Here's an example of background activities that I'm posting for everyone to see. I'm not happy with Riverside County's lack of action after my numerous contacts with them, including meeting in person about two months ago:
To: Kari Verjil, Registrar of Voter, Riverside County, California.
Ms. Verjil and staff.
Thank your for your reply. I read the test reports and canvassing documents you provided.
Unfortunately the reply and reports are not satisfactory because they completely fail to address the very serious election results discrepancies I alerted your office about approximately two months ago.
We are witnessing a massive problem of vote exchange or "flipping" between candidates nationwide in the 2012 primaries. Similar vote problems were also present in 2008 Republican primaries in Riverside County as well as in San Bernardino county, were you worked in 2008.
I sat down with your staff to explain the problem and provided ample documentation to help you investigate to cause of the problem. I also gave a list of recommendations to help PREVENT the problem in 2012.
I have provided overwhelming evidence of this very serious problem, which is affecting thousands of votes. I did not see any specific attempt from your office to investigate "vote flipping" and prevent that specifically from happening again. I will gladly stand corrected if that's the case, but your office made no attempt contact me of that fact.
In your response, you state: "The Registrar of Voters strictly adheres to the vote counting procedures set forth by the California Secretary of State".
The California Canvass Process states on page 7: "Elections Code 15302. Tasks of the Official Canvass: The Official Canvass shall include, but not be limited to, the following tasks"
Note my emphasis on "not be limited to".
Just because you have completed the minimum procedure required by the State, does not mean that the job is complete. Let me explain and show the California Secretary of State procedures are inadequate.
The method by which this alleged election fraud takes place bypasses the weak security measures in place by the state and Riverside county.
Here are some examples:
1) In the California Canvass Process: "Tasks of the Official Canvass", section (b). "A reconciliation of the number of signatures on the roster with the number of ballots recorded on the ballot statement" (c) "... the number of ballots received from each polling place shall be reconciled with the number of ballots case, as indicated on the ballot statement." (d) "A reconciliation of the number of ballots counted, spoiled, canceled or invalidated due to identifying marks, overvote, or as otherwise provided by statute, with the number of votes recorded, including absentee and provisional ballots, by the vote counting system."
THIS CALIFORNIA STATE REQUIREMENT IS INADEQUATE in this regard and you are not LIMITED by it.
As I clearly explained to xxx xxx, counting total votes will not catch fraudulent vote switching of "flipping" between candidates, because the total will remain the same. You must check the total for EACH candidate at the precinct level. Your procedures must be updated.
2) I was also very clear about the manual sampling count. If you check the count of several machines in order to meet the minimum California State requirement of "Conduct the 1% Manual Tally of Votes", this will most likely not catch the fraud as it has been cleverly set up to avoid such detection.
The vote "flipping" occurs after a certain number of votes have been reached. It could be as high as 250. If no testing or canvassing seeks and tests voting machines with high vote counts, the problem will not be detected.
I read the testing report and no manual vote count exceeds 250 votes. They are all MUCH less than that, so the testing AND canvassing procedure is inadequate.
For example on page 15 of the report, the presidential candidates are assigned between 5-10 votes each. I clearly stated that a minimum of 250 votes (preferably) 500 is needed.
Let me add in this respect that the vote total TRANSFER between precinct and center must NOT be subject to a margin of error. The count at the precinct and the center much match EXACTLY for each candidate.
3) You state that "Riverside County" runs AVG Ver. 2012.0.1780 anti-virus software, but nowhere is it stated that the Central Tabulator WinEDS has that software installed. In fact the testing procedure lists the software installed, and the list does NOT show the use of AVG anti-virus. See section 5&6 of the Logic & Accuracy (L & A) tests of May 7, 2012.
4) I also have a huge problem with the same person being used to produce the "Expected Results" and the "Results" themselves in the L & A tests. In my aerospace field of work, different people always define the expectation and the final results.
Please note: The purpose of a test is NOT to get passing results. The purpose of a test is to do the best your can to make the test FAIL. That's why you are relatively safe flying airplanes. We try to make tests fail and when we can't we are much more confident that the aircraft is safe. Looking at the very weak L & A report you provided, I don't feel safe about the testing of the voting equipment in Riverside county.
5) I had requested that the Central Tabulator (WinEDS) be zero baselined, preferably with a new disk drive and NEVER connected to the internet. Why does section 7 of the L & A tests describe an "Internet Connectivity" demonstration?
I have more issues to discuss. However at this point is it only reasonable that I ask you to URGENTLY correct this situation.
1) Please get the help of a statistician to confirm my 2008 results (I attach the data files, which I extracted form Berkeley University data). The Statement of Vote from Riverside was inadequate.
2) Please hire a computer forensics expert to analyze the WinEDS central tabulator to see if any kind of infection has taken place. Have this person provide a detailed report on the date & time of and file changes or infections.
3) I need to have a file directory listing of the WinEDS central tabulator. It is my understanding, speaking to Bev Harris of BlackBoxVoting that this information is publically available.
The above steps are a minor expense to your department and will most likely uncover the cause of this massive election fraud.
Please don't take the contrary opinion of non-professionals. Seek professional advice from statistical and computer forensics experts, willing to go through the calculations and confirm my findings.
You can come out of this looking great or not. It's your choice.
Please respond as to your next steps. I am very easy to reach by email or at xxx xxx xxxx
