These delegated powers, whether express or implied, are, (1) Those which are exclusively vested in the United States; and, (2) Those which are concurrent in the United States and the respective states.
It is perfectly settled that an affirmative grant of power to the United States does not, of itself, divest the states of a like power. The authorities cited settle this question, and it is no longer open for discussion in his Court.
The powers vested exclusively in Congress are. (1) Those which are granted in express terms. (2) Those which are granted to the United States, and expressly prohibited to the States. (3) Those which are exclusive in their nature.
All powers exclusive in their nature may be included under two heads; (1) Those which have thier origin in the constitution, and where the object of them did not exist previous to the Union. These may be called strictly national powers. (2) Those powers which, by other provisions in the constitution, have an effect an operation, when exercised by a state, without or beyond the territorial limits of the State.
As examples of the first class, may be mentioned the "power to borrow money on the credit of the United States." Here the object of the power (to borrow money for the use of the United States), and the means of executing it (by pledging their credit), have their origin in the Union, and did not previously exist. So as to the power "to establish tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," the same remark will apply.
Of the second class, the power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization" is an instance. This power was originally in the States, and was extensively exercised by them, and would now be concurrent, except for another provision in the constitution, that "citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." It is not held to be exclusive, from the use of the term "uniform rule." This court has held that use of an analogous term, "uniform laws," In respect to the associated subject of bankruptcy, does not imply an exclusive power in Congress over that subject. The true reason why the power of establishing an uniform rule of naturalization is exclusive, must be that a person becomming a citizen in one state, would thereby become a citizen of another, perhaps even contrary to its laws, and the power thus exercised would operate beyond the limits of the state.