That is COMPLETELY different. Iran is not attacking or invading anybody, therefor the sanctions are not justified. Japan was invading mainland Asia and attacked the USS Panay in 1937... The sanctions were completely justified, Japan was threatening US national security so you don't keep giving them the materials needed to do it.
Senate vote 100-0
- Thread starter Number19
- Start date
That is COMPLETELY different. Iran is not attacking or invading anybody, therefor the sanctions are not justified. Japan was invading mainland Asia and attacked the USS Panay in 1937... The sanctions were completely justified, Japan was threatening US national security so you don't keep giving them the materials needed to do it.
Lord Xar
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This
Inny Binny
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No, we can't just drop this and say "oh, we're all so sure he's just fantastic on everything else so let's just ignore this, Rand Paul 2016!!!!!!" Sanctions on countries plunge millions into poverty. This is one of the most devastating things one can do to humanity. It definitely has more of an impact than the PATRIOT Act and the NDAA indefinite detention. And it sure as hell matters more than some neocon snuggle-fest allowing giant corporations to pollute every square inch of land (oh come on: we all know the Republican plan to gut the EPA will be followed by conveniently forgetting about those things called property rights).
And as to this fuss over whether sanctions are acts of war: who cares? What is undeniable is that they are one of the most appalling acts of aggression thinkable, and cause untold damage to the livelihood of millions.
And as to this fuss over whether sanctions are acts of war: who cares? What is undeniable is that they are one of the most appalling acts of aggression thinkable, and cause untold damage to the livelihood of millions.
Hospitaller
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I have lost my enthusiasm for Rand.
He is playing politics, even if its just a little, after all you cannot tell someone they have a "touch of pregnancy".
He is playing politics, even if its just a little, after all you cannot tell someone they have a "touch of pregnancy".
That AUMF only authorized action against the people who planned 9/11. Its broader legal interpretation is not RP's fault.
Delivered4000
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Big mistake
I won't support him as much now
I won't support him as much now
How did Japan invading mainland Asia threaten US security? The Japanese said that the attack on the USS Panay was a mistake, they did not see the US flag, and paid an indemnity for it. Similar to the USS Liberty incident with Israel, although I don't think Israel paid anything for it, or got any sanctions for it, but just got more US aid.
osan
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This would appear to suggest that Rand Paul is not up to the snuff of his father.It never ceases to amaze me what bounders we put into office.
Zippyjuan
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I never agree with anybody on all issues all the time. If you decide you don't like somebody because they voted the other way from what you like even one time then you will never like anybody. Sometimes we need to decide what are the more important issues to us and see who supports us on those.
I do disagree with any drive to impose further sanctions on Iran. Sanctions never work the way they are intended and more often than not have negative unforseen consequences. I think we are also about 50 years overdue on lifting sanctions on Cuba.
I do disagree with any drive to impose further sanctions on Iran. Sanctions never work the way they are intended and more often than not have negative unforseen consequences. I think we are also about 50 years overdue on lifting sanctions on Cuba.
Last edited:
kuckfeynes
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Yeah and I'm sure he had no idea that politicians would exploit the intentionally ambiguous language, and the stories of him changing his mind at the last minute was just blatant slander, right?
jmdrake
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Ron Paul made that vote based on the sincere belief that Al Qaeda attacked us using Afghanistan as a staging area and they needed to be rooted out. In the case of Iran, Rand took the same position of his father (they don't pose a real threat) until he was running for the senate. So you're comparing apples to oranges or apples to orangutans. That said I'm still not throwing Rand under the bus over this. I think it's a political calculation and it's being done with Ron's blessing. I could be wrong.
ZanZibar
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From Boston University International Law Journal
Spring 2002
Note:
*161 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A USE OF FORCE: RE-EVALUATING THE LEGALITY OF SANCTIONS FROM AN EFFECTS-BASED PERSPECTIVE
Cassandra LaRae-Perez
IV. When Do Economic Sanctions Rise to an “Act of War” and Is There a Right to Self-Defense?
The introduction of the U.N. Charter changed forever the vocabulary of the law of war. In its predecessor, the Covenant of the League of Nations, parties agreed “not to resort to war,” [FN155] and to “condemn . . . the recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.” [FN156] However, the Covenant does not define which acts constituted acts of war. Further, acts of war, however defined, were not per se illegal under the Covenant. [FN157] The signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact which followed were still allowed to use force against other nations without violating the Pact or the Covenant; they had only to claim self-defense, for the Kellogg-Briand Pact explicitly provided for the right of self-defense but did not limit the consequences or implications of the right. [FN158] Alternatively, a state could avoid violating the Pact or the Covenant by refusing to declare war. [FN159] Acts of “war” were illegal under very limited circumstances according to the Covenant, [FN160] and states were relatively free to decide for themselves whether resorting to war actions was justified. [FN161]
*180 The U.N. Charter framed the issue in a very different manner. Referring to peace, rather than war, the parties to the Charter agree to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” [FN162] and to “refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .” [FN163] “War” is mentioned only once in the Charter. In the Preamble, the Charter states that its purpose is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” [FN164] Thereafter, the Charter refers to “use of force,” “acts of aggression,” and “breach(es) of the peace.” [FN165] The familiar and malleable term “act of war,” once applied to describe an aggressive action by a state, was categorically deleted from the international law that governed the use of war.
A. Applying the New Vocabulary: Economic Sanctions as a Use of Force
Article 39 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the broad power to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.” [FN166] If the Security Council determines that such a threat exists, it may impose complete or partial economic sanctions upon a state for the purpose of maintaining “peace and security” and it may compel member states to comply with such measures. [FN167] If the Security Council decides these measures will be or have proven to be ineffective, it may resort to the use of armed force. [FN168] Therefore, both economic sanctions and the use of armed force are provided in the same chapter of the Charter. Reading Articles 41 and 42 together, then, economic sanctions and use of force are not mutually exclusive actions, but are two primary methods of action by which the Security Council can respond to a “breach of the peace.” Economic sanctions are not always an alternative to the use of force, but are often a first step toward it.
As illustrated in the case studies above, the effects of sanctions can be as devastating as the effects of war. In some cases, they can be more damaging, as they constrain recovery after the devastation of war and prolong suffering. In the absence of sanctions, a country is more able to rebuild itself after a war; in fact, it is often assisted in doing so by the *181 victor of the conflict. The case of Iraq is precisely the opposite. Iraq, while still struggling under the weight of the sanctions, has been required to deposit its own funds with the U.N. for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid to Iraq and to pay reparations to Kuwait, the country Iraq damaged in the war that Iraq, in fact, lost. [FN169]
From an effects-based perspective, economic sanctions appear to be closer to the use of force than the U.N. has been prepared to admit. Even in the absence of armed enforcement, sanctions forcibly constrain the actions of a nation and may be considered to impinge on that nation's sovereignty. Formerly free to trade with nations willing to trade with it, the target nation suddenly finds itself at the mercy of the imposing force. It finds itself in this position not always because the nation with which it formerly traded has made a private commercial decision not to trade, but because the former trading partner is compelled either by the U.N. or by a powerful economic force such as the United States to refrain from trade.
Determining the scope of “the use of force” from the effects perspective is not without precedent. In the International Court of Justice decision on the merits of Nicaragua v. United States, the court stated that in customary international law the prohibition against armed attacks may also apply to sending armed bands across a frontier if the “scale and effects” would have been classified as the effects of an armed attack. [FN170] The Court was prepared to examine the result of the action to determine the characterization of the action itself. Further, the Court stated clearly that a use of force does not always entail an armed attack. [FN171] The Court held that while financial, material and logistical assistance to rebels did not constitute an “armed attack,” “uch assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention . . .” [FN172] The Court did not further define what action, short of armed attack, would constitute a use of force. On its face, the imposition of economic sanctions may appear to have no relation to a use of force, but viewed from the perspective of its effects, economic sanctions are clearly more than an act of international diplomacy.
However, despite the link between the use of armed force and the imposition of economic sanctions, the U.N. has not yet developed any specific criteria for guiding the decision to impose economic sanctions. [FN173] In 1995, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recognized this gap in the law and recommended to the U.N. that objective criteria for determining the *182 purpose of sanctions should be defined. [FN174] Further, Boutros-Ghali recommended that the applications of sanctions should be monitored and their impact measured, though he conceded that restricted access to the target country might make such measurements difficult. [FN175] The General Assembly responded to the statement in 1997 with Resolution 242, Annex II, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. The General Assembly set up an “Informal Open-ended Working Group on An Agenda for Peace.” [FN176] This working group adopted a draft on the question of sanctions imposed by the United Nations. [FN177] The working group recommended that sanctions should be imposed with “clear objectives, provision for regular review and precise conditions for being lifted.” [FN178] Paragraph 4 states that “unintended adverse side effects” on civilians should be minimized by making use of humanitarian aid exceptions. [FN179] More significantly, paragraph 3 suggests that the time frame of sanctions should be monitored to minimize unnecessary suffering by the population. [FN180] The Resolution continues to stress clarity of purposes, an expression of a clear warning before sanctions are applied, partial lifting of sanctions in exchange for compliance with previously defined requirements, periodic review, and the exemption of humanitarian supplies. [FN181] The expected extent of civilian suffering is not weighed in the decision to impose sanctions in the first place, but rather, in the construction of the sanctions themselves.
The Resolution states in paragraph 20 that “[t]he concept of ‘humanitarian limits of sanctions' deserves further attention and standard approaches should be elaborated by the relevant (U.N.) bodies.” [FN182] Paragraph 27 states, “Security Council resolutions should include more precise mandates for sanctions committees, including a standard approach to be followed by the committees.” [FN183]
In June, 2000, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights published a working paper on “the adverse consequences *183 of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights.” [FN184] In this paper, Marc Bossuyt criticizes the sanctions imposed against Iraq, Burundi, and Cuba, and lays out a six-prong test for the evaluation of sanctions. Bossuyt argues that sanctions should:
1. Be imposed for a valid reason. [FN185] That is, for the maintenance of peace and security, not for “invalid” political objectives.
2. Target proper parties. [FN186] Sanctions must not target civilians who are not involved in the threat to peace. This prong essentially rules out comprehensive sanctions in favor of financial sanctions more specifically targeted against the government.
3. Target proper goods or objects. [FN187] Sanctions must not target goods needed for basic subsistence, such as food, medical supplies, and requirements for potable water. Sanctions must also exclude educational materials. Further, even legally targeted items must have a reasonable relationship to the maintenance of peace and security.
4. Be reasonably time limited. [FN188] Sanctions that are in place for an extended period are shown to both compound suffering and become less effective with the passage of time. [FN189] Sanctions against Iraq were not time-limited; they remain in place partly because unanimity in the Security Council is required to lift the sanctions. Placing a time limit on sanctions and requiring a vote to renew rather than to end sanctions would release the bureaucratic and political stranglehold that currently causes the deplorable situation in Iraq.
5. Be effective, that is, they must reasonably be expected to achieve the desired objective. [FN190] They may otherwise violate international law or the Charter.
6. Be free from “protest arising from violations of the ‘principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” ’ [FN191] Also called the Martens Clause test, this prong tests for widespread governmental, scholarly and public outcry. [FN192] If much of the international community is against a measure, it may have an adverse impact on “international solidarity,” presumably destabilizing international peace and security amongst the imposing parties and the opposing parties.
*184 Clear guidelines have yet to be implemented by the Security Council for determining whether and how sanctions should be imposed in the first instance. The six prongs suggested by the Sub-Commission are useful, but are still only vaguely defined. For example, the working group has not set out the mechanisms that will safeguard against impermissible political motivations or the imbalance of influence in the Security Council. While comprehensive sanctions have not been imposed since sanctions were imposed on Iraq, there has not yet been any indication that the Security Council is prepared to refrain from using them in the future. For future sanctions to be in conformity with international law, they will have to be defined clearly with practical applications to implement aspirational objectives. The Security Council will also have to commit to a plan or set of guidelines according to which economic sanctions will be uniformly evaluated.
B. Applying the New Vocabulary: Economic Sanctions as an Act of Aggression
In 1950 the U.N. recognized the need to define “aggression.” The Special Rapporteur assigned to the task, Mr. J. Spirpoulos, found that there was “a ‘natural’ notion of aggression that is not susceptible of definition.” [FN193] He concluded that “[a] ‘legal’ definition of aggression would be an artificial construction, which. . .could not be comprehensive enough to comprise all imaginable cases of aggression, since the methods of aggression are in a constant process of evolution.” [FN194] Despite his prophetic conclusion, the truth of which becomes more relevant as the age of information and genetic sciences evolves, the General Assembly finally settled a definition for the “act of aggression” in Resolution 3314, passed in 1974. According to this definition, an “act of aggression” includes the use of armed force. [FN195] However, current developments in information warfare, biological warfare and in genetic engineering indicate that the U.N.'s definition is grievously inadequate to address the acts waged by one state against another in the 21st century. If the “act of aggression,” or “use of force” will continue to be the legal terms used to define the permissibility or legality of harmful acts, their definitions will have to be broadened to encompass the forms of warfare or acts of harm that are already in use today.
Consider information warfare: the bare act may not legally constitute an “act of aggression,” but the effects are capable of completely destroying*185 a country's economy or interfering with essential military operations. [FN196] If, for example, an agent of an opposing state used the global information network to “take down Wall Street” [FN197] or to interfere with military operations in a conflict such as Desert Storm, [FN198] the United States would almost certainly consider such an action as an “act of aggression.” Similarly, other acts that have an adverse impact on the stability of a country or a devastating effect on its civilian population may be difficult to define as aggressive acts, yet they may have the same effect on a country as would a full-scale war.
Economic sanctions can have equally devastating effects, yet under the current definition, none of the acts above would qualify as an act of aggression. As was recognized in 1950, a narrow definition of the “act of aggression” necessarily excludes aggressive acts that can invade and harm a sovereign state no less than can a bomb or a bullet.
If economic sanctions were properly recognized as a use of force or an act of aggression, the U.N. would be compelled to take stronger action to demand the cessation of the U.S.'s illegal actions against Cuba. The United States would likely be pressured to review its policy in the face of a clearer violation of international law.
----------------------------------------------------------------
From Chicago Journal of International Law
Fall 2003
Article:
Reconciling Political Sanctions with Globalization and Free Trade
*271 PROLOGAMENA TO THINKING ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND FREE TRADE
David A. Baldwin [FNa1]
I. What Are Political Sanctions?
Economic sanctions are sometimes divided into two categories--‘political ‘ and ‘nonpolitical.‘ The criterion for deciding which category particular sanctions exemplify is defined in terms of the motives or goals of the policymakers using the sanctions. [FN1] When economic sanctions are used to influence another state's tariff policy or treatment of private foreign investment, for example, they are depicted as ‘nonpolitical‘ because the sanctions are being used to pursue ‘economic‘ rather than ‘political‘ goals. When economic sanctions are used to influence another state's human rights policy or to get that state to disarm or pay war reparations, however, the sanctions are categorized as ‘political‘ because they are being used to pursue ‘political goals.‘
The practice of differentiating between ‘political‘ and ‘nonpolitical‘ economic sanctions requires a criterion for distinguishing between political and nonpolitical goals. If an example of such a criterion exists, it has escaped this writer's attention. Unless such a criterion can be found, the distinction between ‘political‘ and ‘nonpolitical‘ motives (goals, purposes, or ends) is untenable.
*272 Definitions of ‘politics‘ take two forms. One emphasizes the state. Politics, it is said, is about government. [FN2] ‘Political‘ signifies that which relates to a state, or a society of persons . . . united for the purpose of government.‘ [FN3] This conception of politics cannot be used to differentiate between the political and nonpolitical goals of economic sanctions imposed by states. As activities of the state conducted in pursuit of state goals, all economic sanctions are political sanctions according to this perspective.
The second conception of politics emphasizes processes rather than institutions. According to this view, politics is about social relations involving power, rule, or authority. [FN4] Such a view implies little or nothing about particular goals; any goal that involves power, rule, or authority would seem to qualify as political. Numerous writers have echoed this view:
As a matter of fact the field of political activity cannot be defined, a priori, by reference to particular objects. [FN5]
Our definition says virtually nothing about human motives. [FN6]
The ends of politics may be anything. [FN7]
The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue. [FN8]
The idea that certain goals are inherently political while others are not is incompatible with the second conception of politics. Likewise, the idea that economic sanctions can be classified according to whether their goals are political or not is difficult--nay, impossible--to defend. Attempts to influence the foreign economic policy of another state are political in the same sense that attempts to change another state's human rights policy or military activities are political. This is true regardless of the means used in such influence attempts.
Thus, neither of the two most common ways of defining politics allows one to differentiate the political goals of economic sanctions from the allegedly nonpolitical goals. Those who insist on making this distinction are obliged to specify the conception of politics involved in making such judgments. None to date has done so.
*273 Is this mere semantic nit-picking that has little to do with understanding the role of economic sanctions in foreign policy and international relations? No. Although politics and economics are not the same thing, they are often intertwined in the real world. Thinking of the political and economic realms of human affairs as separate and distinct--with no overlap--makes it almost impossible to understand economic sanctions.
Economic sanctions are prime examples of institutions and policies in which economic and political aspects are inextricably intertwined. They are, in other words, simultaneously economic and political.
The attempt to treat the economy and the polity as autonomous spheres of social life mirrors the attempt to treat war and politics as separate and distinct activities. The point of the famous, but frequently misunderstood, dictum of Carl von Clausewitz was not to glorify war but to subordinate it.
This unity [of politics and war] lies in the concept that war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.
It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is politics--the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own.
We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means‘ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs . . . . Is war not just another expression of . . . thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.
If that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense. [FN9]
Properly understood, Clausewitz's words are as applicable to economic sanctions as to military force. What distinguishes war, according to Clausewitz, is ‘simply the peculiar nature of its means,‘ [FN10] not the ends being pursued. Likewise, one could say that what distinguishes economic sanctions is the peculiar nature of the means, not the goals sought by such means. Just as war is a political activity, so too the use of economic sanctions should be viewed as a political activity --regardless of the ends.
Given the context of this symposium, it should also be noted that what has been said thus far about economic sanctions applies also to legal sanctions. *274 According to either of the conceptions of politics discussed above, the imposition of legal sanctions is a political act in the same sense that imposing economic or military sanctions is a political act.
If all of the goals pursued by economic sanctions are considered political, the universe of episodes of sanctions expands so much that studying all of them would be impossible. While this is true, it is not an argument for redefining economic sanctions. One cannot study everything at once; thus, all researchers must delimit the boundaries of their inquiry. It is quite legitimate for a researcher to rule out consideration of the use of economic sanctions to influence commercial or financial policies in other states on the grounds that the researcher lacks the resources (time, expertise, research assistance, etc.) to consider such matters. It is even legitimate to ignore them on the grounds that one is simply not interested. It is not legitimate, however, to ignore pursuit of such goals on the grounds that they are nonpolitical. This is not a tenable intellectual position--unless accompanied by a conception of politics that justifies such a rationale.
Spring 2002
Note:
*161 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS A USE OF FORCE: RE-EVALUATING THE LEGALITY OF SANCTIONS FROM AN EFFECTS-BASED PERSPECTIVE
Cassandra LaRae-Perez
IV. When Do Economic Sanctions Rise to an “Act of War” and Is There a Right to Self-Defense?
The introduction of the U.N. Charter changed forever the vocabulary of the law of war. In its predecessor, the Covenant of the League of Nations, parties agreed “not to resort to war,” [FN155] and to “condemn . . . the recourse to war for the solution of international controversies.” [FN156] However, the Covenant does not define which acts constituted acts of war. Further, acts of war, however defined, were not per se illegal under the Covenant. [FN157] The signatories to the Kellogg-Briand Pact which followed were still allowed to use force against other nations without violating the Pact or the Covenant; they had only to claim self-defense, for the Kellogg-Briand Pact explicitly provided for the right of self-defense but did not limit the consequences or implications of the right. [FN158] Alternatively, a state could avoid violating the Pact or the Covenant by refusing to declare war. [FN159] Acts of “war” were illegal under very limited circumstances according to the Covenant, [FN160] and states were relatively free to decide for themselves whether resorting to war actions was justified. [FN161]
*180 The U.N. Charter framed the issue in a very different manner. Referring to peace, rather than war, the parties to the Charter agree to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered” [FN162] and to “refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .” [FN163] “War” is mentioned only once in the Charter. In the Preamble, the Charter states that its purpose is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” [FN164] Thereafter, the Charter refers to “use of force,” “acts of aggression,” and “breach(es) of the peace.” [FN165] The familiar and malleable term “act of war,” once applied to describe an aggressive action by a state, was categorically deleted from the international law that governed the use of war.
A. Applying the New Vocabulary: Economic Sanctions as a Use of Force
Article 39 of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council the broad power to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.” [FN166] If the Security Council determines that such a threat exists, it may impose complete or partial economic sanctions upon a state for the purpose of maintaining “peace and security” and it may compel member states to comply with such measures. [FN167] If the Security Council decides these measures will be or have proven to be ineffective, it may resort to the use of armed force. [FN168] Therefore, both economic sanctions and the use of armed force are provided in the same chapter of the Charter. Reading Articles 41 and 42 together, then, economic sanctions and use of force are not mutually exclusive actions, but are two primary methods of action by which the Security Council can respond to a “breach of the peace.” Economic sanctions are not always an alternative to the use of force, but are often a first step toward it.
As illustrated in the case studies above, the effects of sanctions can be as devastating as the effects of war. In some cases, they can be more damaging, as they constrain recovery after the devastation of war and prolong suffering. In the absence of sanctions, a country is more able to rebuild itself after a war; in fact, it is often assisted in doing so by the *181 victor of the conflict. The case of Iraq is precisely the opposite. Iraq, while still struggling under the weight of the sanctions, has been required to deposit its own funds with the U.N. for the purpose of providing humanitarian aid to Iraq and to pay reparations to Kuwait, the country Iraq damaged in the war that Iraq, in fact, lost. [FN169]
From an effects-based perspective, economic sanctions appear to be closer to the use of force than the U.N. has been prepared to admit. Even in the absence of armed enforcement, sanctions forcibly constrain the actions of a nation and may be considered to impinge on that nation's sovereignty. Formerly free to trade with nations willing to trade with it, the target nation suddenly finds itself at the mercy of the imposing force. It finds itself in this position not always because the nation with which it formerly traded has made a private commercial decision not to trade, but because the former trading partner is compelled either by the U.N. or by a powerful economic force such as the United States to refrain from trade.
Determining the scope of “the use of force” from the effects perspective is not without precedent. In the International Court of Justice decision on the merits of Nicaragua v. United States, the court stated that in customary international law the prohibition against armed attacks may also apply to sending armed bands across a frontier if the “scale and effects” would have been classified as the effects of an armed attack. [FN170] The Court was prepared to examine the result of the action to determine the characterization of the action itself. Further, the Court stated clearly that a use of force does not always entail an armed attack. [FN171] The Court held that while financial, material and logistical assistance to rebels did not constitute an “armed attack,” “
However, despite the link between the use of armed force and the imposition of economic sanctions, the U.N. has not yet developed any specific criteria for guiding the decision to impose economic sanctions. [FN173] In 1995, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recognized this gap in the law and recommended to the U.N. that objective criteria for determining the *182 purpose of sanctions should be defined. [FN174] Further, Boutros-Ghali recommended that the applications of sanctions should be monitored and their impact measured, though he conceded that restricted access to the target country might make such measurements difficult. [FN175] The General Assembly responded to the statement in 1997 with Resolution 242, Annex II, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace. The General Assembly set up an “Informal Open-ended Working Group on An Agenda for Peace.” [FN176] This working group adopted a draft on the question of sanctions imposed by the United Nations. [FN177] The working group recommended that sanctions should be imposed with “clear objectives, provision for regular review and precise conditions for being lifted.” [FN178] Paragraph 4 states that “unintended adverse side effects” on civilians should be minimized by making use of humanitarian aid exceptions. [FN179] More significantly, paragraph 3 suggests that the time frame of sanctions should be monitored to minimize unnecessary suffering by the population. [FN180] The Resolution continues to stress clarity of purposes, an expression of a clear warning before sanctions are applied, partial lifting of sanctions in exchange for compliance with previously defined requirements, periodic review, and the exemption of humanitarian supplies. [FN181] The expected extent of civilian suffering is not weighed in the decision to impose sanctions in the first place, but rather, in the construction of the sanctions themselves.
The Resolution states in paragraph 20 that “[t]he concept of ‘humanitarian limits of sanctions' deserves further attention and standard approaches should be elaborated by the relevant (U.N.) bodies.” [FN182] Paragraph 27 states, “Security Council resolutions should include more precise mandates for sanctions committees, including a standard approach to be followed by the committees.” [FN183]
In June, 2000, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights published a working paper on “the adverse consequences *183 of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights.” [FN184] In this paper, Marc Bossuyt criticizes the sanctions imposed against Iraq, Burundi, and Cuba, and lays out a six-prong test for the evaluation of sanctions. Bossuyt argues that sanctions should:
1. Be imposed for a valid reason. [FN185] That is, for the maintenance of peace and security, not for “invalid” political objectives.
2. Target proper parties. [FN186] Sanctions must not target civilians who are not involved in the threat to peace. This prong essentially rules out comprehensive sanctions in favor of financial sanctions more specifically targeted against the government.
3. Target proper goods or objects. [FN187] Sanctions must not target goods needed for basic subsistence, such as food, medical supplies, and requirements for potable water. Sanctions must also exclude educational materials. Further, even legally targeted items must have a reasonable relationship to the maintenance of peace and security.
4. Be reasonably time limited. [FN188] Sanctions that are in place for an extended period are shown to both compound suffering and become less effective with the passage of time. [FN189] Sanctions against Iraq were not time-limited; they remain in place partly because unanimity in the Security Council is required to lift the sanctions. Placing a time limit on sanctions and requiring a vote to renew rather than to end sanctions would release the bureaucratic and political stranglehold that currently causes the deplorable situation in Iraq.
5. Be effective, that is, they must reasonably be expected to achieve the desired objective. [FN190] They may otherwise violate international law or the Charter.
6. Be free from “protest arising from violations of the ‘principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” ’ [FN191] Also called the Martens Clause test, this prong tests for widespread governmental, scholarly and public outcry. [FN192] If much of the international community is against a measure, it may have an adverse impact on “international solidarity,” presumably destabilizing international peace and security amongst the imposing parties and the opposing parties.
*184 Clear guidelines have yet to be implemented by the Security Council for determining whether and how sanctions should be imposed in the first instance. The six prongs suggested by the Sub-Commission are useful, but are still only vaguely defined. For example, the working group has not set out the mechanisms that will safeguard against impermissible political motivations or the imbalance of influence in the Security Council. While comprehensive sanctions have not been imposed since sanctions were imposed on Iraq, there has not yet been any indication that the Security Council is prepared to refrain from using them in the future. For future sanctions to be in conformity with international law, they will have to be defined clearly with practical applications to implement aspirational objectives. The Security Council will also have to commit to a plan or set of guidelines according to which economic sanctions will be uniformly evaluated.
B. Applying the New Vocabulary: Economic Sanctions as an Act of Aggression
In 1950 the U.N. recognized the need to define “aggression.” The Special Rapporteur assigned to the task, Mr. J. Spirpoulos, found that there was “a ‘natural’ notion of aggression that is not susceptible of definition.” [FN193] He concluded that “[a] ‘legal’ definition of aggression would be an artificial construction, which. . .could not be comprehensive enough to comprise all imaginable cases of aggression, since the methods of aggression are in a constant process of evolution.” [FN194] Despite his prophetic conclusion, the truth of which becomes more relevant as the age of information and genetic sciences evolves, the General Assembly finally settled a definition for the “act of aggression” in Resolution 3314, passed in 1974. According to this definition, an “act of aggression” includes the use of armed force. [FN195] However, current developments in information warfare, biological warfare and in genetic engineering indicate that the U.N.'s definition is grievously inadequate to address the acts waged by one state against another in the 21st century. If the “act of aggression,” or “use of force” will continue to be the legal terms used to define the permissibility or legality of harmful acts, their definitions will have to be broadened to encompass the forms of warfare or acts of harm that are already in use today.
Consider information warfare: the bare act may not legally constitute an “act of aggression,” but the effects are capable of completely destroying*185 a country's economy or interfering with essential military operations. [FN196] If, for example, an agent of an opposing state used the global information network to “take down Wall Street” [FN197] or to interfere with military operations in a conflict such as Desert Storm, [FN198] the United States would almost certainly consider such an action as an “act of aggression.” Similarly, other acts that have an adverse impact on the stability of a country or a devastating effect on its civilian population may be difficult to define as aggressive acts, yet they may have the same effect on a country as would a full-scale war.
Economic sanctions can have equally devastating effects, yet under the current definition, none of the acts above would qualify as an act of aggression. As was recognized in 1950, a narrow definition of the “act of aggression” necessarily excludes aggressive acts that can invade and harm a sovereign state no less than can a bomb or a bullet.
If economic sanctions were properly recognized as a use of force or an act of aggression, the U.N. would be compelled to take stronger action to demand the cessation of the U.S.'s illegal actions against Cuba. The United States would likely be pressured to review its policy in the face of a clearer violation of international law.
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From Chicago Journal of International Law
Fall 2003
Article:
Reconciling Political Sanctions with Globalization and Free Trade
*271 PROLOGAMENA TO THINKING ABOUT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND FREE TRADE
David A. Baldwin [FNa1]
I. What Are Political Sanctions?
Economic sanctions are sometimes divided into two categories--‘political ‘ and ‘nonpolitical.‘ The criterion for deciding which category particular sanctions exemplify is defined in terms of the motives or goals of the policymakers using the sanctions. [FN1] When economic sanctions are used to influence another state's tariff policy or treatment of private foreign investment, for example, they are depicted as ‘nonpolitical‘ because the sanctions are being used to pursue ‘economic‘ rather than ‘political‘ goals. When economic sanctions are used to influence another state's human rights policy or to get that state to disarm or pay war reparations, however, the sanctions are categorized as ‘political‘ because they are being used to pursue ‘political goals.‘
The practice of differentiating between ‘political‘ and ‘nonpolitical‘ economic sanctions requires a criterion for distinguishing between political and nonpolitical goals. If an example of such a criterion exists, it has escaped this writer's attention. Unless such a criterion can be found, the distinction between ‘political‘ and ‘nonpolitical‘ motives (goals, purposes, or ends) is untenable.
*272 Definitions of ‘politics‘ take two forms. One emphasizes the state. Politics, it is said, is about government. [FN2] ‘Political‘ signifies that which relates to a state, or a society of persons . . . united for the purpose of government.‘ [FN3] This conception of politics cannot be used to differentiate between the political and nonpolitical goals of economic sanctions imposed by states. As activities of the state conducted in pursuit of state goals, all economic sanctions are political sanctions according to this perspective.
The second conception of politics emphasizes processes rather than institutions. According to this view, politics is about social relations involving power, rule, or authority. [FN4] Such a view implies little or nothing about particular goals; any goal that involves power, rule, or authority would seem to qualify as political. Numerous writers have echoed this view:
As a matter of fact the field of political activity cannot be defined, a priori, by reference to particular objects. [FN5]
Our definition says virtually nothing about human motives. [FN6]
The ends of politics may be anything. [FN7]
The goals that might be pursued by nations in their foreign policy can run the whole gamut of objectives any nation has ever pursued or might possibly pursue. [FN8]
The idea that certain goals are inherently political while others are not is incompatible with the second conception of politics. Likewise, the idea that economic sanctions can be classified according to whether their goals are political or not is difficult--nay, impossible--to defend. Attempts to influence the foreign economic policy of another state are political in the same sense that attempts to change another state's human rights policy or military activities are political. This is true regardless of the means used in such influence attempts.
Thus, neither of the two most common ways of defining politics allows one to differentiate the political goals of economic sanctions from the allegedly nonpolitical goals. Those who insist on making this distinction are obliged to specify the conception of politics involved in making such judgments. None to date has done so.
*273 Is this mere semantic nit-picking that has little to do with understanding the role of economic sanctions in foreign policy and international relations? No. Although politics and economics are not the same thing, they are often intertwined in the real world. Thinking of the political and economic realms of human affairs as separate and distinct--with no overlap--makes it almost impossible to understand economic sanctions.
Economic sanctions are prime examples of institutions and policies in which economic and political aspects are inextricably intertwined. They are, in other words, simultaneously economic and political.
The attempt to treat the economy and the polity as autonomous spheres of social life mirrors the attempt to treat war and politics as separate and distinct activities. The point of the famous, but frequently misunderstood, dictum of Carl von Clausewitz was not to glorify war but to subordinate it.
This unity [of politics and war] lies in the concept that war is only a branch of political activity; that it is in no sense autonomous.
It is, of course, well known that the only source of war is politics--the intercourse of governments and peoples; but it is apt to be assumed that war suspends that intercourse and replaces it by a wholly different condition, ruled by no law but its own.
We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the addition of other means‘ because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs . . . . Is war not just another expression of . . . thoughts, another form of speech or writing? Its grammar, indeed, may be its own, but not its logic.
If that is so, then war cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense. [FN9]
Properly understood, Clausewitz's words are as applicable to economic sanctions as to military force. What distinguishes war, according to Clausewitz, is ‘simply the peculiar nature of its means,‘ [FN10] not the ends being pursued. Likewise, one could say that what distinguishes economic sanctions is the peculiar nature of the means, not the goals sought by such means. Just as war is a political activity, so too the use of economic sanctions should be viewed as a political activity --regardless of the ends.
Given the context of this symposium, it should also be noted that what has been said thus far about economic sanctions applies also to legal sanctions. *274 According to either of the conceptions of politics discussed above, the imposition of legal sanctions is a political act in the same sense that imposing economic or military sanctions is a political act.
If all of the goals pursued by economic sanctions are considered political, the universe of episodes of sanctions expands so much that studying all of them would be impossible. While this is true, it is not an argument for redefining economic sanctions. One cannot study everything at once; thus, all researchers must delimit the boundaries of their inquiry. It is quite legitimate for a researcher to rule out consideration of the use of economic sanctions to influence commercial or financial policies in other states on the grounds that the researcher lacks the resources (time, expertise, research assistance, etc.) to consider such matters. It is even legitimate to ignore them on the grounds that one is simply not interested. It is not legitimate, however, to ignore pursuit of such goals on the grounds that they are nonpolitical. This is not a tenable intellectual position--unless accompanied by a conception of politics that justifies such a rationale.
Feeding the Abscess
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Na, Ron's vote for the language in the AUMF flies in the face of everything he's said about foreign policy and executive power. I fully believe the claims by Dondero that Ron intended on voting against it, and warned that it would be abused.
Really, most of Dondero's claims seem to be more vindictive rather than untruthful. Not that I support Dondero or even his claims, but really, most of it makes Ron just look more anti-statist and libertarian than some crank or hateful person.
Stories, plural? I'm aware of one story from Dondero.Yeah and I'm sure he had no idea that politicians would exploit the intentionally ambiguous language, and the stories of him changing his mind at the last minute was just blatant slander, right?
I don't know if Ron was unsure about his vote, but if he was I am perfectly fine with that. He probably wanted to get the people who planned 9/11 but was fairly certain that it would be expanded beyond that. He did attempt alternatives, like marque and reprisal in Oct 2001. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:h.r.03076:
In the end it was either vote yes or vote no, so he took a chance. He's doing the best he can by voting to go specifically after the people who planned 9/11, not voting to sanction entire countries. Sure, he guessed wrong, but it was an error of having too much faith in people, not a wrong vote on the actual language of the bill.
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QueenB4Liberty
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Exactly.
L
LibForestPaul
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And how has voting as Dr. No helped the cause of liberty exactly? He may win the nomination, he may win the Presidency? Woo underwhelming whoo...Perhaps a little more Sophism may be beneficial. May make his fathers views and likely his views mainstream, who knows?
Lol, the same could be said about the current regime in the US govt as well!
kuckfeynes
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And as he himself has quipped, when in doubt vote no. But as many before Dondero have noted, the chances of him getting reelected for that would have been slim.
Sorry, I love the man, but I refuse to deify him. And I refuse to believe he is so naive to not have an inkling as to how the authorization was going to be interpreted. No would have been the moral vote. As far as I am concerned that is blood on his hands. And yet, very justifiable blood... For here he is today leading the revolution.
And I take this same approach with Rand, or anyone else who represents a clear net gain for liberty. Maybe when liberty is mainstream and liberty candidates are as abundant as liberals and neocons are today I can afford to be more pure. Until then, moral purity can wait. I'm focused on positive yardage, not putting it in the end zone.
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