spelled backward); there was a cartoon ridiculing the Act as a snapping turtle, named "O' grab me", grabbing at American shipping.
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act
The Tariff Act of 1930, otherwise known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff or Hawley-Smoot Tariff (P.L. 71-361)[1] was an act, sponsored by United States Senator Reed Smoot and Representative Willis C. Hawley, and signed into law on June 17, 1930, that raised U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to record levels.[2]
The overall level tariffs under the Tariff were the second-highest in US history, exceeded (by a small margin) only by the Tariff of 1828[3] and the ensuing retaliatory tariffs by U.S. trading partners reduced American exports and imports by more than half.
Some economists have opined that the tariffs contributed to the severity of the Great Depression.[4][5][6]
U.S. imports decreased 66% from US$4.4 billion (1929) to US$1.5 billion (1933), and exports decreased 61% from US$5.4 billion to US$2.1 billion, both decreases much more than the 50% decrease of the GDP. ( I want everyone to notice, we are in an era of a horrible economy with high unemployment and trade surpluses. In 1929, the trade surplus was $1 billion, this did not however translate to long term growth or more employment. In 1933, we ran a smaller trade surplus and had worsening effects, along with LESS TRADE OVERALL. Trade surpluses (foreign exchange deficits) are often regarded as good, but they have almost never translated into higher growth rates or low unemployment rates. The higher growth rates and lower unemployment rates are found in periods of high trade deficits (foreign exchange surpluses). The very way governments come up with trade numbers, and whether a nation has deficits or not, has been criticized as nearly erroneous, by free market economists from Frederic Bastiat to Don Boudreaux. Bastiat demonstrated that a government can record a deficit, even though a net profit was made by their citizen who was involved in the trade. This is counter intutitive, but deductively logical. The government numbers record the price at sale, not the resale value and profit made. When this profit is taken into account, then the only debt in the 'trade deficit' that is not covered by the foreign exchange surplus is government debt acrued by borrowing from foreigners. When people say "we need to do something about the trade deficit", I say "yes we do, we need to stop letting the government run in deficit and debt by borrowing money from foreigners". The common misconception is that unbalanced, or even unreciprocated, trade is bad for the economy. In fact, private sector trade is not debt, and is not bad for the economy at all. It's the debt the government runs up in the trade deficit that materializes as debt, and gives trade deficits a bad name. Private sector trade, good...Public Sector borrowing, bad. As you can see from the severely diminished trade numbers above, protectionism shrinks the economic pie, while free trade (or at least free-er trade) expands the total economic pie, benefiting everyone.)
According to government statistics, U.S. imports from Europe decreased from a 1929 high of $1,334 million to just $390 million during 1932, while U.S. exports to Europe decreased from $2,341 million in 1929 to $784 million in 1932. Overall, world trade decreased by some 66% between 1929 and 1934.[15]
Although the tariff act was passed after the stock-market crash of 1929, some economic historians consider the political discussion leading up to the passing of the act a factor in causing the crash, the recession that began in late 1929, or both, and its eventual passage a factor in deepening the Great Depression.[16] Unemployment was at 7.8% in 1930 when the Smoot-Hawley tariff was passed, but it jumped to 16.3% in 1931, 24.9% in 1932, and 25.1% in 1933.[17]
Imports during 1929 were only 4.2% of the United States' GNP and exports were only 5.0%. Monetarists such as Milton Friedman who emphasize the central role of the money supply in causing the depression, downplay the Smoot-Hawley's effect on the entire U.S. economy.[18]
I think it's fair to say the money supply was responsible for the deflation (too little money in circulation), and the tariffs were responsible for reduction in trade and GDP, overall.
I think it's pretty clear, interfering in the economy to spur exports or reduce imports only hurt the economy. Which, by chance, brings us to our next fallacy...
5. The fallacy of trade deficits
The 19th century economist and philosopher Frédéric Bastiat expressed the idea that trade deficits actually were a manifestation of profit, rather than a loss. He proposed as an example to suppose that he, a Frenchman, exported French wine and imported British coal, turning a profit. He supposed he was in France, and sent a cask of wine which was worth 50 francs to England. The customhouse would record an export of 50 francs. If, in England, the wine sold for 70 francs (or the pound equivalent), which he then used to buy coal, which he imported into France, and was found to be worth 90 francs in France, he would have made a profit of 40 francs. But the customhouse would say that the value of imports exceeded that of exports and was trade deficit against the ledger of France.[30]
In the above example, there is a single trader who is traveling and trading across national borders. The Frenchman owns a cask of wine worth 50 francs, and travels with it to England. France records an export of 50 francs, England an import of 50 francs.. In England, he sells his wine for 70 francs (or the pound equivalent) and buys 70 francs worth of English coal. He then leaves England for France with the 70 francs of coal, so that Enland records this as an export and France as an import. So, England has exported 20 francs more than it has imported, for a trade surplus of 20 francs. Meanwhile France imported 20 francs more than it exported, for a trade deficit of 20 francs. This is the last time the trade is recorded by either government, the entire reason why trade numbers are irrelevant in most cases to trade effects. Therefore, it's important to notice that the nation with the trade surplus (England) actually "lost money" on the trades, while the nation with the trade deficit (France) actually made all the profits. But the trade did not conclude with the importation of 70 francs of English coal by the Frenchman...he then sells it in his native France for 90 francs, without any government recording it as an import/export. This means the trader profited 40 francs overall (he turned 50 francs of wine into 90 francs), and yet his government calls it a 20 franc loss. The idea he lost money for himself, or for his nations GDP, is erroneous.
The idea trade surplus or deficit is directly tied to whether the trade is "balanced" or not, is fallacious. The trade deficit is exactly balanced by the foreign exchange surplus in the private sector. The trade surplus is exactly balanced by the foreign exchange deficit. Every product traded for currency is an investment in currency. Every trade of currency for a commodity is an investment in that commodity. There basically is no such thing as "balanced trade", because every trade is balanced by virtue of the fact they are voluntary, and because of the inverse relationship of trade and foreign exchange. Trade and foreign exchange are negatively correlated.
By reductio ad absurdum, Bastiat argued that the national trade deficit was an indicator of a successful economy, rather than a failing one. Bastiat predicted that a successful, growing economy would result in greater trade deficits, and an unsuccessful, shrinking economy would result in lower trade deficits. This was later, in the 20th century, affirmed by economist Milton Friedman.
Contrary to popular misconception, trade deficits are correlated with higher growth rates, lower unemployment, and wealthier periods. The opposite is true for trade surpluses. We should embrace trade deficits, if in fact we put any creedance in them at all.
NOTICE, I ADDRESS THE SMOOT-HAWLEY TARIFF ACT.