“I'm an imperfect messenger, but the message is perfect” - Ron Paul
Thanks to LatinsforPaul for posting this article about gov't response to Katrina, here are some highlights:
Officials at the White House and the Defense Department apparently dithered for days about whether to “federalize” National Guard units in the affected area. ... Bureaucratic paralysis extended through all levels of authority as Katrina headed toward the Gulf Coast. It continued in the storm’s immediate aftermath. ... Forewarned of Katrina’s severity, as all public officials had been, Governor Blanco likewise was slow off the mark. Although she proclaimed a state of emergency on Friday, August 26, thereby triggering her state’s disaster plan, she deferred to Mayor Ray Nagin on the all-important decision to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans. ... The governor appeared “dazed and unsteady” for much of the week and one of her first public post-Katrina appearances was to lead a thirty-minute prayer service televised locally from the state’s emergency headquarters in Baton Rouge.
Despite the alarms being sounded by LSU’s storm trackers and a personal telephone call on Saturday, August 27, from the director of the National Hurricane Center, warning him of the seriousness of the threat New Orleans faced... he did not make evacuation mandatory until late Sunday morning, when fewer than twenty-four hours remained. ... He and his crisis team opted for refuge at the Hyatt Regency hotel rather than taking charge at the city’s Mobile Command Center or joining other local and state officials at Louisiana’s emergency operations facility in Baton Rouge. In consequence, Mayor Nagin and his advisors were cut off for two days, pending most of their time warding off looters as telephones went dead and the radios used by police and other first responders drained their batteries.
According to a former senior FEMA official, the agency failed to predeploy enough assets—food, water, and medical supplies—before the storm made landfall: “Nobody pulled the trigger on resources. The director of FEMA didn’t pull the trigger. . . . The Department of Homeland Security didn’t pull the trigger. The resources simply did not get there”. ... [FEMA] became part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Indeed, bureaucratic glory seeking may have led it to block nongovernmental first responders’ efforts. Anecdotes are legion of FEMA officials on the ground delaying or even turning away volunteers from other states and shipments of needed supplies. ... On September 1, Louisiana officials may have denied a Red Cross request to begin moving emergency supplies into New Orleans.
Compare that to the private sector:
...the private sector’s main task was to restore business operations in the affected area. Nevertheless, these companies did not tend only to their narrow interests when catastrophe struck. The disaster plans they had in place allowed them to fill broader needs far in advance of the official first responders: “Wal-Mart frequently beat FEMA by days in getting trucks filled with emergency supplies to relief workers and citizens whose lives were upended by the storm. For more than a week, Wal-Mart and a handful of other private enterprises served as the storm-wrecked area’s “only lifeline” to the outside world.
Wal-Mart’s rapid response to Hurricane Katrina was coordinated by its Emergency Operations Center, located near corporate headquarters in Bentonville, Arkansas, and staffed by meteorologists and loss-prevention specialists. Planning began on August 23, six days before the storm made landfall on the Gulf Coast. Based on detailed information about customers’ buying patterns in hurricane-prone areas, Wal-Mart began prepositioning supplies it knew would be in high demand before the storm hit (bottled water, flashlights, batteries, generators, and tarpaulins) and after it hit (mops, chainsaws, and Strawberry Pop-Tarts). Backup generators and dry ice also were deployed to help store managers cope with power outages; teams of roofers were mobilized to deal with building damage; and company employees outside the affected area were alerted to prepare to substitute for locals unable to get to work.Many of these resources were predeployed on both flanks of Katrina’s predicted path in order to increase the chances that no damaged store would be inaccessible.
Besides preparing to deal with the disruption of its own business operations, Wal-Mart delivered $3 million worth of emergency supplies for general distribution in the disaster area after Katrina struck and donated $17 million in cash to the relief effort.
Home Depot began to prepare for Katrina four days in advance of its landfall. All but ten of its thirty-three stores in the affected area were open the next day, and only our remained closed a week later. Like Wal-Mart, Home Depot prepositioned generators and extra workers on both sides of Katrina’s path to ensure a rapid response. FedEx supplies a similar story. Before the storm moved ashore, the company had deployed thirty thousand bags of ice, thirty thousand gallons of water, and eighty-five generators in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and Tallahassee, Florida, so that it could move quickly to meet its employees’ needs in the disaster area prearranged temporary housing for those workers; and dispatched four self-contained “facility repair kits” to fix any damaged physical assets. FedEx also assisted the Red Cross by prepositioning sixty tons of relief supplies before Katrina hit; after the storm, usually at no charge, it delivered another 440 tons of supplies to the Gulf Coast for that organization. The company’s Kinko’s division predeployed photocopiers, toner
cartridges, and seven hundred cases of paper for use by FEMA and the Red Cross.
Although it is true that private firms “had to get [their] stores open, not evacuate a city”, it is also true that disaster planning and response are only minor, albeit critical components of their organizational functions. In contrast, responding to disaster is FEMA’s only mission. ... Wal-Mart and other companies that donated money and relief supplies to the storm’s survivors undoubtedly expected to benefit financially from the customer goodwill their charity cultivated. Nevertheless, incentives evidently matter.
The one concept I have difficulty explain to people is that, if the federal gov't was not taking a significant portion of your wealth, you would be more able to reward those businesses, non-profits, and individuals that are most able to assist you.