So you are not open to it? Humans, and groups of humans, are physical, thermodynamic systems and as such are capable of carrying information. On some level information has to apply to human relations, or are we entirely exempt from such, aloof from physical reality?
Of course information theory applies to humans and human behavior, but you have to choose the right tool. It's silly to try to use physics to analyze the development of clothing fashion or the Top-40 hit list. To say there is no connection whatsoever is obviously incorrect, but you can't process the googolplex physical variables that would be required to describe these massive, diffuse systems at the degree of precision required to draw any kind of meaningful conclusion. That's what
abstraction is for. Abstraction is intentionally throwing away information -- some of which we know is technically connected
somehow -- in order to be able to make meaningful progress in studying our subject. Classical geometry abstracts away every physical consideration and imagines space as nothing but points, lines, planes and other geometrically simple surfaces like spheres, ellipsoids, etc. No human has ever held a geometric cube in their hands. But geometric cubes (and other 3D geometric objects) are absurdly useful in describing physical volumes, despite the fact that they throw away
almost all the information about them!
Maybe I'm a complete idiot on the topic. If I am so deluded then perhaps you can enlighten me as to how I am wrong applying your expertise, or if you don't have the the time, I can wait for someone else to discuss it.
Information is not completely unconnected. Network theory, for example, certainly has connections to the study of things like decentralization, money, distributed cooperation, and many other topics that are relevant to political philosophy.
Libertarianism may be the Michael Jordan of political philosophy, but I have yet to see any definition of liberty or freedom from other libertarians that connects in any way to physical reality, or defined in any way other than in black and white terms. The recent pandemic has shown the dangers of such inflexible thinking and has led many people, wrongly, to reject libertarianism completely, including former libertarian "icons" like Penn Jillette. People nowadays are being woo'ed by the pseudo-rationality of utilitarianism and technocracy because they at least pretend to try and quantify what they are promoting. We need to be able to properly define liberty in a way that connects with reality and up our game or we lose in the current environment.
There is a zeitgeist in the modern world along the lines that any form of broad disagreement is the result of not applying a sufficiently powerful microscope. Gottfried Leibniz coined the now-famous phrase,
Let us Calculate! which later morphed into a mythos surrounding Feynman supposedly saying,
"Shut up and Calculate!" It's an interesting thought, and I wouldn't discourage continued human development in this direction (ultimately, you're talking about something like a
Metaverse). Digital computers were thought of long before the transistor made modern digital computers possible and, while they could imagine the potential of digital computers, you have to actually have a machine that can go fast enough before you can do those things you can imagine doing with such a machine!
My point is that hand-waving is not a substitute for actual computation. If you want to have a "Let us Calculate!"-showdown, then you're going to have to build an exhaustively detailed simulator that can effectively simulate the entire globe (including all human activity in it) down to the resolution of every dust-particle and every glint of light. But the idea that you're just going to sketch some information-theory equations on a blackboard and solve political philosophy is ridiculous.
A formal subject that is more relevant to political philosophy is
game theory. Austrian economics is basically game-theory applied to human choices in the unconstrained environment (i.e. thinking of the economy as a game with no explicitly specified rules), and without concern towards game-equilibria, mechanism design, and related topics that mathematical game theorists tend to care about. From this
starting point, libertarian political philosophy is more or less obvious and that is why most Austrians tend to be libertarian -- at least minarchist, if not night-watchman or full-blown anarchists.
Austrian theory is explicitly anti-quantification. The modern mindset is obsessed with quantification under the assumption that everything can be meaningfully quantified. In economics, however, quantification is useless, at best, and usually harmful. Consider a game of chess. Let us treat this game in the Misesian means-ends framework -- each player has the end of checkmating his opponent, and the means available to them are their chess pieces (their legal moves). In chess, we can assign a numerical (quantified) value to any given position, ranking that position in terms of an abstract "pawns" unit, as chess-engines do. This measure of the position really is objective, and so it makes sense to evaluate any given chess position this way and we can expect that rational chess-players of sufficient skill will arrive at a roughly similar evaluation of any given position, unless it's extremely complicated/subtle. Indeed, this is exactly what we see that grandmasters do... "black is best in this position, by about 3/4ths of a pawn." You might get a little bickering over whether it's 0.8 pawns or 0.7 pawns, but there will be broad agreement in any group of grandmasters for any sufficiently clear position.
But the real world is absolutely unlike this. What is the "utils" of a performance of Beethoven's 5th symphony? Supposing that I love classical music a lot, I might be willing to pay several hundred dollars. But if you hate classical music, you might even be willing to
pay not to be forced to sit through such an event! So, the very same "board position" has almost diametrically opposite evaluations. We can choose any polarizing good or service -- what is the "utils" of sushi, or acupuncture, or a Jackson Pollock? So, there is no solution but to acknowledge that my "util scale" and your "util scale" cannot be the same, nor are they even "roughly the same", they are simply independent. For this reason, most economists since Jevons have agreed that value is subjective.
Most economists agree that value is not objective, but isn't it at least cardinal? That is, can't my "utils" of a grapefruit at least be compared to my "utils" of sushi? If I love grapefruit and hate sushi, can't we assign something like 10 utils to grapefruit and -10 utils to sushi? And the answer is... no, it doesn't make any sense. First of all, my "utils" for the very same good or service are not the same, day to day. If I've just been to the chiropractor, my "utils" for a chiropracty session are... approximately zero. All the joints have been reset, they don't need to be re-reset. So, even if my "utils" for a chiropracty session were 10 yesterday, they are 0 today. And, in any case, what we're really interested in is not assigning some kind of "God's number" to every possible good and service, we're really trying to ask -- given some set of available goods and services --
which will I choose to consume at any given time. Even more broadly, we can choose to forego consumption altogether and engage in other activities, so what we're really interested in is not merely the set of all available goods and services in the market but
the set of all available choices. And that's the starting point of Misesian economics. Each individual chooses, moment by moment, from the set of all available choices, that choice which he or she deems, in their subjective determination, to be the best means for achieving their highest end or ends. That is human action in a nutshell. As you can see, quantification is of little use since we are really talking about subjective, ordinal ranked-choice, not objective, cardinal quantity (utils).
Many more economics fallacies can be raised but the point is that the modern mainstream way of thinking about human choice -- whether in economics or political philosophy more broadly -- is in such bad disrepair that there is little use talking with most mainstreamers about anything beyond the foundations. They need to examine their foundations first, then, after addressing the many cracks in the foundations of their worldview, they will be ready to talk about more complicated topics....