Ron Paul: Can America Afford Ukraine?

[Brett85]

http://www.fitsnews.com/2014/03/10/ron-paul-can-america-afford-ukraine/

Officially, U.S. debt stands at more than $17 trillion. In reality, it is many times more. The cost of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq may be more than six trillion dollars. President Obama’s illegal invasion of Libya cost at least a billion dollars and left that country devastated. The costs of U.S. regime change efforts in Syria are likely thus far enormous, both in dollars and lives. That’s still a secret.

So who in his right mind would think it is a good time to start a war with Russia over Ukraine? And worse, who would commit the United States to bail out a Ukraine that will need at least $35 billion to survive the year?

Who? The president and Congress, backed by the neocons and the so-called humanitarian interventionists!

The House voted overwhelmingly last week to provide $1 billion in loan guarantees to Ukraine. That is just the beginning, you can be sure. But let’s be clear: this is not money for the population of that impoverished country. The administration is sending a billion dollars from U.S. taxpayers to wealthy international bankers who hold Ukrainian debt. It is an international bank bailout, not aid to Ukrainians. And despite the escalating anti-Russia rhetoric, ironically some of that money will likely go to Russia for Ukraine’s two billion dollar unpaid gas bill!

So what happened in Ukraine? The U.S. government and media claims that America must save Ukrainian democracy from an invading Russian army that is threatening the country’s sovereignty. But in reality the crisis was instigated in part by U.S. meddling. Remember the intercepted telephone call in which two senior Obama Administration officials discussed plans to replace the elected government in Ukraine with U.S. puppets? That is exactly what happened. Is that not a violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty? Is that what democracy is all about?

The Obama Administration’s policy toward Ukraine is hypocritical. The overthrow of the government in Kiev by violent street protests was called a triumph of democracy, but when the elected parliament in autonomous Crimea voted last week to hold a referendum to decide its future, President Obama condemned it as a violation of international law. What about the principle of self-determination, which is also enshrined in international law?

I have long thought that a referendum to reorganize Ukraine into a looser confederation of regions might help reduce tensions. I still believe this could help, but it seems the U.S. government is not so enthusiastic about democracy when there is a chance for an outcome it opposes.

I strongly believe that Crimeans have every right to transfer sovereignty over their peninsula to Russia if they wish. The only question that remains is whether there will there be an honest election, and I don’t see any reason there can’t be.

The US government tells the rest of the world, “We want you to be good democrats and have elections,” but if they don’t elect the right people then we complain about it and throw them out, like we did in Egypt. In Crimea they want to have an election to determine their future. President Obama condemned those plans for a vote by saying, “We are well beyond the days when borders can be redrawn over the heads of democratic leaders.” Does he not remember that the authorities in Kiev were installed just weeks ago after a US-backed coup against the Ukrainian constitution?

Congress next week will likely vote for sanctions against Russia. Though many mistakenly believe that sanctions are a relatively harmless way of forcing foreign countries to do what we say, we should be clear: sanctions are an act of war.

Cooler heads in the United States are not currently prevailing. There is a danger of an unimaginable conflict between the U.S. and Russia. We must demand a shift away from a war footing, away from incendiary rhetoric. We are broke and cannot afford to “buy” Ukraine. We certainly cannot afford another war, especially with Russia!

 

[kcchiefs6465]

Thanks for posting, TC.

If you're not a subscriber to the RPC you should check it out.

Ron Paul is speaking more freely than ever.

 

[ClydeCoulter]

Straight forward.

 

[Matt Collins]

Ron is incorrect here, sanctions are not actually an act of war unless the government they are being imposed upon thinks of them as such.

 

[kcchiefs6465]

Ron is incorrect here, sanctions are not actually an act of war unless the government they are being imposed upon thinks of them as such.

Lol.

How positively positivist.

 

[fr33]

Ron is incorrect here, sanctions are not actually an act of war unless the government they are being imposed upon thinks of them as such.

I don't consider sanctions as an act of war but your definition is ridiculous. Do you wait for your government to think for you on other topics?

 

[Matt Collins]

I don't consider sanctions as an act of war but your definition is ridiculous. Do you wait for your government to think for you on other topics?

It's not my definition, it's what is considered by international law.

 

[Ronin Truth]

Hell Ron, the last time I checked America can't afford Amerika.

 

[Occam's Banana]

Ron is incorrect here, sanctions are not actually an act of war unless the government they are being imposed upon thinks of them as such.

And mugging isn't actually theft or battery unless the mugged person files a police report ...
And getting punched in the face isn't actually aggression unless the person who got punched swings back ...
And a schoolyard bully isn't actually stealing when he takes some kid's lunch money unless the kid tattles on him ...



An "act of war" is, by definition, any act by country A that would justify country B in retaliating against country A.
Whether country B actually decides to do so or not (for whatever reaasons) has got nothing to do with it.

Consider a situation in which country B is too weak to effectively do anything about some unjustly aggressive act by country A. By your "logic," the inability of B to pursue remedy by denouncing A for engaging in an "act of war" (and then following up such a denunciation with actual retaliation of some kind) effectively exonerates A of any wrongdoing.

In other words, your argument essentially boils down to an elaborate version of "might makes right."
It's like saying that the Maifia's intimidation of witnesses is not a crime as long as no one is willing to testify against them ...

It's not my definition, it's what is considered by international law.

Oh. International law. Well, in that case, it must be so.

Because, you know, "international law" is always an instrument of justice that is interpreted & applied by neutral "experts" - and the defintions it employs (such as that for "acts of war") could never, ever be warped or perverted into a means of serving the interests of imperialistically hegemonic powers ...

 

[Cap]

It's not my definition, it's what is considered by international law.

Seriously? You sound like fucking Romney when asked if would he get Congress's authorization to take military action against Iran's nuclear facilities and responded with something like "You sit down with your attorneys" or Arlen Specter citing Scottish law.

 

[Matt Collins]

Do your own research, and you'll come to the same conclusion.

 

[cajuncocoa]

Ron is incorrect here, sanctions are not actually an act of war unless the government they are being imposed upon thinks of them as such.

 

[Matt Collins]

From Boston University International Law Journal
Spring 2002

Note:

*161 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A USE OF FORCE: RE-EVALUATING THE LEGALITY OF SANCTIONS FROM AN EFFECTS-BASED PERSPECTIVE


Cassandra LaRae-Perez


IV. When Do Economic Sanctions Rise to an “Act of War” and Is There a Right to Self-Defense?

The introduction of the U.N. Charter changed forever the vocabulary of the law of war. In its predecessor, the Covenant of the League of Nations, parties agreed “not to resort to war,” [FN155] and to “condemn . . . the recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.” [FN156] However, the Covenant does not define which acts constituted acts of war. Further, acts of war, however defined, were not per se illegal under the Covenant. [FN157] The signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact which followed were still allowed to use force against other nations without violating the Pact or the Covenant; they had only to claim self-defense, for the Kellogg-Briand Pact explicitly provided for the right of self-defense but did not limit the consequences or implications of the right. [FN158] Alternatively, a state could avoid violating the Pact or the Covenant by refusing to declare war. [FN159] Acts of “war” were illegal under very limited circumstances according to the Covenant, [FN160] and states were relatively free to decide for themselves whether resorting to war actions was justified. [FN161]

*180 The U.N. Charter framed the issue in a very different manner. Referring to peace, rather than war, the parties to the Charter agree to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” [FN162] and to “refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .” [FN163] “War” is mentioned only once in the Charter. In the Preamble, the Charter states that its purpose is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” [FN164] Thereafter, the Charter refers to “use of force,” “acts of aggression,” and “breach(es) of the peace.” [FN165] The familiar and malleable term “act of war,” once applied to describe an aggressive action by a state, was categorically deleted from the international law that governed the use of war.

A. Applying the New Vocabulary: Economic Sanctions as a Use of Force

Article 39 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the broad power to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.” [FN166] If the Security Council determines that such a threat exists, it may impose complete or partial economic sanctions upon a state for the purpose of maintaining “peace and security” and it may compel member states to comply with such measures. [FN167] If the Security Council decides these measures will be or have proven to be ineffective, it may resort to the use of armed force. [FN168] Therefore, both economic sanctions and the use of armed force are provided in the same chapter of the Charter. Reading Articles 41 and 42 together, then, economic sanctions and use of force are not mutually exclusive actions, but are two primary methods of action by which the Security Council can respond to a “breach of the peace.” Economic sanctions are not always an alternative to the use of force, but are often a first step toward it.

As illustrated in the case studies above, the effects of sanctions can be as devastating as the effects of war. In some cases, they can be more damaging, as they constrain recovery after the devastation of war and prolong suffering. In the absence of sanctions, a country is more able to rebuild itself after a war; in fact, it is often assisted in doing so by the *181 victor of the conflict. The case of Iraq is precisely the opposite. Iraq, while still struggling under the weight of the sanctions, has been required to deposit its own funds with the U.N. for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid to Iraq and to pay reparations to Kuwait, the country Iraq damaged in the war that Iraq, in fact, lost. [FN169]

From an effects-based perspective, economic sanctions appear to be closer to the use of force than the U.N. has been prepared to admit. Even in the absence of armed enforcement, sanctions forcibly constrain the actions of a nation and may be considered to impinge on that nation's sovereignty. Formerly free to trade with nations willing to trade with it, the target nation suddenly finds itself at the mercy of the imposing force. It finds itself in this position not always because the nation with which it formerly traded has made a private commercial decision not to trade, but because the former trading partner is compelled either by the U.N. or by a powerful economic force such as the United States to refrain from trade.

Determining the scope of “the use of force” from the effects perspective is not without precedent. In the International Court of Justice decision on the merits of Nicaragua v. United States, the court stated that in customary international law the prohibition against armed attacks may also apply to sending armed bands across a frontier if the “scale and effects” would have been classified as the effects of an armed attack. [FN170] The Court was prepared to examine the result of the action to determine the characterization of the action itself. Further, the Court stated clearly that a use of force does not always entail an armed attack. [FN171] The Court held that while financial, material and logistical assistance to rebels did not constitute an “armed attack,” “uch assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention . . .” [FN172] The Court did not further define what action, short of armed attack, would constitute a use of force. On its face, the imposition of economic sanctions may appear to have no relation to a use of force, but viewed from the perspective of its effects, economic sanctions are clearly more than an act of international diplomacy.
However, despite the link between the use of armed force and the imposition of economic sanctions, the U.N. has not yet developed any specific criteria for guiding the decision to impose economic sanctions. [FN173] In 1995, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recognized this gap in the law and recommended to the U.N. that objective criteria for determining the *182 purpose of sanctions should be defined. [FN174] Further, Boutros-Ghali recommended that the applications of sanctions should be monitored and their impact measured, though he conceded that restricted access to the target country might make such measurements difficult. [FN175] The General Assembly responded to the statement in 1997 with Resolution 242, Annex II, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. The General Assembly set up an “Informal Open-ended Working Group on An Agenda for Peace.” [FN176] This working group adopted a draft on the question of sanctions imposed by the United Nations. [FN177] The working group recommended that sanctions should be imposed with “clear objectives, provision for regular review and precise conditions for being lifted.” [FN178] Paragraph 4 states that “unintended adverse side effects” on civilians should be minimized by making use of humanitarian aid exceptions. [FN179] More significantly, paragraph 3 suggests that the time frame of sanctions should be monitored to minimize unnecessary suffering by the population. [FN180] The Resolution continues to stress clarity of purposes, an expression of a clear warning before sanctions are applied, partial lifting ofsanctions in exchange for compliance with previously defined requirements, periodic review, and the exemption of humanitarian supplies. [FN181] The expected extent of civilian suffering is not weighed in the decision to impose sanctions in the first place, but rather, in the construction of thesanctions themselves.

The Resolution states in paragraph 20 that “[t]he concept of ‘humanitarian limits of sanctions' deserves further attention and standard approaches should be elaborated by the relevant (U.N.) bodies.” [FN182] Paragraph 27 states, “Security Council resolutions should include more precise mandates for sanctions committees, including a standard approach to be followed by the committees.” [FN183]

In June, 2000, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights published a working paper on “the adverse consequences *183 of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights.” [FN184] In this paper, Marc Bossuyt criticizes the sanctions imposed against Iraq, Burundi, and Cuba, and lays out a six-prong test for the evaluation of sanctions. Bossuyt argues that sanctions should:

1. Be imposed for a valid reason. [FN185] That is, for the maintenance of peace and security, not for “invalid” political objectives.

2. Target proper parties. [FN186] Sanctions must not target civilians who are not involved in the threat to peace. This prong essentially rules out comprehensive sanctions in favor of financial sanctions more specifically targeted against the government.

3. Target proper goods or objects. [FN187] Sanctions must not target goods needed for basic subsistence, such as food, medical supplies, and requirements for potable water. Sanctions must also exclude educational materials. Further, even legally targeted items must have a reasonable relationship to the maintenance of peace and security.

4. Be reasonably time limited. [FN188] Sanctions that are in place for an extended period are shown to both compound suffering and become less effective with the passage of time. [FN189] Sanctions against Iraq were not time-limited; they remain in place partly because unanimity in the Security Council is required to lift the sanctions. Placing a time limit on sanctions and requiring a vote to renew rather than to end sanctions would release the bureaucratic and political stranglehold that currently causes the deplorable situation in Iraq.

5. Be effective, that is, they must reasonably be expected to achieve the desired objective. [FN190] They may otherwise violate international law or the Charter.

6. Be free from “protest arising from violations of the ‘principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” ’ [FN191] Also called the Martens Clause test, this prong tests for widespread governmental, scholarly and public outcry. [FN192] If much of the international community is against a measure, it may have an adverse impact on “international solidarity,” presumably destabilizing international peace and security amongst the imposing parties and the opposing parties.

*184 Clear guidelines have yet to be implemented by the Security Council for determining whether and how sanctions should be imposed in the first instance. The six prongs suggested by the Sub-Commission are useful, but are still only vaguely defined. For example, the working group has not set out the mechanisms that will safeguard against impermissible political motivations or the imbalance of influence in the Security Council. While comprehensive sanctions have not been imposed since sanctions were imposed on Iraq, there has not yet been any indication that the Security Council is prepared to refrain from using them in the future. For future sanctions to be in conformity with international law, they will have to be defined clearly with practical applications to implement aspirational objectives. The Security Council will also have to commit to a plan or set of guidelines according to which economic sanctions will be uniformly evaluated.

B. Applying the New Vocabulary: Economic Sanctions as an Act of Aggression

In 1950 the U.N. recognized the need to define “aggression.” The Special Rapporteur assigned to the task, Mr. J. Spirpoulos, found that there was “a ‘natural’ notion of aggression that is not susceptible of definition.” [FN193] He concluded that “[a] ‘legal’ definition of aggression would be an artificial construction, which. . .could not be comprehensive enough to comprise all imaginable cases of aggression, since the methods of aggression are in a constant process of evolution.” [FN194] Despite his prophetic conclusion, the truth of which becomes more relevant as the age of information and genetic sciences evolves, the General Assembly finally settled a definition for the “act of aggression” in Resolution 3314, passed in 1974. According to this definition, an “act of aggression” includes the use of armed force. [FN195] However, current developments in information warfare, biological warfare and in genetic engineering indicate that the U.N.'s definition is grievously inadequate to address the acts waged by one state against another in the 21st century. If the “act of aggression,” or “use of force” will continue to be the legal terms used to define the permissibility or legality of harmful acts, their definitions will have to be broadened to encompass the forms of warfare or acts of harm that are already in use today.

Consider information warfare: the bare act may not legally constitute an “act of aggression,” but the effects are capable of completely destroying*185 a country's economy or interfering with essential military operations. [FN196] If, for example, an agent of an opposing state used the global information network to “take down Wall Street” [FN197] or to interfere with military operations in a conflict such as Desert Storm, [FN198] the United States would almost certainly consider such an action as an “act of aggression.” Similarly, other acts that have an adverse impact on the stability of a country or a devastating effect on its civilian population may be difficult to define as aggressive acts, yet they may have the same effect on a country as would a full-scale war.

Economic sanctions can have equally devastating effects, yet under the current definition, none of the acts above would qualify as an act of aggression. As was recognized in 1950, a narrow definition of the “act of aggression” necessarily excludes aggressive acts that can invade and harm a sovereign state no less than can a bomb or a bullet.

If economic sanctions were properly recognized as a use of force or an act of aggression, the U.N. would be compelled to take stronger action to demand the cessation of the U.S.'s illegal actions against Cuba. The United States would likely be pressured to review its policy in the face of a clearer violation of international law.




----------------------------------------------------------------
From Chicago Journal of International Law
Fall 2003

Article:
Reconciling Political Sanctions with Globalization and Free Trade

*271 PROLOGAMENA TO THINKING ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND FREE TRADE


David A. Baldwin [FNa1]

I. What Are Political Sanctions?

Economic sanctions are sometimes divided into two categories--‘political ‘ and ‘nonpolitical.‘ The criterion for deciding which category particularsanctions exemplify is defined in terms of the motives or goals of the policymakers using the sanctions. [FN1] When economic sanctions are used to influence another state's tariff policy or treatment of private foreign investment, for example, they are depicted as ‘nonpolitical‘ because thesanctions are being used to pursue ‘economic‘ rather than ‘political‘ goals. When economic sanctions are used to influence another state's human rights policy or to get that state to disarm or pay war reparations, however, the sanctions are categorized as ‘political‘ because they are being used to pursue ‘political goals.‘
The practice of differentiating between ‘political‘ and ‘nonpolitical‘ economic sanctions requires a criterion for distinguishing between political and nonpolitical goals. If an example of such a criterion exists, it has escaped this writer's attention. Unless such a criterion can be found, the distinction between ‘political‘ and ‘nonpolitical‘ motives (goals, purposes, or ends) is untenable.

*272 Definitions of ‘politics‘ take two forms. One emphasizes the state. Politics, it is said, is about government. [FN2] ‘Political‘ signifies that which relates to a state, or a society of persons . . . united for the purpose of government.‘ [FN3] This conception of politics cannot be used to differentiate between the political and nonpolitical goals of economic sanctions imposed by states. As activities of the state conducted in pursuit of state goals, all economic sanctions are political sanctions according to this perspective.

The second conception of politics emphasizes processes rather than institutions. According to this view, politics is about social relations involving power, rule, or authority. [FN4] Such a view implies little or nothing about particular goals; any goal that involves power, rule, or authority would seem to qualify as political. Numerous writers have echoed this view:

As a matter of fact the field of political activity cannot be defined, a priori, by reference to particular objects. [FN5]

Our definition says virtually nothing about human motives. [FN6]

The ends of politics may be anything. [FN7]

The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue. [FN8]

The idea that certain goals are inherently political while others are not is incompatible with the second conception of politics. Likewise, the idea that economic sanctions can be classified according to whether their goals are political or not is difficult--nay, impossible--to defend. Attempts to influence the foreign economic policy of another state are political in the same sense that attempts to change another state's human rights policy or military activities are political. This is true regardless of the means used in such influence attempts.
Thus, neither of the two most common ways of defining politics allows one to differentiate the political goals of economic sanctions from the allegedly nonpolitical goals. Those who insist on making this distinction are obliged to specify the conception of politics involved in making such judgments. None to date has done so.
*273 Is this mere semantic nit-picking that has little to do with understanding the role of economic sanctions in foreign policy and international relations? No. Although politics and economics are not the same thing, they are often intertwined in the real world. Thinking of the political and economic realms of human affairs as separate and distinct--with no overlap--makes it almost impossible to understand economic sanctions.

Economic sanctions are prime examples of institutions and policies in which economic and political aspects are inextricably intertwined. They are, in other words, simultaneously economic and political.

The attempt to treat the economy and the polity as autonomous spheres of social life mirrors the attempt to treat war and politics as separate and distinct activities. The point of the famous, but frequently misunderstood, dictum of Carl von Clausewitz was not to glorify war but to subordinate it.

This unity [of politics and war] lies in the concept that war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.

It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is politics--the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own.

We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means‘ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs . . . . Is war not just another expression of . . . thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.

If that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense. [FN9]

Properly understood, Clausewitz's words are as applicable to economic sanctions as to military force. What distinguishes war, according to Clausewitz, is ‘simply the peculiar nature of its means,‘ [FN10] not the ends being pursued. Likewise, one could say that what distinguishes economic sanctions is the peculiar nature of the means, not the goals sought by such means. Just as war is a political activity, so too the use of economic sanctions should be viewed as a political activity --regardless of the ends.

Given the context of this symposium, it should also be noted that what has been said thus far about economic sanctions applies also to legalsanctions. *274 According to either of the conceptions of politics discussed above, the imposition of legal sanctions is a political act in the same sense that imposing economic or military sanctions is a political act.

If all of the goals pursued by economic sanctions are considered political, the universe of episodes of sanctions expands so much that studying all of them would be impossible. While this is true, it is not an argument for redefining economic sanctions. One cannot study everything at once; thus, all researchers must delimit the boundaries of their inquiry. It is quite legitimate for a researcher to rule out consideration of the use of economicsanctions to influence commercial or financial policies in other states on the grounds that the researcher lacks the resources (time, expertise, research assistance, etc.) to consider such matters. It is even legitimate to ignore them on the grounds that one is simply not interested. It is not legitimate, however, to ignore pursuit of such goals on the grounds that they are nonpolitical. This is not a tenable intellectual position--unless accompanied by a conception of politics that justifies such a rationale.

 

[singe22]

International law? haahahahahahahaha how can someone assumed pro liberty even stomach the mentioning or reference to this. I will get you a nice warm blanket to wrap you up with as you go back to sleep collins.

 

[phill4paul]

Ron is incorrect here, sanctions are not actually an act of war unless the government they are being imposed upon thinks of them as such.

Negative. Sanctions are an act of aggression to bring about capitulation for certain ends. Plain and simple. Building a nuclear weapon as a means of deterrence is an act of self-defense. The U.N. and all the big dick bullies can have their lieyers phrase it for them however they wish. What do you wish? That Iran formerly declare war as an response to these sanctions or that Russia do so? Yeah, there's a lot of neo-cons out there that would love exactly that.

 

[Matt Collins]

Negative. Sanctions are an act of aggression to bring about capitulation for certain ends. Plain and simple. Building a nuclear weapon as a means of deterrence is an act of self-defense. The U.N. and all the big dick bullies can have their lieyers phrase it for them however they wish. What do you wish? That Iran formerly declare war as an response to these sanctions or that Russia do so? Yeah, there's a lot of neo-cons out there that would love exactly that.

Sanctions are only an act of war if the government they are imposed upon considers them so.

 

[Spikender]

Bombing a country endlessly is only an act of war if the Government of the country that is being bombed upon considers them so.

 

[Occam's Banana]

Do your own research, and you'll come to the same conclusion.

[snip utterly non-responsive wall o' scholarly hand-waving]

Yeah. Sure. OK. And things like the "War on Drugs" and warrantless surveillance and "indefinite detention" and [fill in the blank] are all just fine 'n' dandy, too - 'coz "legal experts" say they are ...

You are not stupid, Matt. So why do you persist in treating the rest of us as if we are fools? You cannot seriously expect us to be impressed by your ab auctoritate invocations of "international law" and your citations of positivist scholarship in this regard. So what gives? What's the point?

Sanctions are only an act of war if the government they are imposed upon considers them so.

An "act of war" is any act by country A that would justify country B in the use retaliatory force against country A.
Whether country B actually decides (for whatever reasons) to retaliate or not is absolutely and utterly irrelevant. Period.
You can stick your fingers in your ears and dance around chanting "neener-neener-neener, international law" all you want.

I've danced around this particular maypole with Teh Collinz a number of times in the past. On this issue, he is a one-trick pony - or a stuck record.

The only weapon in his holster is a toy gun that pops out a flag that says "international law" instead of "BANG!" ...

Thus, I am certain that Matt will simply ignore all of the following (or, at most, he will simply quote some of it and then write a sentence or so that boils down to something like "You are wrong. I have researched it. International law FTW."). But for others (on either side of this issue) who may be interested, here is yet another reason why (in addition to the others I've pointed out in this thread and elsewhere) Matt's "definition" of "acts of war" (as only being "acts of war" if some country wishes to "consider them so") is grotesquely absurd, irrational and unworkable:

Making an "act of war" contingent upon what some country arbitrarily chooses, post facto, to "consider" to be an "act of war" significantly degrades the ability to formulate policy by countries that genuinely wish to avoid war. If one country genuinely desires to avoid war - but some other country can unilaterally declare that it has chosen to consider some (certain kinds of) acts by the first country to be "acts of war" - then you have the makings of one hell of an intractable mess. How is a country supposed to go about formulating sane & consistent policies if assessments of those policies as being "acts of war" (or not) are up to decisions made by some other country after those policies have already been enacted? IOW: How can you have any kind of sensible foreign policy if the only way to identify casus belli is to enact a policy and then wait to see what happens? It is sheer madness to insist that determinations of what is or is not a legitimate "act of war" are contingent and a posteriori.

Furthermore, if country A is weaker than country B, A can effectively be "held hostage" to the whims & demands of B. Country B, if it sufficiently stronger than country A, can simply run roughshod over A and A will just have to "grin and bear it" - because if A actually cried "foul" (by announcing that it considered B's actions to be "acts of war"), it would face the prospect of conquest, subjugation and/or annihilation at the hands of B. It should be abundantly clear to anyone paying the slightest bit of attention that the United States is playing the part of country B in the world today. It is doing so with great vigor and enthusiasm - and the "definition" of "act of war" proferred by Matt & "international law" does nothing but enable & reinforce this kind of behavior.

Objectively applied criteria for what does or does not justify forceful retaliation are anathema to schoolyard bullies, mobsters and modern "international lawyers." Bullies, mafioso and modern "international lawyers" want to live in a world where "it's okay to do it if you can get away with it without anyone squealing on you" - which is why they will heartily endorse Matt's subjective, arbitrarily contingent and post facto "definition" of "act of war" ...

 

[Cap]

Ron is incorrect here, sanctions are not actually an act of war unless the government they are being imposed upon thinks of them as such.

The only time I have ever seen where Ron has been wrong, was the instant he allowed you to have anything to do with his campaign.

 

[Artemi]

Can America afford Ukraine?
The answer is Yes. There are video on the youtube where Nuland states that officially US gave Ukraine 5 000 000 000 dollars for democracy purposes.

Pretty nice investment, in future war.