WHAT WE'RE UP AGAINST IN THE GENERAL: My Argument with a Flock of Communists...

[Mini-Me]

The Earth seemed flat to everyone living on it, so from their PERSPECTIVE, they believed it was flat. The truth is that the Earth is round, proven by a variety of scientific instruments and mathematics. Perception is related to this argument, HOWEVER (big however), even if we perceive the truth, we can still disagree on moral values. E.g, I can believe that killing anybody is immoral - however you can bring up self-defense as an argument. The fact that we have a disagreement proves Morality is subjective.

If you ever find a Mathematical proof against/for any moral value, that will be noteworthy achievement (maybe a nobel prize?). AceNZ disagreed that Morality is subjective, so I proved him wrong multiple times now.

We can also have a discussion about what is Math - but one thing I would like to say, if you go in this direction, Math has truly been universal tool across all societies and cultures of humanity. Sure, the way we represent Math can vary, such as language and characters, however the Logical nature of Math cannot be denounced.

Morality is indeed harder to prove objectively, maybe impossible, and I do not blame you for believing it unprovable. However, even something that is unprovable and unknowable is not necessarily subjective: You put your faith in math, and I agree this is wise, but are you aware that math rests upon unprovable axioms that we take for granted as self-evident? Are you aware that the exact formulation of these axioms has changed throughout history? Are you further aware of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems, which essentially state that any self-consistent set of axioms will be inherently unable to prove certain true statements, and only inconsistent sets of axioms would be able to prove them? (They're among the most revolutionary discoveries of the 20th century.) There are plenty of things in this universe that are true but unprovable...maybe even true but unknowable. I do not blame you for believing morality is subjective on the basis of people being unable to strictly prove any moral standard, but I also think you should take a step back from assuming it must necessarily be subjective.

Are you also aware that science is unable to constructively prove anything, only offer evidence that is consistent with - or which rejects - certain viewpoints? Nothing is strictly provable, which is the entire basis of the philosophy of skepticism. Check out René Descartes for starters, and check out the Münchhausen Trilemma. I tend to side with Popperian "fallibilism" as a tentative solution, but we can still never REALLY know for sure. We can only prove anything if we first take a few unprovable axioms for granted, and we still cannot prove everything that is true (Gödel again). Proving any particular moral standard almost certainly requires us to take a few more unprovable things for granted than we need for other subjects or day-to-day life...but the point is that the difference between provable and unprovable subjects lies more on a spectrum of certainty rather than a black and white contrast between binary categories.

Now, you say that we can only argue against moral arguments with other moral arguments (as I think you did before one of your edits), but this is also not strictly true. You may not be able to constructively prove any one moral standard, but you can still narrow things down by process of elimination, if you can manage to reject others as absurd. I don't find Hoppe's "argumentation ethics" to be conclusive at all, but he makes some pretty interesting logical points, and some of them I do find compelling. There are also plenty of moral arguments which fall woefully astray of Occam's Razor, for instance. Occam's Razor is no proof of anything, but it's a heuristic that indicates that, all other things being equal, the simpler answer is more likely to be true. The relative simplicity of universal laws tends to support this principle, among other things. There is no guarantee that ANY standard of morality is necessarily "true" or "correct," but assuming one may be, it is most likely to be simple and elegant.

With Occam's Razor in mind, consider the ideas of self-ownership vs. arbitrary statism: Self-ownership and negative rights consistently argue that each and every person owns himself (or herself) to the exclusion of others, whereas arbitrary statism and positive rights essentially assert one of infinite different configurations of some people owning parts of themselves and parts of others, where some people may own not only themselves but others as well. The sheer arbitrariness is astounding and limitless, so you can be certain that IF any moral standard is objectively correct, it's almost certainly not going to be one of those configurations, and it's much more likely to be self-ownership. The parsimony of self-ownership makes it a much more natural default position, whereas asserting that Mr. Dictator owns both himself and your family requires a whole lot more justification...which just isn't there. There are still other issues that lie on a spectrum and probably require subjective value judgments or utilitarian arguments to navigate, like the exact formulation of property, homesteading, and abandonment, but for all we know, there might be a "right answer" for all of those too.

I'm not trying to forcefully argue that morality is necessarily objective here. I'm arguing that it MIGHT be, and we just don't know. I think it's unfair to demand that everyone should agree with you on its subjectivity, or that any arbitrary standard is just as valid as a well-formulated one. (For instance, I believe that the Nazis were more than just "different;" they were inconsistent and arbitrary, and the evil of their "morality" followed from that.) Your worldview is typical of postmodern thought, which brought along with it the popularization of moral relativism and situational ethics. Iconoclasm is great, but I find it painfully ironic that casual adherents of this generally skeptical (cynical?) and relativistic worldview aren't also critical of this very skepticism and relativism: It's now unpopular to believe a certain perspective is inherently better than another, except for the perspective that no perspective is better than another. That particular perspective is the new dogma, to be defended to the death. I'm tempted to troll a little and pull a double negative on you: Maybe the question of whether morality is objective or subjective is itself subjective? That's not actually my position, but if we're going to go all skeptical and all, maybe there is no such thing as absolute truth, and that statement isn't absolutely true either...

 

[soulcyon]

Haha, yeah I editted out that "challenge against moral" argument - I thought about that for a few minutes and realized it was not true.

I do agree about the skepticism and lack of "absolute-ness" in our society - I mean honestly, every letter we type and thought transferred is simply neurons flying off in our brain, mostly deciding what muscle to move next. Also, your point about the axioms just confirms many things about math: There are mathematical theorems that cannot be proven because the axioms are so rigid. However, if you ever disprove the axioms of Math (logic and constistency), you will turn this world inside-out in a matter of seconds. This is why I rely on the Math contention, because it only takes 1 simple disproof (albeit near impossible) to refute that contention.

edit: also @ skepticism, which is why science is so successful! Because we can repeatedly run through a process to achieve desired result, which is the basis of the scientific process. So regardless of being a strictly provable, we can be assured desired results will occur when following a set of "laws" (Newton, for starters). And then we can have a discussion about Chaos theory -.- alright, i'm going to stop with this brain-leeching. Almost time for class.

@The Occam's Razor, what about Parenthood? Parent's can believe they own their child, since they go through the hardships of giving birth and raising the child. So you can imagine that some child abuse is based on a moral understanding that the child does not own his/her own body. Meh, maybe that's a bit off topic.

I'm not demanding any following or agreement, sorry if I sounded aggressive. But I would like to see people think through their own side of the argument before posting. And I definitely would love to see more of your thoughtful discussion Mini-me

 

[WilliamC]

If someone came into my home and threatened my family, I'd do everything under the sun to stop them as well. It seems you hear I reject property rights, and think that means there's no sense of possession, no sense of law, no sense of order. That's simply untrue.
It's like people who haven't a clue about anarchism thinking 'oh, that means anyone can murder people whenever they want'. It requires misrepresenting the position to an extreme degree.

Fair enough, I've come across folks arguing against property rights before and some of them reject the argument I posed.

I'm glad you accept that property rights stem from our evolved territorial instincts and are thus innately natural in their origins.

I too like the meaning behind John Lennon's 'Imagine' and it would be nice if people someday evolve to a high enough level where we can live in such a utopian world.

 

[Mini-Me]

Haha, yeah I editted out that "challenge against moral" argument - I thought about that for a few minutes and realized it was not true.

I do agree about the skepticism and lack of "absolute-ness" in our society - I mean honestly, every letter we type and thought transferred is simply neurons flying off in our brain, mostly deciding what muscle to move next. Also, your point about the axioms just confirms many things about math: There are mathematical theorems that cannot be proven because the axioms are so rigid. However, if you ever disprove the axioms of Math (logic and constistency), you will turn this world inside-out in a matter of seconds. This is why I rely on the Math contention, because it only takes 1 simple disproof (albeit near impossible) to refute that contention.

edit: also @ skepticism, which is why science is so successful! Because we can repeatedly run through a process to achieve desired result, which is the basis of the scientific process. So regardless of being a strictly provable, we can be assured desired results will occur when following a set of "laws" (Newton, for starters). And then we can have a discussion about Chaos theory -.- alright, i'm going to stop with this brain-leeching. Almost time for class.

@The Occam's Razor, what about Parenthood? Parent's can believe they own their child, since they go through the hardships of giving birth and raising the child. So you can imagine that some child abuse is based on a moral understanding that the child does not own his/her own body. Meh, maybe that's a bit off topic.

I'm not demanding any following or agreement, sorry if I sounded aggressive. But I would like to see people think through their own side of the argument before posting. And I definitely would love to see more of your thoughtful discussion Mini-me

Thanks, and sorry if I sounded too scolding.

You raise a very interesting counterargument when it comes to children and self-ownership: When can a child be considered mature enough to make his or her own decisions and face the consequences? When is a child old enough to be allowed to cross the street alone? There is no doubt that parents have to make subjective value judgments here. Children complicate the concept of self-ownership, much like mentally impaired people and animals as well, for different reasons. (Pregnancy and Siamese twins are also unusually complex issues, since they involve shared bodies.) It's important to note that this additional layer of complication does not invalidate Occam's Razor though. As Einstein once said, "It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience." Paraphrased (or perhaps he also said it like this): Make everything as simple as possible, but no simpler.

First, I should note that I think children still own themselves when it comes down to it: On some level, the vast majority just cede fine-grained control of their lives to a parent or guardian in exchange for security. There's a genuine mutual understanding, much like a contractual arrangement. If they truly wish to be free or under someone else's guardianship on a consistent basis (i.e. not some snap decision, like a drunk who tells his friends he can drive tonight), there might be something to say for that...it's just that few if any children would ever REALLY want the responsibility that comes with that freedom.

Still, let's ignore that and address complications head-on. Anyway, the common thread with all of those corner cases (children, mentally impaired, animals, etc.) is that sentience is a spectrum, and self-ownership (at least relative to others) is closely linked with the assumption of equivalent sentience. This is a fair default assumption for competent adults - one that requires some serious justification to override - but there's definitely room for subjectivity in in terms of making that classification. I believe some moral systems are totally absurd to the extent that they impart arbitrarily differing levels of dignity and free will to competent adults, whereas others are more logical than others, but at the same time, I doubt there's some hidden universal constant threshold for determining the sentience/competence level at which self-ownership applies.

Where does that leave me? In reality, I fall somewhere between objective and subjective morality: I believe there probably is objectively "correct" morality to some degree, although I obviously can't prove it. I don't think I have all the answers, but I do believe some things are so obviously incorrect/absurd/imbalanced that they should not be legitimately up for debate. In other words, I'm not certain that my morality is correct, but I'm pretty certain that Josef Mengele's was flat-out wrong. At the same time, I would concede that there are plenty of subjective areas where disagreement is perfectly valid. You hit on an extremely important one. The exact parameters of homesteading, property boundaries in 3D (how high? how low?), and property abandonment are also highly subjective. We can probably rule out the more incoherent conceptions, but if there are any objectively correct answers to any of those issues at all, I'm more inclined to believe that there are several potentially right answers, or entire spectrums of potentially right answers, rather than just one answer which is objectively correct.

Okay...gotta go!

 

[AceNZ]

Perception is related to this argument, HOWEVER (big however), even if we perceive the truth, we can still disagree on moral values. E.g, I can believe that killing anybody is immoral - however you can bring up self-defense as an argument. The fact that we have a disagreement proves Morality is subjective.

Disagreement does not make something subjective.

Regarding your example, the missing piece is that morality is contextual. It's immoral to kill, except in the context that your life is being threatened -- again, a proper code of moral values leads you to life and happiness.


@Mini-Me, thanks for your input -- although I disagree with the philosophy of skepticism and with the Popper-like idea that you can't really know anything (if true, how do you know even that?). Knowledge is hierarchical; new knowledge doesn't invalidate old knowledge, it adds to it, by applying context. For example, Newton's Laws of motion weren't invalidated by Relativity. Rather, they were modified to apply only in the context where the speed of motion is well below the speed of light.

We must be able to know things for sure in order to survive. I know for sure that if I jump off of a cliff, I will be injured or die. I know for sure that if I eat poison I will be injured or die. I know for sure that I need to eat and breathe in order to live. To attempt to deny man's ability to know is to attempt to deny man's mind and the nature of consciousness.

Popper basically argued that all statements are subjective, because statements use concepts, and concepts can't be logically derived from perception. He denied inductive certainty, which means he denied all knowledge above the perceptual level. He held that axioms require justification, but hypotheses do not; that arbitrary assertions are welcome, and that the arbitrary is good until and unless it's falsified. He also argued that one counterexample to a generalization refutes it, instead of recognizing the idea that it just adds context ("except in cases where..."), and therefore modifies the generalization instead of refuting it.

Although he was against induction, he argued for deduction, but without understanding that deduction requires induction (deduction is the application of general knowledge to a specific case; induction is required to develop that general knowledge in the first place).

 

[soulcyon]

Disagreement does not make something subjective.

You keep saying this but cannot prove it.

Objectivity: "A proposition is generally considered to be objectively true when its truth conditions are met and are "mind-independent"—that is, not met by the judgment of a conscious entity or subject."
Subjectivity: "Subjectivity refers to the subject and his or her perspective, feelings, beliefs, and desires"

There is no way morality can become "mind-independent" because moral/immoral actions can only be judged upon and affected by conscious entity (humans).

Although he was against induction, he argued for deduction, but without understanding that deduction requires induction (deduction is the application of general knowledge to a specific case; induction is required to develop that general knowledge in the first place).

Induction involves a conclusion that is larger than the premise, while Deduction forces the generality of the conclusion to be the same as the premise. In deduction, you deduce parts of the premise (usually hierarchial), to derive at an alternate perception (the conclusion). Simple example: induction - "I always hang pictures on nails" => use induction => "All pictures hang from nails". Just from the nature of induction, it is very hard to call induction a logical reasoning technique.

 

[DanConway]

Just like free will, it seems all theory is against induction and all practice is for it.

Morality is objective, because it derives from the nature of human beings, which is also objective, though hard to pin down. (I ask those who repeat "you can't derive an ought from an is" (because someone hundreds of years ago said it wasn't obvious how to do so) whether they expect to derive an ought from an is-not.)

 

[Mini-Me]

Disagreement does not make something subjective.

Regarding your example, the missing piece is that morality is contextual. It's immoral to kill, except in the context that your life is being threatened -- again, a proper code of moral values leads you to life and happiness.


@Mini-Me, thanks for your input -- although I disagree with the philosophy of skepticism and with the Popper-like idea that you can't really know anything (if true, how do you know even that?). Knowledge is hierarchical; new knowledge doesn't invalidate old knowledge, it adds to it, by applying context. For example, Newton's Laws of motion weren't invalidated by Relativity. Rather, they were modified to apply only in the context where the speed of motion is well below the speed of light.

We must be able to know things for sure in order to survive. I know for sure that if I jump off of a cliff, I will be injured or die. I know for sure that if I eat poison I will be injured or die. I know for sure that I need to eat and breathe in order to live. To attempt to deny man's ability to know is to attempt to deny man's mind and the nature of consciousness.

Popper basically argued that all statements are subjective, because statements use concepts, and concepts can't be logically derived from perception. He denied inductive certainty, which means he denied all knowledge above the perceptual level. He held that axioms require justification, but hypotheses do not; that arbitrary assertions are welcome, and that the arbitrary is good until and unless it's falsified. He also argued that one counterexample to a generalization refutes it, instead of recognizing the idea that it just adds context ("except in cases where..."), and therefore modifies the generalization instead of refuting it.

Although he was against induction, he argued for deduction, but without understanding that deduction requires induction (deduction is the application of general knowledge to a specific case; induction is required to develop that general knowledge in the first place).

You definitely know a lot more about Popper than I do! I don't personally adhere to most of the ideas you indicated, although I wonder if the difference between contradictory falsifying a generality and adding context may just be a matter of perspective and emphasis. Either way, the takeaway should be, "the theory as currently formulated is imprecise and needs some adjustment, but then it'll be consistent with the evidence again."

Anyway, the reason I like fallibilism is not because I agree with skepticism, but because it annoys me! Skepticism not only claims that we really know nothing for certain, but that we should abandon our knowledge altogether. The viewpoint that "everything you know is wrong" isn't disprovable (you could technically be a brain in a vat or computer simulation, and jumping of a cliff could hypothetically make you bounce), but I find it an unreasonably pessimistic take on knowledge, and I consider its "correctness" as such a remote possibility that I'd like to put it aside or behind me. I view fallibilism mostly as a disclaimer to actual skeptics, like, "Okay, I'm aware of skepticism, and I'm aware of the Münchhausen Trilemma, and I realize I could be wrong about all the axioms my beliefs are based upon, and consensus reality could be nothing more than a mirage...I get it, okay? Now, can I please put those hypothetical possibilities in the 'unlikely' category and go forward assuming the self-evident is true and I'm not just a brain in a vat? If we take for granted this basic foundation, we can build useful knowledge on top of it. Now I can say, [assuming these basic ideas that are implicitly necessary to navigate everyday life,] jumping off a cliff onto rocks will definitely kill me, barring a miracle." In short, I view fallibilism as a way of saying that we can be conditionally certain of much of our knowledge, and the condition is that we take a few basic assumptions for granted. If our most basic assumptions fly out the window, we don't know anything, but that case is usually too unlikely to warrant much consideration...at least unless we're in some particular situation where we should legitimately be casting doubt on our senses (tired, drunk, tripping balls, etc.).

Aside from annoyance toward skepticism, my viewpoint also includes pretty textbook moral fallibilism (as my above posts indicate): I hold that objective morality may exist that transcends mere subjective opinion (and I even believe some standards can be demonstrated as...highly unlikely ), but I'm also open to the idea that there could be more than one right answer, and mine might not even be one of them...although I'd like to think it is.

 

[royalecraig]

this site might be useful on the idrological battles to come http://changingminds.org

 

[AceNZ]

You keep saying this but cannot prove it.

I probably can't prove it to a devout subjectivist, since our foundational views of consciousness and reality are completely different.

For those who may not be familiar with it, here's a summary of the subjectivist view (this is from writers and thinkers in the field, not from me):

1. Consciousness exists and is responsible for creating the world each of us sees
2. To arrive at truth, you only need to direct your focus inward
3. Feelings are the creators of fact
4. What's true for you is true for you, what's true for me is true for me
5. All we can ever know is what goes through our consciousness, so we're cut off from true reality
6. The universe is ruled by chance
7. Certainty is impossible, so much is still unknown
8. The physical world is what's important; consciousness doesn't matter (reality is more important than ideas)
9. Standards, moral principles and concepts aren't important
10. There are no absolute truths
11. Anything I want is good, anything I don't want is bad
12. There are no answers to moral questions
13. Concepts are arbitrary, social, without any basis in reality
14. Everything is uncertain and relative (constant push toward skepticism)

Sound familiar to any of the arguments being made in this thread?

Here's a summary of the Objectivist view (my view):

1. The world around us exists separately from our consciousness
2. The only way to know the world around us is to study it
3. Our senses are important; the only starting point for knowledge is perceptual
4. The physical world and consciousness are both important
5. Ideas are the means of knowing reality
6. My moral principles are important, but their application can depend on the circumstances (context)
7. Emotions are important, but they should be balanced with conscious thought
8. We have free will
9. The world is knowable by man
10. There are absolute truths

Just for fun, here's a summary of the rationalist view:

1. The world around us exists, but the mind is purely receptive
2. If you just leave yourself open, reality will sweep you to the truth (we know reality through revelation)
3. When I ask myself how I know key pieces of knowledge are true, the answer is often "I just know."
4. The senses can't be trusted
5. Ideas are different from reality and superior to it
6. Deduction is the only method of knowledge
7. Things must follow from each other: against choice
8. My moral principles are based on rules that I must obey no matter what (context doesn't matter)
9. I know my principles are right based on intuition, my conscience and my sense of duty
10. People who always obey my principles are virtuous, and those who don't are wicked
11. Man's desires, hopes, wishes and preferences are what prevents him from always being virtuous
12. Emotions are basically useless. They are corrupting and an element of evil
13. If there was no God, then anything would be permitted

And nihilism:

1. Neither the world around us nor consciousness exists
2. Nothing really matters
3. There are no absolute truths
4. There is no such thing as morals or ethics

Skeptics would say: maybe there's a reality, but we can't know for sure.

Induction involves a conclusion that is larger than the premise, while Deduction forces the generality of the conclusion to be the same as the premise. In deduction, you deduce parts of the premise (usually hierarchial), to derive at an alternate perception (the conclusion). Simple example: induction - "I always hang pictures on nails" => use induction => "All pictures hang from nails". Just from the nature of induction, it is very hard to call induction a logical reasoning technique.

That's not a valid application of induction, since you have failed to integrate your knowledge and observations, such as: people other than you hang pictures; you know of other ways to hang pictures, etc. A valid application of induction would be: all men are mortal. You have only seen a few men, but that statement integrates with and doesn't contradict other essentials you know: the aging process, the age of people you know, etc.

 

[AceNZ]

Either way, the takeaway should be, "the theory as currently formulated is imprecise and needs some adjustment, but then it'll be consistent with the evidence again."

I basically agree (I would phrase it slightly differently). Unfortunately, that's not what Popper and other adherents to skepticism say.

The viewpoint that "everything you know is wrong" isn't disprovable (you could technically be a brain in a vat or computer simulation, and jumping of a cliff could hypothetically make you bounce), but I find it an unreasonably pessimistic take on knowledge, and I consider its "correctness" as such a remote possibility that I'd like to put it aside or behind me.

I know you said you'd like to set it aside, but since you brought it up: saying that you could be a brain in a vat ("The Matrix") or a computer simulation assumes the existence of a vat, a computer, a programmer, scientists, surgeons, electrodes, someone to put you in the vat, etc, etc. It's an attempt to use knowledge to destroy its own roots. Advanced knowledge presupposes more basic knowledge. You cannot rationally assert the certainty of advanced knowledge if the more basic knowledge is put in doubt.

In addition, for something to be possible, there must be at least some evidence for it. There is no evidence here, so such a claim is totally arbitrary (which also means it's not possible).

In short, I view fallibilism as a way of saying that we can be conditionally certain of much of our knowledge, and the condition is that we take a few basic assumptions for granted.

You're giving the skeptics too much credit, IMO. We can be more than just conditionally certain. Do you really have any doubt at all that jumping off a cliff will hurt you?

I hold that objective morality may exist that transcends mere subjective opinion (and I even believe some standards can be demonstrated as...highly unlikely ), but I'm also open to the idea that there could be more than one right answer, and mine might not even be one of them...although I'd like to think it is.

If you're interested, there are some great books on objective morality that might help sway you (one way or the other). Tara Smith's work is very good, as well as The Virtue of Selfishness.

 

[Mini-Me]

I basically agree (I would phrase it slightly differently). Unfortunately, that's not what Popper and other adherents to skepticism say.

I'm not sure why you insist on saying Popper adheres to skepticism. Fallibilism is a pretty distinct position, after all, and I'd consider it more like "foundationalism with an asterisk" than "might as well be skepticism." It accepts the idea of objective truth; it simply concedes that it's only provable conditionally (i.e. unprovable axioms are true, and/or our sensory experience is true) if at all (here I'm just referring to Gödel, who is pretty agnostic about epistemology here). This is in fact why I brought up skepticism and fallibilism in the first place: soulcyon stated that morality is not strictly provable and therefore subjective, and I indicated the technical impossibility of absolute, unconditional proof of anything as a way of pointing out, "unprovable does not by itself imply subjective."

Either way, are you sure you didn't misunderstand Popper on falsifiability? It's a more scientific concept that's only tangentially related to fallibilism (let alone skepticism). It would be absolutely ridiculous to say, "This piece of evidence contradicts theory XYZ, therefore theory XYZ must be scrapped entirely and can never be permitted to be fixed to reflect the new evidence. Let no man ever speak of heretical theory XYZ again. Any new theories from here forward must bear absolutely no resemblance to theory XYZ, or Karl Popper will find out about your grave offense and throw you in a wood chipper and eat you." I get the feeling Popper didn't mean quite that.

I know you said you'd like to set it aside, but since you brought it up: saying that you could be a brain in a vat ("The Matrix") or a computer simulation assumes the existence of a vat, a computer, a programmer, scientists, surgeons, electrodes, someone to put you in the vat, etc, etc. It's an attempt to use knowledge to destroy its own roots. Advanced knowledge presupposes more basic knowledge. You cannot rationally assert the certainty of advanced knowledge if the more basic knowledge is put in doubt.

"Brain in a vat" is just an analogy used for illustration, and the abstract concept arose long before computers (Descartes's evil demon)! We base our knowledge of the universe on our experience within it, but if that very experience is a grand illusion, matter may not necessarily exist at all. Instead, a singular consciousness existing in a vacuum, comprising the whole universe (one with very different laws than the one we experience), might as well be dreaming all of this up. Whether or not this is actually possible depends greatly on the nature of the universe itself, which even according to our worldly understanding is a pretty deep mystery. (First cause is a paradoxical violation of causality, and so is a linear causal chain extending infinitely backwards. I suppose a circular timeline may be non-paradoxical...depending...) For that matter, we technically may not even know if a universe with our particular universe's laws is even the only kind that could support a literal computer simulation.

That's not to say that an illusory universe with a singular consciousness is a reasonable assumption...just a remote possibility. Whereas skepticism loses itself in a black hole of not knowing, fallibilism builds knowledge on a branching foundation. It's the if/else/then or switch/case statement of knowledge: If an illusory world is true, what do we know? "I think, therefore I exist," and little else. If our perception of our world and our formulation of axioms are accurate, what do we know? Lots! If we add a few other assumptions, what more do we know? Lots more!

In addition, for something to be possible, there must be at least some evidence for it. There is no evidence here, so such a claim is totally arbitrary (which also means it's not possible).

I'm not following you here, because you seem to have an unusually strict definition of what is possible. Where does it come from? I might argue that for something to be seriously considered true, there must be at least some evidence for it, or at the very least, it must be one of finite possible alternatives, each of which has an equivalent lack of evidence. However, the realm of mere possibility is vast.

You're giving the skeptics too much credit, IMO. We can be more than just conditionally certain. Do you really have any doubt at all that jumping off a cliff will hurt you?

If you abuse quantum physics a little (a LOT), practically anything can happen when you jump off the cliff. The probability of anything other than death upon impact (or severe mutilation?) is astronomically/negligibly small, but my hazy understanding is that the probability of you teleporting to China is technically not zero...and that's just working within known physical laws, ruling out actual skepticism.

If you're interested, there are some great books on objective morality that might help sway you (one way or the other). Tara Smith's work is very good, as well as The Virtue of Selfishness.

Hrm, maybe. The notion of objective truth appeals to me, and I DO believe in it. I just think you're being overconfident about the unconditional provability of many truths, because I see no honest way to move forward from the Münchhausen Trilemma without first conceding fallibilism. Self-certain foundationalism seems more to me like misunderstanding the nature of the trilemma entirely.


We're WAYYY off topic now though.

 

[soulcyon]

I probably can't prove it to a devout subjectivist, since our foundational views of consciousness and reality are completely different.

Devout subjectivist? lmao, I'm only talking about Morality, yet you think my whole line of thinking is of a subjectivist. Even with the "objectivist view" you described, you CHOOSE when to apply your morals in situations. The fact that your SUBJECTIVE opinion upon situations proves that even in your objective world, morality is purely subjective! Please stop beating around the bush.

That's not a valid application of induction, since you have failed to integrate your knowledge and observations, such as: people other than you hang pictures; you know of other ways to hang pictures, etc. A valid application of induction would be: all men are mortal. You have only seen a few men, but that statement integrates with and doesn't contradict other essentials you know: the aging process, the age of people you know, etc.

The example I gave is Weak induction, you give the example of strong induction. But my statement still stands because strong induction only needs to work if everything you perceived is truthy. "All men are mortal" is a conclusion statement, so what is your base statement? I can't imagine a base statement that induces to "All men are mortal" :\

 

[soulcyon]

Double post: I see where AceNZ is coming from, will start another thread debunking this article.

http://www.strongatheism.net/library/philosophy/case_for_objective_morality/

 

[Occam's Banana]

We're WAYYY off topic now though.

But fascinatingly so. (I <3 epistemology. )

 

[AceNZ]

I'm not sure why you insist on saying Popper adheres to skepticism. Fallibilism is a pretty distinct position, after all, and I'd consider it more like "foundationalism with an asterisk" than "might as well be skepticism."

Popper has fooled you. He's one of the most notorious skeptics and positivists in 20th century philosophy.

 

[Mini-Me]

Popper has fooled you. He's one of the most notorious skeptics and positivists in 20th century philosophy.

I'll post more later.

Perhaps I misunderstand how much he leans toward skepticism? It ultimately doesn't matter though, since it's not like I worship at his temple or anything. Fallibilism itself still stands alone as something I can get behind, and I'm not especially concerned about the kind of guy who first discovered it. I certainly don't have to view it from the same perspective as him. As for positivism, I'm quite far from that position. You're no positivist either (given what I believe to be your views on logic and intuition), but even you seem to lean more toward that position than I do regarding empiricism, based on your statement about what things are possible.

 

[AceNZ]

Perhaps I misunderstand how much he leans toward skepticism? It ultimately doesn't matter though, since it's not like I worship at his temple or anything. Fallibilism itself still stands alone as something I can get behind, and I'm not especially concerned about the kind of guy who first discovered it. I certainly don't have to view it from the same perspective as him.

So you agree with the guy who "discovered" fallibilism, but you just don't agree with what he discovered or what he said about it?

As for positivism, I'm quite far from that position.

OK, but fallibilism is basically anchored in Positivism: they both claim that the senses and logic applied to them are the only source of knowledge; that concepts and the like are meaningless.

You're no positivist either (given what I believe to be your views on logic and intuition), but even you seem to lean more toward that position than I do regarding empiricism, based on your statement about what things are possible.

If anything, I'm an anti-Positivist. I strongly believe in concepts as being a source of knowledge. Knowledge is ultimately anchored in sensory experience, but that doesn't mean we can't create new knowledge based on those experiences (such as through induction).

My view is that what's possible must have some anchor in reality. Arbitrary statements don't have an anchor in reality, which means they should have no cognitive status. Where fallibilism says the arbitrary should be considered unless something can be presented to show that it's false, I would say the arbitrary should just be dismissed, with no consideration or discussion at all.

I could claim that I have an invisible pink elephant under my house. Are you honestly willing to consider such a thing as possible?

 

[AceNZ]

Either way, are you sure you didn't misunderstand Popper on falsifiability? It's a more scientific concept that's only tangentially related to fallibilism (let alone skepticism). It would be absolutely ridiculous to say, "This piece of evidence contradicts theory XYZ, therefore theory XYZ must be scrapped entirely and can never be permitted to be fixed to reflect the new evidence. Let no man ever speak of heretical theory XYZ again. Any new theories from here forward must bear absolutely no resemblance to theory XYZ, or Karl Popper will find out about your grave offense and throw you in a wood chipper and eat you." I get the feeling Popper didn't mean quite that.

Here's a quote from Popper:

natural law might be compared to 'proscriptions' or 'prohibition'. They do not assert that something exists or is the case; they deny it. They insist on the non-existence of certain things or states of affairs, proscribing or prohibiting, as it were, these states of affairs: they rule them out. If we accept as true one singular statement which, as it were, infringes the prohibition by asserting the existence of a thing (or the occurrence of an event) ruled out by the law, then the law is refuted.

In the terms of logic, he's saying that all S is P demands no S be non-P, so if non-P is found, S is refuted, not modified.

This also ties back to an earlier comment of mine, that Popper says axioms require justification, but scientific hypotheses do not. He wants scientific hypotheses to be tested, but he holds that:

1. His desire for testing is only a subjective preference
2. No test will ever prove any hypothesis nor even make it more probable
3. There are no requirements for launching a scientific hypothesis—arbitrary assertions are warmly welcomed—and the arbitrary is good until and unless falsified

"Brain in a vat" is just an analogy used for illustration, and the abstract concept arose long before computers (Descartes's evil demon)! We base our knowledge of the universe on our experience within it, but if that very experience is a grand illusion, matter may not necessarily exist at all. Instead, a singular consciousness existing in a vacuum, comprising the whole universe (one with very different laws than the one we experience), might as well be dreaming all of this up.

Experience can't be an illusion, for one simple reason: we're conscious. Matter does exist: just look and you can experience it yourself. There is no singular consciousness in a vacuum; such a claim is arbitrary, with no basis in reality.

To be conscious means to be conscious of something.

Whereas skepticism loses itself in a black hole of not knowing, fallibilism builds knowledge on a branching foundation. It's the if/else/then or switch/case statement of knowledge: If an illusory world is true, what do we know? "I think, therefore I exist," and little else. If our perception of our world and our formulation of axioms are accurate, what do we know? Lots! If we add a few other assumptions, what more do we know? Lots more!

Descartes got it backwards. "I think, therefore I exist" is wrong. The correct formulation is: "I exist, therefore I think". Existence is primary.

I'm probably sounding like a broken record, but we can be sure that axioms are correct; there's no need for uncertainty (skepticism).

If you abuse quantum physics a little (a LOT), practically anything can happen when you jump off the cliff. The probability of anything other than death upon impact (or severe mutilation?) is astronomically/negligibly small, but my hazy understanding is that the probability of you teleporting to China is technically not zero...and that's just working within known physical laws, ruling out actual skepticism.

The odd nature of things appearing and disappearing as shown in quantum physics only appears at the sub-molecular level. There is no evidence, or even a theoretical foundation, that any macro-sized object can suddenly teleport to another location. Again, that's an arbitrary assertion.

Hrm, maybe. The notion of objective truth appeals to me, and I DO believe in it. I just think you're being overconfident about the unconditional provability of many truths, because I see no honest way to move forward from the Münchhausen Trilemma without first conceding fallibilism. Self-certain foundationalism seems more to me like misunderstanding the nature of the trilemma entirely.

A detailed refutation of the trilemma would take some time. Just quickly, I can say that circular logic is not always the terrible thing it's made out to be. It is bad when you assert an arbitrary claim and use it to establish itself. However, in induction, the initial statement is not arbitrary, it's based on observation. The second step in induction is an actual integration: connecting what you observed to everything else you know, not to itself. It's really the mutual relationship of parts to the whole. After that, the right definitions become the peg for future definitions.