Snowball
Member
- Joined
- Nov 25, 2011
- Messages
- 5,234
I figured it would be good to start a thread that is not so news-based,
but rather just a thread where posters can share their opinions on what's happening and what to expect in geopolitics,
a place for thought and discussion. I'll begin.
Takeaways:
1) Ukraine's use of drones is not a major escalation to the war, in a manner that more significantly involves US/UK. There is still no reason to believe that the US/UK have approved heavy missile strikes into Russia proper. Russia's warnings could have had an affect on their decision-making, and Zelensky's bosses are going to force him to get in line, and stop making such demands.
2) When Nasrallah basically told Israel to "bring it" and that he would not allow Israelis to move into the northern villages, he knew what he was doing, and that is committing to escalation, including the likelihood that the IAF would launch air strikes in Beirut.
3) I don't believe "mainstream" reports that either the ED blasts or the F-35 strikes are highly targeted against Hizbullah, and much less do I believe that they were based on some incredible penetration of Hizbullah on the intelligence level inside Lebanon. I see these claims as puffery and excuses to condone state terrorism that is a lot more broad and unspecified than the bankers' media and bankers' governments will admit, but they are also to be expected, after Nasrallah's speech.
4) I sympathise with non-Hizbullah Lebanese who don't want an all-out war against Israel and its protector the US. The worst has already been done in Gaza, and although there are deaths and theft and mass persecution of Palestinians across the West Bank by militant groups of the Zionists, disallowing Jews from moving back into their homes in the north means war that will hurt many more thousands of people who have nothing to do with any of this. Prohibiting Jews from moving back to their vacated neighborhoods does not affect Hizbullah's military capabilities or in any way make them more vulnerable. Additionally, it does nothing to advance the purported agenda of Hizbullah which is to stop the war against Palestinians, or the resistance against Golan occupation. Therefore, one must question Hizbullah's true motives, and they are beginning to seem a little more like Hamas because they are willing to sacrifice the lives of innocent people for their cause. Even though they are not committing those acts, it is their conduct which knowingly makes Israel carry out such attacks, as it was Hamas actions that brought the devastation in Gaza. As much as a statement like this offends some, it is nonetheless true. Even right now, Israel is co-coordinating Beirut strikes with additional strikes in Rafah.
5) If Hizbullah's true motives are indeed more about being an Iranian proxy than representing the interest of the wider Lebanese people, we shouldn't be surprised to see powerful nations with influential Jews refuse to come out on the Hizabulah side, and even assist the Israelis in possibly "finishing them off", in the same manner that they have been doing to Hamas, despite the civilian cost. Many influential players, capable of driving policy to various extents, perceive both Hamas and Hizbullah as unwelcome special interest groups that are causing more harm than good to the Arabic people across the Levant. Although they deplore the aggressiveness and cruelty of the Zionists, they are neither surprised by it, especially considering the internal political changes inside Israel since the B.N. coalition government has been installed.
6) It may very well be entirely true that the B.N. coalition goverment has enough internal command and support to carry out the conspiracy of the most hawkish Zionists, Eretz Israel, involving the complete disbursement of Palestinians as an independent political group, a One State Solution ("Israel"), expanded territory, etc. Arabs could be lesser-citizens inside of it but without political strength, while the great majority are expelled. Jerusalem entirely would pass to Zionist government, and the Catholic and Orthodox would have to depend upon expected Zionist promises not to disrupt their venerable Holy Sites. It is virtually unimaginable to contemplate anything else in regards to the Christian churches and real estate. It is not unimaginable at all, however, that the Muslim sites, especially Al-Aqsa and the Dome are in a more precarious situation, due not only to their more anti-Jewish populations but that the site is the very same place where a Third Temple would be constructed, if the sect gets their way. They are not, however, in charge of Israel yet. They are likely to be held back internally. The majority of Jews are not supportive of the irretractable mayhem such an historic alteration would cause. They would, however, support more land grabs, a One State Solution, and Palestinian expulsion. Arabs without equal citizenship and without political control would be in Israel as they are today, but not in a separate sense, and by far fewer numbers, as workers and professionals.
7) The Iranian civilian government which is secularly elected is not supportive of all-out war against "Israel" solely for the Palestinian cause, and the Aytollah surely knows this, and could be directing the country towards a more sustainable future, by which Iran will become more economically and militarily powerful (just in case), part of BRICs, and part of the Russo-Chinese axis of power that would only commit to real war in league with the Russians as their chief partner (such as in a WW III scenario). The Iranians would possibly even allow Hizbullah to be "Hamassed" if they do not adapt.
What to expect:
1) Ukraine war not to dramatically escalate, at least until American election results.
2) Movement of the IDF to the border areas which Hizbulah will, (by their actions only) allow to occur, once they receive the word from Iran that Iran is not willing to stage all-out war against Israel over this problem (as long as Israel does not begin all-out war, but proceeds in these stages and makes their demands clearly, which are, at this point, getting predictable).
3) A positive BRICs Summit in October, no big October Surprise involving war or terrorism, as long as Israel is not existentially under attack.
but rather just a thread where posters can share their opinions on what's happening and what to expect in geopolitics,
a place for thought and discussion. I'll begin.
Takeaways:
1) Ukraine's use of drones is not a major escalation to the war, in a manner that more significantly involves US/UK. There is still no reason to believe that the US/UK have approved heavy missile strikes into Russia proper. Russia's warnings could have had an affect on their decision-making, and Zelensky's bosses are going to force him to get in line, and stop making such demands.
2) When Nasrallah basically told Israel to "bring it" and that he would not allow Israelis to move into the northern villages, he knew what he was doing, and that is committing to escalation, including the likelihood that the IAF would launch air strikes in Beirut.
3) I don't believe "mainstream" reports that either the ED blasts or the F-35 strikes are highly targeted against Hizbullah, and much less do I believe that they were based on some incredible penetration of Hizbullah on the intelligence level inside Lebanon. I see these claims as puffery and excuses to condone state terrorism that is a lot more broad and unspecified than the bankers' media and bankers' governments will admit, but they are also to be expected, after Nasrallah's speech.
4) I sympathise with non-Hizbullah Lebanese who don't want an all-out war against Israel and its protector the US. The worst has already been done in Gaza, and although there are deaths and theft and mass persecution of Palestinians across the West Bank by militant groups of the Zionists, disallowing Jews from moving back into their homes in the north means war that will hurt many more thousands of people who have nothing to do with any of this. Prohibiting Jews from moving back to their vacated neighborhoods does not affect Hizbullah's military capabilities or in any way make them more vulnerable. Additionally, it does nothing to advance the purported agenda of Hizbullah which is to stop the war against Palestinians, or the resistance against Golan occupation. Therefore, one must question Hizbullah's true motives, and they are beginning to seem a little more like Hamas because they are willing to sacrifice the lives of innocent people for their cause. Even though they are not committing those acts, it is their conduct which knowingly makes Israel carry out such attacks, as it was Hamas actions that brought the devastation in Gaza. As much as a statement like this offends some, it is nonetheless true. Even right now, Israel is co-coordinating Beirut strikes with additional strikes in Rafah.
5) If Hizbullah's true motives are indeed more about being an Iranian proxy than representing the interest of the wider Lebanese people, we shouldn't be surprised to see powerful nations with influential Jews refuse to come out on the Hizabulah side, and even assist the Israelis in possibly "finishing them off", in the same manner that they have been doing to Hamas, despite the civilian cost. Many influential players, capable of driving policy to various extents, perceive both Hamas and Hizbullah as unwelcome special interest groups that are causing more harm than good to the Arabic people across the Levant. Although they deplore the aggressiveness and cruelty of the Zionists, they are neither surprised by it, especially considering the internal political changes inside Israel since the B.N. coalition government has been installed.
6) It may very well be entirely true that the B.N. coalition goverment has enough internal command and support to carry out the conspiracy of the most hawkish Zionists, Eretz Israel, involving the complete disbursement of Palestinians as an independent political group, a One State Solution ("Israel"), expanded territory, etc. Arabs could be lesser-citizens inside of it but without political strength, while the great majority are expelled. Jerusalem entirely would pass to Zionist government, and the Catholic and Orthodox would have to depend upon expected Zionist promises not to disrupt their venerable Holy Sites. It is virtually unimaginable to contemplate anything else in regards to the Christian churches and real estate. It is not unimaginable at all, however, that the Muslim sites, especially Al-Aqsa and the Dome are in a more precarious situation, due not only to their more anti-Jewish populations but that the site is the very same place where a Third Temple would be constructed, if the sect gets their way. They are not, however, in charge of Israel yet. They are likely to be held back internally. The majority of Jews are not supportive of the irretractable mayhem such an historic alteration would cause. They would, however, support more land grabs, a One State Solution, and Palestinian expulsion. Arabs without equal citizenship and without political control would be in Israel as they are today, but not in a separate sense, and by far fewer numbers, as workers and professionals.
7) The Iranian civilian government which is secularly elected is not supportive of all-out war against "Israel" solely for the Palestinian cause, and the Aytollah surely knows this, and could be directing the country towards a more sustainable future, by which Iran will become more economically and militarily powerful (just in case), part of BRICs, and part of the Russo-Chinese axis of power that would only commit to real war in league with the Russians as their chief partner (such as in a WW III scenario). The Iranians would possibly even allow Hizbullah to be "Hamassed" if they do not adapt.
What to expect:
1) Ukraine war not to dramatically escalate, at least until American election results.
2) Movement of the IDF to the border areas which Hizbulah will, (by their actions only) allow to occur, once they receive the word from Iran that Iran is not willing to stage all-out war against Israel over this problem (as long as Israel does not begin all-out war, but proceeds in these stages and makes their demands clearly, which are, at this point, getting predictable).
3) A positive BRICs Summit in October, no big October Surprise involving war or terrorism, as long as Israel is not existentially under attack.
