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By Andrew George and Rebecca Brodey
Oct. 9, 2025
The judge lengthened his sentence over conduct for which he was acquitted.
Few likely blinked when a federal judge cited coercion and abuse as aggravating factors in Sean “Diddy” Combs’s sentencing to 50 months in prison. After all, 50 months is comfortably between federal prosecutors’ recommendation of 11 years and three months and Mr. Combs’s request for 14 months. And we’d all heard reports during the trial about Mr. Combs’s horrific conduct. But here’s the problem: The jury acquitted Mr. Combs of the charges that alleged coercion and abuse.
Mr. Combs was convicted of two counts of transporting individuals for prostitution under the Mann Act. He was acquitted of the more serious charges: racketeering conspiracy and sex trafficking involving coercion. Yet the judge repeatedly invoked “coercion” during sentencing. He explicitly asserted that he was permitted to “consider acquitted conduct.” By doing so, he made clear that he was punishing Mr. Combs for conduct the jury didn’t find to be a crime.
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Article continues:
By Andrew George and Rebecca Brodey
Oct. 9, 2025
The judge lengthened his sentence over conduct for which he was acquitted.
Few likely blinked when a federal judge cited coercion and abuse as aggravating factors in Sean “Diddy” Combs’s sentencing to 50 months in prison. After all, 50 months is comfortably between federal prosecutors’ recommendation of 11 years and three months and Mr. Combs’s request for 14 months. And we’d all heard reports during the trial about Mr. Combs’s horrific conduct. But here’s the problem: The jury acquitted Mr. Combs of the charges that alleged coercion and abuse.
Mr. Combs was convicted of two counts of transporting individuals for prostitution under the Mann Act. He was acquitted of the more serious charges: racketeering conspiracy and sex trafficking involving coercion. Yet the judge repeatedly invoked “coercion” during sentencing. He explicitly asserted that he was permitted to “consider acquitted conduct.” By doing so, he made clear that he was punishing Mr. Combs for conduct the jury didn’t find to be a crime.
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Article continues:
