This is some inspired writing - very true.
This Republic was never meant to be a "polyglot boarding house for the world."
http://mises.org/etexts/mises/clash/preface.asp
The great problem here is: why should people always consult their long-run, as contrasted to their short-run, interests? Why is the long-run the "right understanding"? Ludwig von Mises, more than any economist of his day, has brought to the discipline the realization of the great and abiding importance of time preference in human action: the preference of achieving a given satisfaction now rather than later. In short, everyone prefers the shorter to the longer run, some to different degrees than others. How can Mises, as a utilitarian, say that a lower time preference for the present is "better" than a higher? In brief, some moral doctrine beyond utilitarianism is necessary to assert that people should consult their long-run over their short-run interests. This consideration becomes even more important when we consider those cases where government intervention confers great, not "small," gains on the privileged, and where retribution does not arrive for a very long time, so that the "temporary" in the above quote is a long time indeed.
This consideration becomes still more poignant in the noble and surprising essay, "The Freedom to Move as an International Problem," newly translated from a 1935 newspaper in Vienna. It is surprising because it presents a remarkably sharp attack on the immigration barriers erected by the United States and the British Dominions. For Mises trenchantly identifies these barriers as creating a ruling class elite, albeit a large one, in which workers in a particular geographical area with a high standard of living, use the State to keep immigrants from lower-wage areas out, thereby freezing the latter into a permanently lower wage. Mises correctly adds that, contrary to the Marxian myth of the international solidarity of the proletariat, it is the unions in the high living standard countries who have lobbied for the immigration restrictions. Mises is hard-hitting on the privileges conferred by immigration barriers: "The oft-referred-to 'miracle' of the high wages in the United States and Australia may be explained simply by the policy of trying to prevent a new immigration. For decades people have not dared to dis*cuss these things in Europe." Mises concludes his essay with an implicit justification of overcrowded Europe making war upon the restrictive countries: "This is a problem of the right of immigration into the largest and most productive lands.... Without the reestablishment of freedom of migration throughout the world, there can be no lasting peace."
Even here, Mises tries to show that, in the long run, the workers of the privileged countries are worse off from the immigration barriers, but it is clear that the "run" is so long and the intermediary advantages so substantial, that the utilitarian harmony of universal interests here breaks down.
http://mises.org/journals/jls/13_2/13_2_4.pdf
Like tariffs and exchange controls, migration barriers of whatever type are egregious violations of laissez-faire capitalism.
The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion. If no man may aggress against another, if, in short, everyone has the absolute right to be “free” from aggression, then this at once implies that the libertarian stands foursquare for what are generally known as “civil liberties”: the freedom to speak, publish, assemble, and to engage in . . . “victimless crimes.”
I shall contend that emigration, migration, and immigration all fall under the rubric of “victimless crime.” That is, not a one of these three per se violates the non-aggression axiom. Therefore, at least for the libertarian, no restrictions or prohibitions whatsoever should be placed in the path of these essentially peaceful activities.
Furthering this point and elucidating on the completely absurdity of immigration restriction advocates, but not migration restriction (Since we know the US is not homogenous):
A moment’s reflection will convince any disinterested party that immigration is not necessarily invasive. Immigration consists of no more than moving to a foreign country. For the purist libertarian, national boundaries are only lines on a map, demarcating one “country” from another; there is no such thing as a legitimate nation-state. According to Rothbard:
[T]here can be no such thing as an “international trade” problem. For nations might then possibly continue ascultural expressions, but not as economically meaningful units. Since there would be neither trade nor other barriers between nations nor currency differences, “international trade” would become a mere appendage to a general study of interspatial trade. It would not matter
whether the trade was within or outside a nation.
Therefore, immigration across national boundaries should be analyzed in an identical manner to that migration which takes place within a country. If it is non-invasive for Jones to change his locale from one place in Misesania to another in that country, then it cannot be invasive for him to move from Rothbardania to Misesania. Alternatively, if migration across international borders is somehow illegitimate, this should apply to the domestic variety as well. As long as the immigrant moves to a piece of private property whose owner is willing to take him in (maybe for a fee), there can be nothing untoward about such a transaction.
This, along with all other capitalist acts between consenting adults, must be considered valid in the libertarian world. Note that there is no freedom of movement of the person per se. This is always subject to the willingness of property owners in the host nation to accept the immigrant onto their land.
What is the basis of immigration restriction from Mexico if the people of Mexico apparently do not believe in liberty, nor do the people of Oregon, Massachussets, or Washington. Therefore, what is the basis that you can restrict migration from Mexico to Texas, but you cannot restrict migration from Oregon to Texas, if the result is the same? Are you then, not contradictory in nature? If you object to Mexicans moving into Texas or any other territory because they do not have the same value system, then you must also reject Oregonites (?) and Massachussetens (?) migrating to Texas. Why do I not hear any objection to Oregonites moving from Oregon to Texas?
