That wasn't a concession because it still made it clear we were fighting for delegates, and Ron's speech the next day at the Texas State GOP convention when his assigned topic was 'Republicans uniting' where he had every opportunity to make nice, made it clear he was fighting for all we could get and relished the idea of a floor fight, specifically. He referred to his time leading the Texas delegation for Reagan in 1976 (only he didn't take credit for leading it) and said that was the last time the people had a say in their nominee and he thought all conventions should be like that.
Saying we don't expect to win the one goal does not mean giving up on the many other goals which were ALWAYS part of what was being worked for. The goal of the RON Paul campaign was to win the nomination or get RON the highest profile to set him up as a leader of the faction from retirement from Congress. In fact, Ron DID have six states put him into nomination at RNC and they had to change the rules to raise the number of states needed, and then PRETEND on national television that a vote for that change which clearly did NOT pass on voice vote had passed, despite objections.
The fight was very much still on.
And the failure of the 'official campaign' to continue to put all its weight behind the CANDIDATE and the grass roots, combined with that endorsement led to immediate and huge changes in support.
Looking back, if they had it to do again, do you seriously think it was the right thing to do from the standpoint of growing Ron's influence and support? And isn't RON what the RON Paul campaign should be about? And even just through the Rand prism, the jury is still very much out whether Rand will be able to get enough loyal national support from this to make up for what he lost, imho.
We're talking about different things here. We both were here on RPF, you I think every day probably, and me pretty much every day. So we know all the various permutations of meaning and whatnot - having the goals change, etc, admitting defeat, but still moving forward. And when you both admit defeat, and still move forward, it leads to a lot of confusion, which is what we're seeing here. Benton isn't wrong to say that that email was the concession. But at the same time that concession left a lot for Ron Paul supporters to sink their teeth into, to allow them to keep moving forward.
That attempt to strike a middle ground, the whole "it's over, now keep working" did apparently cause that confusion. Collectively, we were unable to intellectually process that information.
In some respects it might've been better if Ron Paul just said "it's over, we lost, go home now. Thanks for all your hard work." But Ron Paul knew that would make his hard core supporters so very unhappy. And he didn't want to make his hard core supporters unhappy. And he didn't drop out in 2008, when he didn't have all of those delegates, so there was no reason to really expect Ron Paul to drop out in 2012.
It's fairly clear that the email was seen in the campaign, and by Ron Paul, as a concession. And what Rand Paul was acting upon was that email, that concession.
We could argue about what the precise meaning and the practical ramifications of concession, or conceding. I really don't want to dwell on that.
The most reasonable thing to assume is that the campaign is doing what the candidate wants.
And we decided to believe that the campaign was somehow sabotaging the candidate. And it wasn't. Those emails were official emails, he didn't retract those emails.
And really, we had our people there at the convention, and even after getting ripped off, we didn't do anything to fk st up.
The most interesting, and disappointing thing was revealed by Doug Wead in a 15 minute interview sometime around the convention. We talked about it here. Ron Paul (or the campaign) decided that it was better not to attack Romney in Michigan. They tell us that then. They didn't say "we're gonna kinda try to win, but we won't do anything that might hurt Ron or Rand in the future. Like negative attack ads. Now, if you're going to run for President, and you're trying to convince someone that you want to win, you really have to expect that part of the process of winning is going to include withstanding really negative attack ads. That, apparently, the threat of negative ads by Romney, was enough to basically give up all hope of winning. But they didn't tell us that. We would've had to throw those punches to win. We had to have known that those punches had to be thrown to win, and the decision was made not to throw those punches. So, we were in jack ourselves off territory with that decision prior to Michigan. But they didn't tell us that we were just jerking ourselves off at that point. You can be behind by 3 touchdowns in the 4th corner and still have hope to win. However, if you make the decision not to throw passes and only run (and not tell the fans that) you aren't going to win. It's called the "hail mary" pass, and we didn't throw one. The Ron Paul campaign seemed to go into "we need a black swan" much earlier than any of the grassroots thought.
And no one really talks about that Wead interview that much. But that's really it right there.