Today's Federal tax on earned wages may violate our Constitution.

[Sonny Tufts]

And paid troll Tufts won't answer my question on why he's not serving his clients. His gig here must be better. Pitiful. lol

I don't do tax returns; that's what CPA's are for. I advise my clients ahead of time so they can enter into transactions with the most favorable tax outcome that's consistent with their other goals.

 

[Sonny Tufts]

A tax upon the national workforce is by definition a 'direct tax.'

Whose definition? Some crackpot tax protester (a redundant term)? It sure isn't the one the courts use or that the Framers had in mind.

 

[Sonny Tufts]

Pollock.

Guess again. Hylton dealt with a tax on carriages, considered a luxury at the time. Pollock dealt with an income tax, specifically a tax on investment income. Apples and oranges.

Mr. Justice Chase thought that the tax was a tax on expense, because a carriage was a consumable commodity, and in that view the tax on it was on the expense of the owner. He expressly declined to give an opinion as to what were the direct taxes contemplated by the constitution. Mr. Justice Paterson said: 'All taxes on expenses or consumption are indirect taxes. A tax on carriages is of this kind.' He quoted copiously from Adam Smith in support of his conclusions, although it is now asserted that the justices made small account of that writer. Mr. Justice Iredell said: 'There is no necessity, or propriety in determining what is or is not a direct or indirect tax in all cases. It is sufficient, on the present occasion, for the court to be satisfied that this is not a direct tax, contemplated by the constitution.'

What was decided in the Hylton Case was, then, that a tax on carriages was an excise, and therefore an indirect tax. Pollock, 158 U.S. at 626-627

Since carriages weren't involved in Pollock, there's no way the Court could have overruled Hylton, given the Pollock court's interpretation of the holding in the latter.

If anything, Pollock merely expanded the class of direct taxes (which in Hylton were assumed to be capitations and taxes on land) to include taxes on the income from real and personal property. But of course, Pollock's reasoning was later repudiated by the Court itself:

by the previous ruling [Brushaber], it was settled that the provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged, and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the income was derived -- that is, by testing the tax not by what it was, a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin or source of the income taxed. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916) (emphasis added)

 

[johnwk]

a tax upon a working person's earned wage takes the form of a direct tax

A tax upon the national workforce is by definition a 'direct tax.'

You are absolutely correct if you are referring to today's federal tax upon the sale of property which every wage earner has in their labor.

In fact, there is clear and convincing evidence found in the State ratification debates by our Founders which do articulate characteristics which distinguish a direct tax from one which is indirect.

As an advocate in adopting the Constitution, James Wilson (who was a prominent delegate to the Constitutional Convention) pointed out during Pennsylvania’s ratification debates that:

“In this Constitution, a power is given to Congress to collect imposts [an indirect type of tax], which is not given by the present Articles of Confederation. A very considerable part of the revenue of the United States will arise from that source; it is the easiest, most just, and most productive method of raising revenue; and it is a safe one, because it is voluntary. No man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and each buys in proportion only to his consumption." Elliots VOL II, page 467, Wilson


And this very characteristic identifying an indirect tax as a voluntary payment when buying articles of consumption, is again articulated, and more in depth during the Connecticut State Ratification debates by Oliver Ellsworth, who provides the following characteristics distinguishing a direct tax from one which is indirect.


January 7, 1788. [On this Power of Congress to lay Taxes.]

”Direct taxation can go but little way towards raising a revenue. To raise money in this way, people must be provident; they must constantly be laying up money to answer the demands of the collector. But you cannot make people thus provident. If you would do any thing to the purpose, you must come in when they are spending, and take a part with them. This does not take away the tools of a man’s business, or the necessary utensils of his family: it only comes in when he is taking his pleasure, and feels generous; when he is laying out a shilling for superfluities, it takes twopence of it for public use, and the remainder will do him as much good as the whole.”

Ellsworth goes on to note:

“The experiments, which have been made in our own country, show the productive nature of indirect taxes. The imports into the United States amount to a very large sum. They never will be less, but will continue to increase for centuries to come. As the population of our country increases, the imports will necessarily increase. They will increase, because our citizens will choose to be farmers; living independently on their freeholds, rather than to be manufacturers, and work for a groat a day.”

”On the other hand, direct taxes are not voluntary, nor, in general, are they avoidable. And with respect to direct taxes, the anti-federalist minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania warned that direct taxation “…is a tax that, however oppressive in its nature, and unequal in its operation, is certain as to its produce and simple in its collection; it cannot be evaded like the objects of imposts or excise …” ___ See Connecticut ratification debates Elliot’s VOL II, page 191, Ellsworth

So, a few characteristics which define an indirect tax are, it is voluntarily paid during the taxpayer’s consumption, and safe because no man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and such a tax are costs added by government to things which individuals are free to acquired or reject, while direct taxes are those which are assessed to the individual by government, are oppressive, and not avoidable.

The bottom line is today's federal tax, upon the wage a laboring class person earns when selling the property each has in their labor, takes the form of a direct tax as understood by our Founders and is entitled to the protection of apportionment.


JWK


The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its framers and the people who adopted it._____HOME BLDG. & LOAN ASSOCIATION v. BLAISDELL, 290 U.S. 398 (1934)

 

[Weston White]

Whose definition? Some crackpot tax protester (a redundant term)? It sure isn't the one the courts use or that the Framers had in mind.

The definitions of early legal dictionaries, scholarly economists, and jurists, see: 'capitation' and 'personalty' taxes. False ideologies, like yours, are why such matters were debated so vigorously throughout the Federalist debates, being seriously concerning to the unsettled masses. For example, just because some dickheaded, cocksucking, asshole, motherfucker name Anthony Stephen Fauci (who neither is nor possesses the certifications of a scientist, microbiologist, chemist, virologist, infectiologist, epidemiologist, or immunologist, but who is only a general MD practitioner that has never actually practiced on his own patients, despite all of his crazy and medically baseless experimenting he's authorized or performed on his unwitting victims) and William Henry Gates III (a college dropout, who is a seriously misguided technocratic eugenicist, a lying, punk-ass, dweeb that defrauded and stole the achievements of others in order to peddle his shitty Windows software, mostly on the backs of hardworking taxpayers through government contracted purchases) conspired one day to conveniently redefine was a medical vaccination is, does not factually alter the empirical definition of what is a vaccine.

No, people can protest taxes for many, many reasons, in-fact for as many reasons as there are classes and types of taxes; in doing so does not establish them as being a "crackpot." The Legislature has even recognized this, for example, in their ratification of the RFRA, i.e., 42 U.S. Code § 2000bb–3.

The matter of taxing individual pay has remained one of the most contentious issues throughout the last century, so much so that the IRS constantly either demands or begs of Congress to amend or implement new statutes to deter, to instill fear upon, the mass of taxpayers to overwhelm them from so much as doubting anything outside of what the IRS preaches to them upon each passing tax season. ...And yet SCOTUS to date, has steadfastly avoided granting certiorari to all such tax cases even though such cases meet the necessary requisites for their review and of which have numbered in scores upon scores of over the decades...which is especially worrisome being that the reality is that SCOTUS has heard and reheard other tax matters over and over and over throughout the centuries, and many of those cases subject-matter that the the Court had agreed to review were plain ludicrous, obviously misguided, or otherwise flagrant or illogical in premise, e.g., federal judge salaries' were wholly exempt from income taxation until 1939 (O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277 (1939); or even the findings in Pollock, i.e., that because the source of the tax was constitutionally exempted from direct taxation so also was the gains and profits realized from those sources.)

(Honestly, I am of the belief that SCOTUS dares not touch the taxing of wages issue for they know that they will be massively buried by nation wide amicus curiaes from every side of the debate, so much so that it will take their staff years and years to summarize them all--that is aside from the fact that they are likely very aware of the truth about income taxes laws being grossly misapplied, along with the incessant abuses being committed by the IRS and state taxing boards, and that the current taxing system is necessary to the continued financial interests of the Federal Reserve ponzi-scheme.)

 

[Weston White]

Guess again. Hylton dealt with a tax on carriages, considered a luxury at the time. Pollock dealt with an income tax, specifically a tax on investment income. Apples and oranges.

I will defer to the CRS' determination on the matter over yours.

Senate Document # 108-17, 108th Congress, Second Session, "Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decision," in The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002, at page 2388, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, U.S. Gov't Printing Office (2004).

28. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust
Co. 158 U.S. 601 (1895)

Hylton v. United States 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
171 (1796)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylton_v._United_States#cite_note-7

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-12.pdf

Since carriages weren't involved in Pollock, there's no way the Court could have overruled Hylton, given the Pollock court's interpretation of the holding in the latter.

But a direct tax upon property was at issue in both of them. So, apples to apples actually.

If anything, Pollock merely expanded the class of direct taxes (which in Hylton were assumed to be capitations and taxes on land) to include taxes on the income from real and personal property. But of course, Pollock's reasoning was later repudiated by the Court itself:

And capitation taxes also pertain to taxing of persons, along with their abilities and efforts, such as their occupation, trade, subsistence, or livelihood...As are personalty taxes.


Apropos, lest we not overlook that there is an established legal distinction between what are 'salaries,' which pertain to the (generally annualized pay without consideration to overtime pay) of public officers, professional employments and services, and such employments that require the performance of official duties or professional knowledge and skills and 'wages' which are merely the (generally hourly) compensation rendered for the performance of menial or mechanical labor. Hence, salaries are paid only to those employed to render services of a particular kind (such as a Mr. Earl or governmental official) and that are above the grade of general laboring (such as Joe the Plumber.)

 

[Sonny Tufts]

No, people can protest taxes for many, many reasons, in-fact for as many reasons as there are classes and types of taxes; in doing so does not establish them as being a "crackpot." The Legislature has even recognized this, for example, in their ratification of the RFRA, i.e., 42 U.S. Code § 2000bb–3.

But if their reasons are idiotic, imbecilic, devoid of any legal support, and have been consistently rejected by every court that has had to waste its time listening to them, they are crackpot. Congress has even recognized this in its passage of the penalty for frivolous tax submissions -- Section 6702 of the Code.

The matter of taxing individual pay has remained one of the most contentious issues throughout the last century

Not at all. The validity of an unapportioned tax on pay-for-work has been definitively decided since the 1881 Springer case. The sole exception dealt with the pay for state and local employees, which the Court originally held to be beyond Congress' power to tax but which the Court later held to be taxable just like the pay of nongovernmental workers.

A nondiscriminatory tax laid on their [state employees] net income, in common with that of all other members of the Community, could by no reasonable probability be considered to preclude the performance of the function which New York and New Jersey have undertaken, or to obstruct it more than like private enterprises are obstructed by our taxing system. Even though, to some unascertainable extent, the tax deprives the states of the advantage of paying less than the standard rate for the services which they engage, it does not curtail any of those functions which have been thought hitherto to be essential to their continued existence as states. At most it may be said to increase somewhat the cost of the state governments because, in an interdependent economic society, the taxation of income tends to raise (to some extent which economists are not able to measure…) the price of labor and materials. The effect of the immunity if allowed would be to relieve respondents of their duty of financial support to the national government, in order to secure to the state a theoretical advantage so speculative in its character and measurement as to be unsubstantial. A tax immunity devised for protection of the states as governmental entities cannot be pressed so far. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 US 405, 420–421 (1938).

And capitation taxes also pertain to taxing of persons, along with their abilities and efforts, such as their occupation, trade, subsistence, or livelihood.....As are personalty taxes.

Apropos, lest we not overlook that there is an established legal distinction between what are 'salaries,' which pertain to the (generally annualized pay without consideration to overtime pay) of public officers, professional employments and services, and such employments that require the performance of official duties or professional knowledge and skills and 'wages' which are merely the (generally hourly) compensation rendered for the performance of menial or mechanical labor. Hence, salaries are paid only to those employed to render services of a particular kind (such as a Mr. Earl or governmental official) and that are above the grade of general laboring (such as Joe the Plumber.)

The claim that a tax on pay-for-work is a capitation was rejected in Springer. A capitation is a tax that is imposed upon people without regard for "their abilities and efforts, such as their occupation, trade, subsistence, or livelihood".

There is no distinction in tax law between salaries and wages in terms of inclusion in gross income. As SCOTUS once put it, "[The tax code] is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected.” C.I.R. v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).

 

[johnwk]

There is a fatal flaw in Springer v. United States regarding meaning of direct tax

The claim that a tax on pay-for-work is a capitation was rejected in Springer. A capitation is a tax that is imposed upon people without regard for "their abilities and efforts, such as their occupation, trade, subsistence, or livelihood".

There is a fatal flaw in citing Springer as confirmation that a tax on income, including a working person’s earned wage, could not have been considered a direct tax by our Founders, and thus requiring apportionment. The fatal flaw is found in Justice Swayne's own words who delivered the written opinion. He states:


"The very elaborate researches of the plaintiff in error have furnished us with nothing from the debates of the State conventions, by whom the Constitution was adopted, which gives us any aid. Hence we may safely assume that no such material exists in that direction . . . "


Well, the assumption was wrong! In fact, there is evidence in the State ratification debates which do articulate characteristics which distinguish a direct tax from one which is indirect.

As an advocate in adopting the Constitution, James Wilson (who was a prominent delegate to the Constitutional Convention) pointed out during Pennsylvania’s ratification debates that:

“In this Constitution, a power is given to Congress to collect imposts [an indirect type of tax], which is not given by the present Articles of Confederation. A very considerable part of the revenue of the United States will arise from that source; it is the easiest, most just, and most productive method of raising revenue; and it is a safe one, because it is voluntary. No man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and each buys in proportion only to his consumption." Elliots VOL II, page 467, Wilson


And this very characteristic identifying an indirect tax as a voluntary payment when buying articles of consumption, is again articulated, and more in depth during the Connecticut State Ratification debates by Oliver Ellsworth, who provides the following characteristics distinguishing a direct tax from one which is indirect.


January 7, 1788. [On this Power of Congress to lay Taxes.]

”Direct taxation can go but little way towards raising a revenue. To raise money in this way, people must be provident; they must constantly be laying up money to answer the demands of the collector. But you cannot make people thus provident. If you would do any thing to the purpose, you must come in when they are spending, and take a part with them. This does not take away the tools of a man’s business, or the necessary utensils of his family: it only comes in when he is taking his pleasure, and feels generous; when he is laying out a shilling for superfluities, it takes twopence of it for public use, and the remainder will do him as much good as the whole.”

Ellsworth goes on to note:

“The experiments, which have been made in our own country, show the productive nature of indirect taxes. The imports into the United States amount to a very large sum. They never will be less, but will continue to increase for centuries to come. As the population of our country increases, the imports will necessarily increase. They will increase, because our citizens will choose to be farmers; living independently on their freeholds, rather than to be manufacturers, and work for a groat a day.”

”On the other hand, direct taxes are not voluntary, nor, in general, are they avoidable. And with respect to direct taxes, the anti-federalist minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania warned that direct taxation “…is a tax that, however oppressive in its nature, and unequal in its operation, is certain as to its produce and simple in its collection; it cannot be evaded like the objects of imposts or excise …” ___ See Connecticut ratification debates Elliot’s VOL II, page 191, Ellsworth

So, a few characteristics which define an indirect tax are, it is voluntarily paid during the taxpayer’s consumption, and safe because no man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and such a tax are costs added by government to things which individuals are free to acquired or reject, while direct taxes are those which are assessed to the individual by government, are oppressive, and not avoidable.

The bottom line is, those who assert a tax on a working person’s earned wages is not a direct tax, which requires apportionment, ignore the very words of those who framed our Constitution and participated in its ratification debates.

JWK


Those who reject abiding by the text of our Constitution, and the intentions and beliefs under which it was agree to, as documented from historical records ___ its framing and ratification debates which give context to its text ___ wish to remove the anchor and rudder of our constitutional system so they may then be free to “interpret” the Constitution to mean whatever they wish it to mean.

 

[Weston White]

But if their reasons are idiotic, imbecilic, devoid of any legal support, and have been consistently rejected by every court that has had to waste its time listening to them, they are crackpot. Congress has even recognized this in its passage of the penalty for frivolous tax submissions -- Section 6702 of the Code.

True to a point, but that is certainly not the case here. And the courts don't have to waste their time (they get paid either way) hearing such (frivolous) arguments, because they are summarily dismissed.

Not at all. The validity of an unapportioned tax on pay-for-work has been definitively decided since the 1881 Springer case. The sole exception dealt with the pay for state and local employees, which the Court originally held to be beyond Congress' power to tax but which the Court later held to be taxable just like the pay of nongovernmental workers.

We’re back to Springer again, seriously?

Again, Springer was subsequently narrowed by Pollock. Mr. Springer, a very wealthy attorney, was in Congress during that period. He was justifiably taxable under federal income taxation. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_McKendree_Springer

Besides being very limited in its scope of subject-matter, Springer was a poorly prepared, poorly argued income tax case that preceded the 16th Amend. Little debate on the matter is provided within this case as it would pertain to indirectly taxing the remuneration or pay of laborers, unlike in Pollock.

In fact Springer acknowledged: “It will thus be seen that whenever the government has imposed a tax which it recognized as a direct tax, it has never been applied to any objects but real estate and slaves.” Moreover, referenced throughout the case was that ‘capitations’ had always been considered as being direct taxes, which such direct forms of taxation provides for charges “directly” and unavoidably upon persons in consideration of their labor, occupation, and the like. In essence: “The substance, and not the shadow, determines the validity of the exercise of the power.” (Pollock) So, this case does not support your claims.

Also, to consider respectively is that the income tax is similar to Ancient Rome’s tradition known as ‘tributum,’ i.e., a tax imposed on the citizenry to fund the costs of war; as also their direct poll tax or ‘tributum capitis.’

In Springer there was zero mention of any of the following terms: wage, labor, earning or earn, work, employed, occupation, and so on. And syntactically, “income, gains, and profits” (which is referenced about a dozen times) is guided by the legal principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ (i.e., the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other.) Hence, income as meant under taxing statutes, pertains to income that came into being as a gain or profit; and it doesn't take a rocket scientist to realize that wages brought about through general laboring cannot be construed or misnomered as a gain or profit, even if one desires to refer to their wages as income.

So no, try again, within the breadth of our Constitution "incomes" is not equatable to mere wage payments.

The claim that a tax on pay-for-work is a capitation was rejected in Springer. A capitation is a tax that is imposed upon people without regard for "their abilities and efforts, such as their occupation, trade, subsistence, or livelihood".

No, that is not what was stated in Spinger; more over that was not an issue that was before the Court in that case, so regardless, the Court lacked the legal jurisdiction to decide on it as a matter of law.

No, you have that backwards guy--that is the definition of a 'poll tax', what you described is in fact, a capitation tax, also referenced as a 'personalty' or 'personal tax.'

There is no distinction in tax law between salaries and wages in terms of inclusion in gross income. As SCOTUS once put it, "[The tax code] is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected.” C.I.R. v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).

Firstly, 26 USC taxes income only that's been derived from various sources, including salaries and wages; however, it's not taxing the mere return of one's capital, such as laboring in a contractual exchange for wages--it has to be 'income' prior to becoming taxable and the receipt of wages in and of itself is not income as meant by the 16th Amend.

Lastly, yes there is a distinction, the information in my earlier post is from Black's Law, which it cites to about a dozen cases in its definition. Moreover, 'incomes' within the 16th Amend. maintains an established "constitutional sense" based definition as it relates to preceding case law and legislation. While Title 26 exists under the legal principle of in 'pari materia,' and thus, 26 USC § 61 does not mean what it appears to prima facie state (which is also why 26 USC will forever remain as non-positive law--amended statues as they exist today clash and conflict horribly with the still relevant earlier statutes.)

 

[Sonny Tufts]

As an advocate in adopting the Constitution, James Wilson (who was a prominent delegate to the Constitutional Convention) pointed out during Pennsylvania’s ratification debates that:

“In this Constitution, a power is given to Congress to collect imposts [an indirect type of tax], which is not given by the present Articles of Confederation. A very considerable part of the revenue of the United States will arise from that source; it is the easiest, most just, and most productive method of raising revenue; and it is a safe one, because it is voluntary. No man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and each buys in proportion only to his consumption." Elliots VOL II, page 467, Wilson


And this very characteristic identifying an indirect tax as a voluntary payment when buying articles of consumption

The quote does not define all indirect taxes. It simply refers to imposts as the anticipated type of tax that will raise the most revenue. In no way does it deal with duties or excises, nor does it attempt to distinguish indirect taxes from direct taxes.

I've previously pointed out to you that Ellsworth didn't speak for all of the Founders, so your continuing to quote him as if he did is pointless.

 

[Sonny Tufts]

Besides being very limited in its scope of subject-matter, Springer was a poorly prepared, poorly argued income tax case that preceded the 16th Amend. Little debate on the matter is provided within this case as it would pertain to indirectly taxing the remuneration or pay of laborers, unlike in Pollock.

How in the world do you know the case was poorly prepared and argued? Here's how Justice Harlan described it in his dissent in Pollock:

Springer was assessed for an income tax on his professional earnings and on the interest on United States bonds. He declined to pay. His real estate was sold in consequence. The suit involved the validity of the tax as a basis for the sale. Again every question now presented was urged upon this court. The brief of the plaintiff in error, Springer, made the most copious references to the economic writers, Continental and English. It cited the opinions of the framers of the Constitution. It contained extracts from the journals of the convention, and marshalled the authorities in extensive and impressive array. It reiterated the argument against the validity of an income tax which included rentals. It is also asserted that the Hylton case was not authority, because the expressions of the judges in regard to anything except the carriage tax were mere dicta.

The court adhered to the ruling announced in the previous cases and held that the tax was not direct within the meaning of the Constitution. It reexamined and answered everything advanced here, and said, in summing up the case:

"Our conclusions are that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate, and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complained is within the category of an excise or duty."

The facts, then, are briefly these: at the very birth of the government, a contention arose as to the meaning of the word "direct." The controversy was determined by the legislative and executive departments of the government. Their action came to this court for review, and it was approved. Every judge of this court who expressed an opinion made use of language which clearly showed that he thought the word "direct" in the Constitution applied only to capitation taxes and taxes directly on land. Thereafter, the construction thus given was accepted everywhere as definitive. The matter came again and again to this court, and, in every case, the original ruling was adhered to. The suggestions made in the Hylton case were adopted here, and, in the last case here decided, reviewing all the others, this court said that direct taxes within the meaning of the Constitution were only taxes on land and capitation taxes.

In Springer there was zero mention of any of the following terms: wage, labor, earning or earn, work, employed, occupation, and so on. And syntactically, “income, gains, and profits” (which is referenced about a dozen times) is guided by the legal principle of ‘ejusdem generis’ (i.e., the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other.) Hence, income as meant under taxing statutes, pertains to income that came into being as a gain or profit; and it doesn't take a rocket scientist to realize that wages brought about through general laboring cannot be construed or misnomered as a gain or profit, even if one desires to refer to their wages as income.

There didn't have to be a discussion of these terms for the simple fact that Springer wasn't stupid enough to argue that neither his bond interest nor his revenue from his law practice wasn't income. To the contrary, at the trial he asked the judge to instruct the jury that "the tax on the income, gains, and profits of the defendant, assessed upon him, as appears by the evidence in this case, was a direct tax". His main argument was that a tax on his income was a direct tax, and the Court viewed the matter in the same way: "The central and controlling question in this case is whether the tax which was levied on the income, gains, and profits of the plaintiff in error, as set forth in the record, and by pretended virtue of the acts of Congress and parts of acts therein mentioned, is a direct tax."

The rationale of Springer is simple: the only direct taxes under the Constitution are capitations and taxes on land. The income tax is neither of these but is in the nature of an excise or duty. That's it.

Now if you want to continue to make the imbecilic argument that wages aren't income, have at it. But it's probably the most brain-dead, consistently-rejected argument there is, and people who make it in court frequently get fined for doing so. On a scale of 0 to 10 with 10 being the best argument and zero the worst, the claim that the earth is flat is probably .5, while yours is at zero only because the scale doesn't extend into negative numbers.

Consider these statements by the United States Supreme Court:

“[T]he earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided by capital ... are commonly dealt with as income in legislation.” Stratton’s Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913).

“There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them....” Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114 (1930).

“[The tax code] is broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected.” C.I.R. v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945).

“Wages usually are income ....” Central Illinois Public Serv. Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 21, 25 (1978).

“[T]he premise that personal injury awards cannot involve gain is obviously false, since they often are intended in significant part to compensate for the loss of gain, e. g., lost wages. (Citation omitted.) Since the gain would have been income, surely at least that part of a personal injury award that replaces it must also be income.”
Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 375 (1987), (plurality opinion of Justice Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, White, and Stevens, Blackmun concurring in the result; footnote omitted).

“The definition of gross income under the Internal Revenue Code sweeps broadly. Section 61(a), 26 U.S.C. 61(a), provides that ‘gross income means all income from whatever source derived,’ subject only to the exclusions specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Code. As this Court has recognized, Congress intended, through 61(a) and its statutory precursors, to exert ‘the full measure of its taxing power,’ [citation omitted] and to bring within the definition of income any ‘accessio[n] to wealth.’ [citation omitted] There is no dispute that the settlement awards in this case [for ‘back wages’ to compensate for sex discrimination] would constitute gross income within the reach of 61(a).” United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 233 (1992). Later in the same opinion, the Supreme Court referred to the compensation received by the taxpayers as “the wages properly due them - wages that, if paid in the ordinary course, would have been fully taxable.” 504 U.S. at 241.

“It [I.R.C. section 104, relating to compensation for personal injuries] also excludes from taxation those damages that substitute, say, for lost wages, which would have been taxed had the victim earned them.” O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996).

“Even if we suppose that strike benefits are made to compensate in a sense for the loss of wages, the principle of payments in compensation does not apply because the thing compensated for, the wages, had they been received, would have been included in gross income.” United States v. Kaiser, 363 U.S. 299, 311 (1960).

“It was therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of Cheek’ s understanding that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income, as incredible as such misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be.” Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 204 (1991), (emphasis added).

Then there are the decisions of the Circuit Courts:

“Every court which has ever considered the issue has unequivocally rejected the argument that wages are not income.” United States v. Connor, 898 F.2d 942, 943-944 (3rd Cir. 1990).

“In our view, petitioner’s wages are taxable as gross income...” Beard v. Commissioner, 793 F.2d 139, 140 (6th Cir. 1986), aff’g 82 T.C. 766 (1984);

“Wages are taxable income,” and arguments to the contrary are ‘“patently frivolous.’” Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 746 F. 2d 1187, 1188 (6th Cir. 1984), affg. T.C. Memo. 1983-474; ; Beerbower v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 787 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1986).

“Wages are income, and the tax on wages is constitutional.” Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986), citing United States v. Thomas, 788 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1986); Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1984); Granzow v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1984);

“Although not raised in his brief on appeal, the defendant’s entire case at trial rested on his claim that he in good faith believed that wages are not income for taxation purposes. Whatever his mental state, he, of course, was wrong, as all of us are already aware. Nontheless, the defendant still insists that no case holds that wages are income. Let us now put that to rest: WAGES ARE INCOME. Any reading of tax cases by would-be tax protesters now should preclude a claim of good-faith belief that wages--or salaries--are not taxable.” United States v. Koliboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984), (emphasis in original; convictions for criminal failures to file affirmed).

“[W]e have [repeatedly] held that wages are within the definition of income under the Internal Revenue Code and the Sixteenth Amendment, and are subject to taxation.”
Denison v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 241, 242 (8th Cir.1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1069, 105 S.Ct. 2149, 85 L.Ed.2d 505 (1985); United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1193 (1994).

“Furthermore, § 61(a) of the Code defines gross income as ‘all income from whatever source derived, including . . . compensation for services.’ In sum, the sixteenth amendment authorizes the imposition of a tax upon income without apportionment among the states, and under the statute, the term ‘income’ includes the compensation a taxpayer receives in return for services rendered. Taxpayers’ argument that wages received for services are not taxable as income is clearly frivolous.” Funk v. Commissioner, 687 F.2d 264, 265 (8th Cir. 1982), affirming T.C. Memo. 1981-506.

“Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on income, and under the Tax Code, wages are income.” Grimes v. Commissioner, 806 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir. 1986).

“Compensation for labor or services, paid in the form of wages or salary, has been universally held by the courts of this republic to be income, subject to the income tax laws currently applicable.” United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1981).

“Irrefutably, wages earned in compensation for services are “income” pursuant to the federal tax laws.” Boubel v. United States, 86 AFTR2d ¸2000-5123, No. 1:99-cv-380 (U.S.D.C. E.D.Tenn. 6/22/2000).

“f anything in our tax law is clear, it is that: ‘WAGES ARE INCOME.’ ... [A]ny contention to the contrary is patently frivolous....” Hill v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 118, 120-22 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), (emphasis in original), (quoting United States v. Koliboski, 732 F.2d 1328, 1329 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984)).

“As the cited cases, as well as many others, have made abundantly clear, the following arguments alluded to by the Lonsdales are completely lacking in legal merit and patently frivolous: ... (5) wages are not income....” Lonsdale v. United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990).

“[P]laintiff’s claim that wages are not subject to taxation has been so soundly rejected that plaintiff has risked the imposition of sanctions by raising this argument at all.” Fuselier v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 8 (2004).

“[W]ages are indeed income subject to taxation.” Hamzik v. United States, 92 AFTR 2d 2003-5743, KTC 2003-497 (Fed.Cls. 2003).

“No reasonable person could seriously think that, for example, the revenue laws can be avoided, and the government’s tax collection efforts can be brought to a standstill by the contention that wages are not income.” Peth v. Breitzmann, 611 F. Supp. 50, 56 (E.D.Wis. 1985), 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21509, 85-1 U.S.T.C. ¶9321, 55 AFTR2d 1280 (complaints dismissed and sanctions imposed for filing frivolous actions “brought in bad faith”).

http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html#wagesincome

 

[johnwk]

The quote does not define all indirect taxes. It simply refers to imposts as the anticipated type of tax that will raise the most revenue. In no way does it deal with duties or excises, nor does it attempt to distinguish indirect taxes from direct taxes.

I've previously pointed out to you that Ellsworth didn't speak for all of the Founders, so your continuing to quote him as if he did is pointless.

What you edited out of my post in order to misrepresent the truth and facts are HERE.

The truth cannot be changed to what it is not, Sonny.

 

[Sonny Tufts]

The truth cannot be changed to what it is not, Sonny.

Indeed it can't. And the truth you refuse to face is that from the very beginning (i.e., the Hylton case, three of whose justices were involved in constitutional and ratification conventions) SCOTUS and every other court in the country have interpreted the Direct Tax Clause very narrowly, confining it to capitations, taxes on land, and (in Pollock) taxes on the mere ownership of property. Your cherry-picked quotes don't reflect the understanding of all of the people involved in the writing and ratification of the Constitution, and they certainly aren't the law.

 

[johnwk]

What is, and what is not a direct tax within the meaning of our Constitution?

Indeed it can't. And the truth you refuse to face is that from the very beginning (i.e., the Hylton case, three of whose justices were involved in constitutional and ratification conventions) SCOTUS and every other court in the country have interpreted the Direct Tax Clause very narrowly, confining it to capitations, taxes on land, and (in Pollock) taxes on the mere ownership of property. Your cherry-picked quotes don't reflect the understanding of all of the people involved in the writing and ratification of the Constitution, and they certainly aren't the law.

Why do you "cherry-pick" Supreme Court cases occurring after the Constitution's ratification, rather than what was articulated by our Founders prior to and during the Constitution's ratification debates?

For example, and with regard to the meaning of a direct tax, as an advocate in adopting the Constitution, James Wilson (who was a prominent delegate to the Constitutional Convention) pointed out during Pennsylvania’s ratification debates that:

“In this Constitution, a power is given to Congress to collect imposts [an indirect type of tax], which is not given by the present Articles of Confederation. A very considerable part of the revenue of the United States will arise from that source; it is the easiest, most just, and most productive method of raising revenue; and it is a safe one, because it is voluntary. No man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and each buys in proportion only to his consumption." Elliots VOL II, page 467, Wilson


And this very characteristic identifying an indirect tax as a voluntary payment when buying articles of consumption, is again articulated, and more in depth during the Connecticut State Ratification debates by Oliver Ellsworth, who provides the following characteristics distinguishing a direct tax from one which is indirect.


January 7, 1788. [On this Power of Congress to lay Taxes.]

”Direct taxation can go but little way towards raising a revenue. To raise money in this way, people must be provident; they must constantly be laying up money to answer the demands of the collector. But you cannot make people thus provident. If you would do any thing to the purpose, you must come in when they are spending, and take a part with them. This does not take away the tools of a man’s business, or the necessary utensils of his family: it only comes in when he is taking his pleasure, and feels generous; when he is laying out a shilling for superfluities, it takes twopence of it for public use, and the remainder will do him as much good as the whole.”

Ellsworth goes on to note:

“The experiments, which have been made in our own country, show the productive nature of indirect taxes. The imports into the United States amount to a very large sum. They never will be less, but will continue to increase for centuries to come. As the population of our country increases, the imports will necessarily increase. They will increase, because our citizens will choose to be farmers; living independently on their freeholds, rather than to be manufacturers, and work for a groat a day.”

”On the other hand, direct taxes are not voluntary, nor, in general, are they avoidable. And with respect to direct taxes, the anti-federalist minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania warned that direct taxation “…is a tax that, however oppressive in its nature, and unequal in its operation, is certain as to its produce and simple in its collection; it cannot be evaded like the objects of imposts or excise …” ___ See Connecticut ratification debates Elliot’s VOL II, page 191, Ellsworth

So, a few characteristics which define an indirect tax are, it is voluntarily paid during the taxpayer’s consumption, and safe because no man is obliged to consume more than he pleases, and such a tax are costs added by government to things which individuals are free to acquired or reject, while direct taxes are those which are assessed to the individual by government, are oppressive, and not avoidable.

The bottom line is, those who assert a tax on a working person’s earned wages is not a direct tax, which requires apportionment, ignore the very words articulated during the framing and ratification debates identifying a direct tax.



The question is, why are there so many who pretend that the bread which working people earn when selling the property each has in their own labor, when taxed, is not a direct tax and requires an apportionment?

.

 

[Weston White]

A capitation is a tax that is imposed upon people without regard for "their abilities and efforts, such as their occupation, trade, subsistence, or livelihood".

BTW, your earlier stated quotation is incorrect and it’s dicta at best—from Hylton not Springer. Chase’s assertions are incorrect, in that capitations are not synonymous to poll taxes, albeit they are part of the same species of direct taxation, as it were:

“I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND. I doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal property, within the United States, is included within the term direct tax.”

How in the world do you know the case was poorly prepared and argued?

It is apparent from a reading of the SCOTUS case; the Court itself for the most part quoted from the Constitution and made a few references to the Constitutional convention. And more to the point:

The plaintiff in error advises us by his elaborate brief "that on the trial of the case below the proceedings were merely formal," and that "no arguments or briefs were submitted, and only such proceedings were had as were necessary to prepare the case for the Supreme Court."
…
Several other minor points have been earnestly argued by the learned plaintiff in error, but as they are all within the category of not having been taken in the court below, we need not more particularly advert to them.
. . .
The very elaborate researches of the plaintiff in error have furnished us with nothing from the debates of the state conventions, by whom the Constitution was adopted, which gives us any aid. Hence we may safely assume that no such material exists in that direction…

There didn't have to be a discussion of these terms for the simple fact that Springer wasn't stupid enough to argue that neither his bond interest nor his revenue from his law practice wasn't income.

Well, that there didn’t need to be a discussion of those terms was precisely my point, as it was not a matter before the Court to decide upon due to Springer’s professional associations and federal nexus (as an elected official.) And as to your quoting of dissenting opinion in Pollock:

“Springer was assessed for an income tax on his professional earnings and on the interest on United States bonds. He declined to pay. His real estate was sold in consequence.”

Do you actually read what you post or do you just blindly copy and paste the cached rabbit droppings of desperation from DBE’ Webpage?

To the contrary, at the trial he asked the judge to instruct the jury that "the tax on the income, gains, and profits of the defendant, assessed upon him, as appears by the evidence in this case, was a direct tax". His main argument was that a tax on his income was a direct tax, and the Court viewed the matter in the same way: "The central and controlling question in this case is whether the tax which was levied on the income, gains, and profits of the plaintiff in error, as set forth in the record, and by pretended virtue of the acts of Congress and parts of acts therein mentioned, is a direct tax."

“But the court refused to so charge the jury, to which refusal the defendant excepted.”

Your response does not make any sense, especially with consideration to the Pollock quote you provided. In any case, he requested five instructions for the jury, which were all denied. From Springer:

...delivered to William M. Springer a notice in writing, with certain accompanying forms, requiring him within ten days to make out and return, according to those forms, a list of his income, gains, and profits for the year 1865. In compliance therewith, Springer made out the necessary statement, dated June 21, 1866, and delivered it to the deputy, together with a written protest against the authority of the latter to demand the statement, on the ground that the acts of Congress under which that officer acted were unconstitutional and void. The statement, showing that the net income received by Springer for the year 1865, and subject to taxation, amounted to $50,798, upon which the sum of $4,799.80 was assessed as tax

The rationale of Springer is simple: the only direct taxes under the Constitution are capitations and taxes on land.

Not entirely, it is more correct to state that direct taxation has been legislatively limited to only poll taxes, taxes on lands and its appurtenances (including slaves.)

The income tax is neither of these but is in the nature of an excise or duty. That's it.

Nobody is arguing that as it’s true. However, the income tax cannot serve as an abusive mechanism to impose indirect taxes upon what are empirically understood to exist as direct taxes (such as: capitations, poll taxes, personal taxes, et al.), to do so is to discard well-founded constitutional constraints—such was neither the purpose nor objective of the XVI Amend.

Now if you want to continue to make the imbecilic argument that wages aren't income, have at it.

Certainly, wages are income; however, wages are not ‘incomes’ as meant by the breadth of the XVI Amend. It is only due to the XVI Amend., post Pollock that an individual can no longer assert that any increase in capital realized from say the prudent investing of the income they’ve received as wages is exempted from indirection taxation.

 

[Weston White]

I’ve never actually analyzed the two apportioning of direct tax examples in Hylton before, but upon doing so I have found them to be incorrect to the point of being intentionally ludicrous so to ensure their comparisons would fail as to substantiate their viewpoints. If the Justices got this point wrong, what credibility do they have on any other matter pertaining to ruling on matters of direct taxation?

Justice Chase stated:

“For example, suppose two states equal in census to pay eighty thousand dollars each by a tax on carriages of eight dollars on every carriage; and in one state, there are one hundred carriages, and in the other one thousand. The owners of carriages in one state would pay ten times the tax of owners in the other. A., in one state, would pay for his carriage eight dollars, but B., in the other state, would pay for his carriage eighty dollars."

This example is wrong. If you establish a set value to be taxed per item under the rule of apportionment you then entirely negate the point of apportioning a total sum, as the total figure can only be $8 per object subject to the tax, no more and no less—this is more in line with uniformity than with apportionment.

Also, his figures are not correct: $80,000 / 1,000 = $80.00 and $80,000 / 100 = $800.00.

And so, being that a $8 tax is imposed on each carriage, regardless of the apportionment value imposed upon either state, it would only come to: 1,000 * $8 = $8,000 and 100 * $8 = $800 == $8,800. While, following Justice Iredell’s example (included below), the sum produced here equally amounts to: [1,100 carriages * $8] $8,800.

And then in Justice Iredell’s example, he conflates apportionment with the number of Representatives established by the census (for the 1st Congress), and his figures are just silly, with a total of 105 carriages to be found within 15-states and what we’re to presume is the apportioned sum of a mere $1,050 due for all 15-states.

As Justice Iredell stated:

“That this tax cannot be apportioned is evident. Suppose 10 dollars contemplated as a tax on each chariot, or post chaise, in the United States, and the number of both in all the United States be computed at 105, the number of Representatives in Congress.

This would produce in the whole - - - 1050 [105 carriages * $10 = $1,050]

The share of Virginia being 19-105 parts, would be - - - Dollars 190 [19 * $10 = $190]

The share of Connecticut being 7-105 parts, would be - - - 70 [7 * $10 = $70]

Then suppose Virginia had 50 carriages [$190 / 50 = $3.80 each]

Connecticut - - 2 [$70 / 2 = $35.00 each]

The share of Virginia being 190 dollars, this must of course be collected from the owners of carriages, and there would therefore be collected from each carriage - - - 3 80

The share of Connecticut being 70 dollars, each carriage would pay - - - 35

[* And the remaining portion: 79 parts * $10 = $790 / 53 carriages = $14.91 each == $1,050 and 105]

If any state had no carriages, there could be no apportionment at all. This mode is too manifestly absurd to be supported, and has not even been attempted in debate.”

It is apparent that in Justice Iredell’s example he apportioned the tax not by population, as the Constitution requires, but instead by the total number of objects to be taxed respective to the number of Representatives for each state mentioned as parts of the total number of Representatives of the 1st Congress—this is not a realistic example and does not follow the requirement for Constitutional apportionment. Viz., this example is stating that the entire population of the U.S. is 105 (as parts of within his example) and that the total number of carriages is also 105 with 50 of carriages existing within a single state out of the 15 total states; that only 2 of the 15 states were compared with the carriages taxes costing $3.80 for Virginia, $35.00 for Connecticut (and presumably the remaining would average $14.91 each.) Continuing this example for the remainder of the states and carriages, averaging 4-carriages per state, as follows (“()” denotes the supposed population of each state that is actually the number of Representatives for each state):

North Carolina (10): $100 = $25 each
Delaware (1): $10 = $2.5 each
Georgia (2): $20 = $5 each
Kentucky (2): $20 = $5 each
Maryland (8): $80 = $20 each
Massachusetts (14): $140 = $35 each
New Hampshire (4): $40 = $10 each
New Jersey (5): $50 = $12.50 each
New York (10): $100 = $25 each
Pennsylvania (13): $130 = $32.50 each
Rhode Island (2): $20 = $5 each
South Carolina (6): $60 = $15 each
Vermont (2): $20 = $4 each


* It has been stated that at the founding of our Nation, the mechanics for the apportionment of taxes was never really explained or perhaps understood, yet neither was that of uniformity for indirect taxation. However, this is a false assertion, as we can (as could our Founder's--who were obviously inspired by the great writers, philosophers, and economists who comprised the Age of Enlightenment, Turgot, Smith, etc.) look historically to France, Britain, Rome, etc., for clarification on how such methods of taxation were achieved with consideration to the great writings on such matters. I.e., for direct taxes:

(1) determine a budget necessary to generate national revenue to maintain the prudent operation of its prescribed powers,
(2) apportioning that precise sum amongst the states according to each's population,
(3) establish the objects, items, or persons to be taxed and the rates or percentages due thereupon, or otherwise delegate it upon the states to determine the most effective method specific to the circumstance of each state;
(4) establish the dates, locations, and points for collection or otherwise the alternatives for non-payment or non-compliance (noting that SCOTUS has stated direct taxes do no fall upon the states, but the people thereof, excepting in cases where the state acted as a fiduciary or medium for collection of such taxes)


Additionally, for consideration:

1. Slaves were able to be taxed per head as a direct tax (e.g., .50 per head), even though the slave population was vast throughout the South, yet sparse in the North.

2. The sums apportioned to each state is dependent more upon its population than the object being rated for direct taxation, i.e., the lower a state's population the lower the apportioned sum will ultimately fall upon them.

3. The first direct tax occurred during Colonial America, which which was the Stamp Tax--a tax levied upon virtually all printed materials, publications, wills, documents, cards, dice, etc. (This is when the concept of "taxation without representation" was born and lead to America's first uprisings against Britain's rule.) Now, if such a direct method of taxation worked on paper materials, it would work as well work on other items, such as carriages; if slaves or homeowners could be taxed by apportionment, so then could laborers, etc.

 

[NorthCarolinaLiberty]

I don't do tax returns; that's what CPA's are for. I advise my clients ahead of time so they can enter into transactions with the most favorable tax outcome that's consistent with their other goals.

LMAO at mister high and mighty. You were posting in the height of tax season. Guess you shill gig pays more than your "clients."

 

[NorthCarolinaLiberty]

Off the top:

1. The income tax was imposed on the basis of generating revenue to support war efforts; however, the USA has not declared war since 1942. Moreover, it has gone on to be misappropriated in order to sustain myriads of social justice programs that are entirely outside of the powers of the federal government--amendments to our Constitution are otherwise necessary.

2. Mandatory payroll withholdings violate the 5th Amend., as it's the taking of personal property without just compensation and solely to the benefit of the government--the taxpayer forever looses the ability to collect investment interest on the withheld sums, while the government does and neglects to proffer it as either a tax deduction or refund of any type.

3. State income taxes further subjugate individual rights and constitutional protections as states imposing income taxes do so upon the whole amount due (firstly) to the federal government, yet without any prudent consideration that a portion of that sum was never at any point in time in the possession or control of the taxpayer--state income taxes should only tax the remaining sum that was precedently taken by the federal government. Otherwise, taxpayers are being doubly taxed upon monies that was of no practicable benefit to them other than for the purpose of being taxed to the benefit and advantage of the state and federal governments (i.e., the government is using these withholdings to generate pooled investment interest throughout the year and then at the end of the year collects taxes from these sums from each individual taxpayer.)

Bonuses:

4. Taxes imposed upon employee wages are only constitutional when the employer is obliged to pay them--for only then can it be found to be 'indirect' as meant under our Constitution.

5. The income tax scheme was conceived of by a sickly, drunkard Brit who lived a highly privileged life--well, until his young death, leaving behind a ludicrous amount of debt and the knowledge that his income taxing scheme was a consistent failure.

+ rep. Thanks.

 

[NorthCarolinaLiberty]

A tax upon the national workforce is by definition a 'direct tax.'

Whose definition? Some crackpot tax protester (a redundant term)? It sure isn't the one the courts use or that the Framers had in mind.

As if someone needs to look this up, but I'll believe the crackpots at Investopedia before I believe a paid troll like you, Tufts.

A direct tax is a tax that a person or organization pays directly to the entity that imposed it. Examples include income tax, real property tax, personal property tax, and taxes on assets, all of which are paid by an individual taxpayer directly to the government.

 

[Sonny Tufts]

As if someone needs to look this up, but I'll believe the crackpots at Investopedia before I believe a paid troll like you, Tufts.

A direct tax is a tax that a person or organization pays directly to the entity that imposed it. Examples include income tax, real property tax, personal property tax, and taxes on assets, all of which are paid by an individual taxpayer directly to the government.

Got news for you: The Supreme Court, not Investopedia, decides what a direct tax (as that term is used in the Constitution) is, and it has said that the only direct taxes are capitations and taxes on the ownership of real and personal property.

Even when the Direct Tax Clause was written it was unclear what else, other than a capitation (also known as a “head tax” or a “poll tax”), might be a direct tax. See Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586, 596–598 (1881). Soon after the framing, Congress passed a tax on ownership of carriages, over James Madison’s objection that it was an unapportioned direct tax. Id., at 597. This Court upheld the tax, in part reasoning that apportioning such a tax would make little sense, because it would have required taxing carriage owners at dramatically different rates depending on how many carriages were in their home State. See Hylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171, 174 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). The Court was unanimous, and those Justices who wrote opinions either directly asserted or strongly suggested that only two forms of taxation were direct: capitations and land taxes. See id., at 175; id., at 177 (opinion of Paterson, J.); id., at 183 (opinion of Iredell, J.).

 That narrow view of what a direct tax might be persisted for a century. In 1880, for example, we explained that “direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate.” Springer, supra, at 602. In 1895, we expanded our interpretation to include taxes on personal property and income from personal property, in the course of striking down aspects of the federal income tax. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601, 618 (1895). That result was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment, although we continued to consider taxes on personal property to be direct taxes. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 218–219 (1920).

National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)