Further, of the state, defined as "the ultimate authority to which in a given territory no recourse to a higher authority exists," Radnitzky states,
"that coercion is not a characteristic that is implied in its definition. If (per impossibile) the contract theory were a tenable theory, then the institution would not be coercive and yet qualify as a state." Certainly, one is free in one's definitions, but not all definitions are fruitful.
According to Radnitzky's definition, for instance, the founder-proprietor of a settlement - a gated community - would have to be considered a state, because he decides about membership (inclusion and exclusion) and is the ultimate authority in all settler-conflicts. However, the founder of a community does not exact taxes, but he collects fees, contributions or rents from his follow-settlers. And he does not pass laws (legislates) regarding the property of other, but all settler-property is from the outset subject to his ultimate jurisdiction.
Similarly, it is conceivable that all private land owners in a given territory transfer their land to one and the same person, for instance, in order to so establish the ultimate authority which according to Hobbes is necessary for peace. Thereby, they sink from the rank of an owner to that of a renter. Radnitzky would also term such a proprietor, established in this way, a state. But why? It is contrary to common terminology and hence confusing.
And which purpose would be served, to label something entirely different with the same name: namely an institution, which derives its status as ultimate authority neither from an act of original appropriation nor from a real estate transfer on the part of original appropriators? It is this difference in the genesis of the institution, that lets us speak of (coercive) taxes and tribute and of laws and legislation instead of voluntarily paid rents and accepted community standards and house rules. Why not, in accordance with conventional speech, reserve the term state exclusively for the former (compulsory) institution?
However, regarding this (compulsory) state, then, this must be kept in mind: that its institution is even then 'unjust', if (per impossible) it rested on unanimous agreement. Consensus does not guarantee truth. A state-agreement is invalid, because it contradicts the nature of things. At any given point in time (and absent any pre-stabilized harmony), a scarce good can only have one owner. Otherwise, contrary to the very purpose of norms, conflict is generated instead of avoided.
Yet multiple ownership regarding one and the same stock of goods is precisely what state-agreement implies. The consenting parties did not transfer all of their land to the state but consider themselves as free land owners (not renters). Yet at the same time they appoint the state as ultimate decision-maker concerning all territorial conflicts and thus make him the owner of all land. The price that must be paid for this 'unjust' - contrary to the nature of things - agreement is permanent conflict.
Conflict is not unavoidable but possible. However, it is nonsensical to consider the institution of a state as a solution to the problem of possible conflict, because it is precisely the institution of a state which first makes conflict unavoidable and permanent. ~ Hoppe,
Does the State Resolve or Create Conflict?
