You said Madison's words only covered the 1st Amendment, yet trial by jury is covered by the 6th and 7th.
This is Madison's words...
Clearly Madison was trying to add protection to the States but the States rejected that. They didn't want the federal government meddling in their individual state governments. Just like how the states wouldn't have voted for a BOR's that would be imposed upon them.
Which is why state courts used the US Constitution to over turn state laws that conflicted with the B0R such as
http://www.guncite.com/court/state/1ga243.html
At May Term, 1846, of said Superior Court, the said bill of indictment came on to be tried before Judge Warren; when the plaintiff in error having been arraigned, and plead not guilty by his counsel, moved to quash the indictment on the following grounds:
1st. That the before-recited statute of the State of Georgia, assented to on the 25th of December, 1837, under which said indictment was found, is contrary to, and in violation of, the Constitution of the United States of America.
It is always with unfeigned reluctance that we approach a question involving the constitutionality of a state law. It is made our duty, however, (p.246)in the present case, and we should be unworthy of the exalted station we occupy, if we were to shrink from its performance.
There are certain fundamental principles appertaining to questions of this character, which should never be overlooked. I will state a few of them, and then proceed to examine the statutes in controversy.
It ought seldom or ever to be decided, in
a doubtful case, that a law is void for repugnance to the Constitution. And it is not on slight implications and vague conjectures that the Legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers. On the contrary, the opposition between the law and the Constitution should be such, that the judges feel a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other. The presumption is in favor of every legislative act, and the whole burden of proof lies on him who denies its constitutionality. These doctrines have been repeatedly advanced by the highest judicatory in the nation.--
See 6
Cranch, 128; 4
Wheaton, 625; 12
Ib. 436.
And the Constitution of the United States, in declaring that the right of the people to keep and bear arms, should not be infringed, only reiterated a truth announced a century before, in the act of 1689, "to extend and secure the rights and liberties of English subjects"--whether living 3,000 or 300 miles from the royal palace.
I am aware that it has been decided, that this, like other amendments adopted at the same time, is a restriction upon the government of the United States, and does not extend to the individual States. The court held otherwise, however, in the case of the
People vs. Goodwin, (18
John. Rep. 200) and Chief Justice Spencer, who delivered its opinion, says: "The defendant's counsel rely principally on the fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution of the
United States, which contains this provision: '
Nor, shall any person be subject, for the same offence, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.' It has been urged by the prisoner's counsel, that this constitutional provision operates upon State courts--
proprio vigore. This has been denied on the other side. I
am inclined to the opinion, that the article in question does extend
to all judicial tribunals, whether constituted by the Congress of the United States or the States individually. The provision is general in its nature and unrestricted in its terms; and the sixth article of the Constitution declares, that that Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not withstanding.
These general and comprehensive expressions extend the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, to every article which is not confined by the subject matter to the national government, and is equally applicable to the States. Be this as it may, the principle is undeniable, that no person can be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offence."
The language of the
second amendment is broad enough to embrace both Federal and State governments--nor is there anything in its terms which restricts its meaning. The preamble which was prefixed to these amendments shows, that they originated in the fear that the powers of the general government were not sufficiently limited. Several of the States, in their act of ratification, recommended that further restrictive clauses should be added. And in the first session of the first Congress,
ten of
these amendments having been agreed to by that body, and afterwards sanctioned by three-fourths of the States, became a part of the Constitution. But admitting all this, does it follow that because the people refused to delegate to the general government the power to take from them the right to keep and bear arms, that they designed to rest it in the State governments? Is this a right reserved to the
States or to
themselves? Is it not an inalienable right, which lies at the bottom of every free government? We do not believe that, because the people withheld this arbitrary power of disfranchisement from Congress, they ever intended to confer it on the local legislatures. This right is too dear to be confided to a republican legislature.
Questions under some of these amendments, it is true, can only arise under the laws and Constitution of the United States. But there are other provisions in them, which were never intended to be thus restricted, but were designed for the benefit of every citizen of the Union in all courts and in all places; and the people of the several States, in ratifying them in their respective State conventions, have virtually adopted them (p.251)as beacon-lights to guide and control the action of their own legislatures, as well as that of Congress. If a well-regulated militia is
necessary to the
security of the State of Georgia and of the United States, is it competent for the General Assembly to take away this security, by disarming the people? What advantage would it be to tie up the hands of the national legislature, if it were in the power of the
States to destroy this bulwark of defence? In solemnly affirming that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the
security of a
free State, and that, in order to train properly that militia, the unlimited right of the
people to
keep and
bear arms shall not be impaired, are not the sovereign people of the State committed by this pledge to preserve this right inviolate? Would they not be recreant to themselves, to free government, and false to their own vow, thus voluntarily taken, to suffer this right to be questioned? If they hesitate or falter, is it not to concede (themselves being judges) that the safety of the States is a matter of indifference?