The Ethics of Lying

Lots of species have the capacity to communicate with one another; this is hardly exclusive to human beings. Your premise is entirely false.
I suppose you missed the word "sophisticated"? We communicate not only desires and emotions, but knowledge and wisdom. Your attempts at justifying deception are disheartening.
 
Cabal,

I think your start is the correct path - that is, lying "in a non-violent situation" should be examined independently of "lying in a violent situation".
 
I suppose you missed the word "sophisticated"? We communicate not only desires and emotions, but knowledge and wisdom. Your attempts at justifying deception are disheartening.

I'm not attempting to justify anything. I'm attempting to discover truth. I do not find your premise to be all that true or even relevant at all. You contend that lying is absolutely wrong because our ability to communicate as we do is a gift; a gift from whom? It would seem that you are already tending toward mysticism in order to validate your own particular brand of morality--this isn't something I'm all that compelled or interested by. Further still I'm equally uninterested in appeals to emotion.

If the effect of the lie is negligible and/or absolutely harmless, is the act of lying still immoral? If so, why?


Cabal,

I think your start is the correct path - that is, lying "in a non-violent situation" should be examined independently of "lying in a violent situation".

Perhaps, but from this it follows that lying cannot be absolutely immoral. Absolutes do not have absolute exceptions.

If morality is primarily concerned with the principle of non-aggression, then how can lying which does not result in damage to property be considered immoral?
 
Perhaps, but from this it follows that lying cannot be absolutely immoral. Absolutes do not have absolute exceptions.

Equally, killing is not absolutely immoral either - it has context, such as in defense of one's life from an aggressor.

The commonality of context of both of these (lying and killing) is the violence or lack of it.

Thus, killing and lying are absolutely immoral absent of violence.

If morality is primarily concerned with the principle of non-aggression, then how can lying which does not result in damage to property be considered immoral?

Because lying distorts the truth - and free men base their decisions and actions on truth - thus, by destroying truth, you lead men to make bad decisions, which harms them.
 
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I think society would be better if everyone always told the truth. Problem is, most people today can't handle the truth. You are forced to either lie or be politically correct...or else you'll face consequences. I was once fired for basically telling the truth. I did nothing wrong, my employer just wanted someone who would be politically correct and bullshit him.
 
Is it immoral to lie? Why?
Is there a different standard for different classifications of lies?
Are we morally obligated to tell the truth in all situations which are otherwise absent of violence?

Doesn't have anything to do with political philosophy :p.
 
Equally, killing is not absolutely immoral either - it has context, such as in defense of one's life from an aggressor.

How is this relevant? No one in this thread is contending that killing is absolutely immoral. There are those contending that lying is absolutely immoral. I think it's already been demonstrated that this is not the case. So then the question becomes when is lying immoral and when is it not? And under what circumstances? And how can we apply this to a concise ethic which is not in contradiction of other ethical principles and valid theories of morality?

The commonality of context of both of these (lying and killing) is the violence or lack of it.

Thus, killing and lying are absolutely immoral absent of violence.

I see what you're getting at here, but the difference is killing necessarily requires violence--either of the aggressive or defensive persuasion. Lying, on the other hand, does not necessarily require violence of either persuasion; so it isn't as analogous to killing and thus can't really be held to the same reason.

Because lying distorts the truth - and free men base their decisions and actions on truth - thus, by destroying truth, you lead men to make bad decisions, which harms them.

Lots of things can distort truth, this doesn't make something immoral though. Moreover lying does not destroy truth; truth continues to exist regardless of what lies may be told. Further still, lying does not necessarily compel anyone to make any decision or choice, nor does it necessarily force anyone to make any decision or choice. So these assertions that you've made above are not necessarily true, which makes the conclusion which you've extracted from these premises flawed.

If my girlfriend asks me if I like her new hairdo, and I tell her it looks good, even if I have further or contrary thoughts to what I said--is this immoral because it isn't precisely true? The truth in this case is my subjective opinion of her new hairdo--I have not lied to her out of malicious intent; my lie does not harm her or her property in any way; she likely even feels better because of my lie. Did she ask me this question with a preference for the truth, or was she asking me this question with a preference for positive reinforcement regardless of the radical truth? Is she entitled to the thoughts which only exist in my head which can be properly described as my property until such a time as I choose to freely share them? Is radical honesty the only moral course?

All we can accurately say from the above scenario is that I am responsible for the effects of my answer, however much of a lie it may or may not be. I don't see how the above is immoral, whereas in another scenario, if a blind man were to ask me if it were safe to cross the street, and I tell him "sure" even though there is oncoming traffic, and this results in the man either causing a traffic accident or being harmed by oncoming traffic; my lie is essentially what has caused this, and thus I am responsible for this. We can argue that this is immoral, but this lie is much different than the previous lie due to the effects of it.

This is why I think, outside of instances of fraud which are necessarily immoral, we cannot say that lies (even in the absence of violence) are necessarily immoral without considering the effects of the lie in question.
 
Doesn't have anything to do with political philosophy :p.

Well there is no philosophy section, and arguing with the same statists about why we don't need a State to build roads gets boring. I figured a change of pace would be refreshing. Though lying and politics certainly have close relations.
 
How is this relevant? No one in this thread is contending that killing is absolutely immoral. There are those contending that lying is absolutely immoral.
That is the point.

These same people will agree with you that killing in defense of innocent life against an attack from evil would actually be moral, not merely "not immoral" (that is, dispense with amoral) - yet, according to you, they claim that lying in defense of innocent life against an attack from evil is immoral --- is irreconcilable.

I see what you're getting at here, but the difference is killing necessarily requires violence--either of the aggressive or defensive persuasion. Lying, on the other hand, does not necessarily require violence of either persuasion; so it isn't as analogous to killing and thus can't really be held to the same reason.

You can utilize the same mechanics to calculate the morality - killing of the innocent is violence so the response, self-defense is violence in protecting the innocent - because of the harm it does upon the physical person.

Thus, lying as it harms the innocent makes the lie immoral. This does not grant another the right to use violence upon the liar - as the mechanics of violence aggression is a reflection - a use of violence in defense- thus of a lie upon the innocent creates the moral use of a lie upon the liar in return.

A response to a lie is a lie - so much along the Sir Francis Bacon philosophy
.... With a fraud, I am a fraud and a half.
This is why I think, outside of instances of fraud which are necessarily immoral, we cannot say that lies (even in the absence of violence) are necessarily immoral without considering the effects of the lie in question.

I can agree with that.
 
I lie almost every time I ask some one, "How they are?". The nature of the lie is that I do not care how they are, yet I ask, from which the other party might reasonably infer that I do care. I still ask people "How they are?" and it is a lie. However, the consequences of the lie are benign and even pleasant to the deceived. If someone asked me who the murderer was and I lied, saying I did not know, because I wanted to protect myself from retribution, would I be guilty of a malicious lie because my omission hinders justice? The malicious lies are told with intent to harm another person (NAP). In refusing the truth, as to the identity of the murderer, it might be said I am depriving the slain of justice and am thus aggressing upon their memory. If I, instead of refusing to name the murderer (out of my own self interest), named a person I knew to be innocent of the charge I would be telling a malicious lie. When I treat, with empathy, a stranger it is a benign lie.
 
Not all lies are unethical. If a lie is designed to limit or stop harm or fraud of a greater level than the lie creates, it is ethical.

For example:

Nazi: Are there any Jews in this house?

Jew hider: No, sir. No Jews under my floor boards.

Nazi: Very well then, carry on good citizen.

Jew hider: (closes door) I hate to lie, but it's either that or a concentration camp for Mr. Lebowitz.


Hence, lying can be the "path of least coercion". It's the extreme case where consequentialist outcomes in utility overrule the deontological outcomes of the NAP.

Wrote about it here.

Another example is infiltration of the Death Star by Han Solo wearing a stormtrooper outfit. Or stealing when your kids are starving to death. In the latter case, the positive consequentialist outcome of stealing doesn't preclude the action from being criminal (under natural law)...it simply reduces the retributive (if any) and renumerative penalties as compared to stealing under less extreme circumstances.
 
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