Libertarian approach/solution to flashing/exhibitionism

How should flashing/exhibitionism be dealt with?


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Becoming Uninsured is synonymous to becoming Outlaw.

Nitpick forthcoming:

Actually that isn't really the case in history. In a stateless society (or at least some of them), being uninsured was something both some poor people experienced (or ideologically driven individuals who opposed preemptively paying for insurance of a legal nature), and what outlaws experienced.

Outlawry is when you CANNOT get insured by a legal surety. Usually anyone who tries to help you, or even insure you post-outlawry, is also labeled an outlaw.

An uninsured person (but not an outlaw), either because they are too poor and couldn't find charitable surety, or because they are opposed to paying preemptively for a surety, are not functionally equivalent to outlaws. Outlaws CANNOT get insured, whereas the uninsured can (if they have more money or change their minds about refusing preemptive insurance).

Interestingly, when an uninsured poor person (not an outlaw) was harmed or defrauded in some stateless societies, it appears they would go before a group of surety representatives and present their case. Based on this, the sureties would bid up the worth of this claim, and the winning bid (not determined just by price, but by the choice of the claimant) would get the right to homestead the claim. They would then investigate and seek remuneration from the victimizer(s). The claimant was in some societies paid for their victimization immediately by the homesteading surety, and in other societies they had to wait and hope the surety found and extracted some form of payment from the victimizer.

But either way, the non-outlawed uninsured person wasn't treated as an outlaw in society, by individuals or sureties.

It's my contention that if we had a stateless society today, it might work based on everyone buying legal insurance on the market (which occurred via profit and charity in many stateless societies), based on a 100% homesteading of claims model (which is theoretically possible, although I'm not sure it ever occurred in the past), or some combination of the two (which happened in a few stateless societies of the past). The first option and the last option are most likely, because we are so much wealthier per capita than we were in ancient stateless societies.

I just wanted to say all that because it's important not to tell people who we are relating our theories to, on how stateless society might work, that either they get insured preemptively or they are essentially outlaws. That's not necessarily how it worked in the past, and not likely to be how it would work in the future. If a non-outlaw who isn't insured (assume they are too poor and there isn't enough charity) is victimized, there is a still a market to homestead their claims. In other words, righting wrongs has a market value in and of itself.
 
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Nitpick forthcoming:

Actually that isn't really the case in history. In a stateless society (or at least some of them), being uninsured was something both some poor people experienced (or ideologically driven individuals who opposed preemptively paying for insurance of a legal nature), and what outlaws experienced.

Outlawry is when you CANNOT get insured by a legal surety. Usually anyone who tries to help you, or even insure you post-outlawry, is also labeled an outlaw.

An uninsured person (but not an outlaw), either because they are too poor and couldn't find charitable surety, or because they are opposed to paying preemptively for a surety, are not functionally equivalent to outlaws. Outlaws CANNOT get insured, whereas the uninsured can (if they have more money or change their minds about refusing preemptive insurance).
Absolutely true; when I wrote Uninsured, I should have written Uninsurable, because that's what I was thinking. Thanks for correcting that.


Interestingly, when an uninsured poor person (not an outlaw) was harmed or defrauded in some stateless societies, it appears they would go before a group of surety representatives and present their case. Based on this, the sureties would bid up the worth of this claim, and the winning bid (not determined just by price, but by the choice of the claimant) would get the right to homestead the claim. They would then investigate and seek remuneration from the victimizer(s). The claimant was in some societies paid for their victimization immediately by the homesteading surety, and in other societies they had to wait and hope the surety found and extracted some form of payment from the victimizer.
That is very interesting! I didn't know that, but it makes total sense.
 
If the system of insurance companies, security and defense companies, and arbitration companies which constitutes the legal system under libertarianism prohibit their customers from engaging in vigilante justice, then yes, there are legal repercussions for violating that prohibition. There may be a penalty built into the contract that the customer signed. The company may refuse to indemnify and defend him in a dispute over the death with the killed man's heirs or insurance company. Or, worst of all: they may drop him as a customer and blacklist him. He may become Uninsured, a pariah, putting an end to his life as it was.

I understand, but that's not what he meant, as I understood it. If I said "There should be no legal penalties for using drugs/owning an automatic weapon" would you use the same argument? You'd technically be right, but we all know this.

There is no public property. That's the whole point of libertarianism: get rid of all so-called public property. In a libertarian society, all property is private.

Agreed. Unfortunately, we aren't in such a society, which is when stuff gets tricky.
But could there be a situation in which openly carrying a handgun could lead to reasonable fear of being murdered?

Conceivably. Say I pointed the gun at you.
 
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