Warrior_of_Freedom
Member
- Joined
- Jan 9, 2008
- Messages
- 8,454
Sure I'd pay, and take the kid too! I'd see the mother declining that money, FAST.
Of course they can! Apparently (pun intended), you enter a paperless contract whenever you get laid!
LOL donor for getting lucky with 2 lesbians and then getting caught;
How do you know those lesbians are not complete hogs and he actually naturally inseminated the pregnant lesbian? Also what do you mean by "getting caught"? I dont think he was hiding from anyone.
Was it entirely under his control whether or not this child was conceived? Yes, it was. If he had not given them the sperm, then it wouldnt have happened. Thus he is responsible.If he was not in possession of his seed at insemination how could he be responsible for the conception?
I agree, if he had taken the money I would think that would weigh in his favor. Since he didn't take the money, then what was his "payment"? Perhaps the knowledge that his dna would be passed on to another generation; which would further point to his responsiblity.Conversely, I see some legalism fail on his behalf by not taking any money in exchange; I believe there is some lawful magic to "in consideration of" making for a more enforceable contract.
Was it entirely under his control whether or not this child was conceived? Yes, it was. If he had not given them the sperm, then it wouldnt have happened. Thus he is responsible.
If he was in the room when the syringe was squeezed or actually participated in the artificial insemination I could agree. After that sperm left his possession (if it indeed did) he had no control over whether or not the woman chose to make actual use of it away from his presence.
Still no word on whether he was actually there for the syringe implantation? That colors the whole thing for me. If he wasn't there he gave them sperm so the "could" artificially inseminate. If he was not in possession of his seed at insemination how could he be responsible for the conception?
Conversely, I see some legalism fail on his behalf by not taking any money in exchange; I believe there is some lawful magic to "in consideration of" making for a more enforceable contract.
But, he had ultimate control over whether or not they had access to it. His actions were necessary for insemination to take place, there is no way of claiming that he had no responsiblity for the effects.
Agreements Are Important But Not Necessarily Dispositive
Even if the parties use a physician, some states expressly allow the parties to change the status of a sperm provider from donor to father, based on a contract. However, again, parties need to pay careful attention to the statutory requirements if they wish to exercise this option, as a sperm provider discovered the hard way in a Kansas case. In In the Interest of K.M.H. (KS 2007), the mother did involve a physician in the insemination, triggering application of the statute, which denied the donor parental rights. However, the donor claimed that he and the mother had an oral agreement that he would act as father to any resulting child. The Kansas AI statute allowed the parties to avoid the statutory bar on parental rights for donors, but only if they agreed in writing. Hence, the court rejected the sperm provider’s claim because it was based on an oral agreement. Obviously in a state with this kind of statute, parties wishing the sperm provider to assume parental rights and responsibilities should sign a written agreement.
A similar result occurred in a Texas case. In In the Interest of H.C.S. (2006)), a Texas appellate court ruled that a man who provided semen to inseminate his sister’s partner did not have standing under the Texas insemination statute to maintain an action to establish paternity, despite his claim of an oral agreement that he would be involved in the child’s life. In order to be considered a legal father, a male donor and the mother would have had to sign and file an acknowledgment of paternity, which was not done. However, another Texas court, in In re Sharon Elizabeth Sullivan (2005), had ruled a year earlier that a sperm provider did have standing to try to establish paternity, without reaching the merits of whether he would be considered a donor or a father, given the existence of a written “co-parenting” agreement.
In many states, there is no statutory guidance about the impact of contracts on the parental status of known sperm providers, and the cases have differed in their treatment of these contracts. In several instances, courts have relied on contracts between the parties to resolve the donor’s parental status. A Florida court looked to a written agreement to determine that the sperm provider was a donor in Lamaritata v. Lucas (2002). A Florida statute declared that sperm donors had no parental rights. Although the statute did not define “sperm donor,” the sperm provider and the recipient had entered into a written agreement that identified him as a sperm “donor.” That designation was sufficient to conclude that the statute applied.
In two other cases, courts have found that the existence of a contract between the sperm provider and recipient transformed the provider from donor to father. In In the Interest of R.C. (1989), the Colorado Supreme Court held that the Colorado artificial insemination statute would not apply if the donor proved, as he alleged, that he and the mother had an agreement that he would act as parent and that their conduct was consistent with that assertion. In that case, the sperm provider could claim paternity. An Oregon case that same year, McIntyre v. Crouch (1989), held that the sperm provider was a donor under Oregon’s AI statute (despite not using a physician). However, the court also found that if he could prove an agreement to act as a father, he would be able to claim paternity. To apply the donor statute in that situation would violate his constitutional right to due process.
In a Pennsylvania case, the existence of a contract protected the donor from a claim for child support. In Ferguson v. McKiernan (2007), a friend who had previously been romantically involved with the mother provided semen to a clinic for her insemination. The donor and mother entered into a contract relieving him of any parental rights or responsibilities. Five years after the child’s birth, the mother sought child support. The lower court initially found in her favor, relying on the fairly universal rule that a contract to waive child support where the child is conceived through intercourse is not enforceable. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the contract was enforceable. Although Pennsylvania does not have an AI statute clarifying the rights of donors and recipients, the court found no meaningful distinction between the circumstances of this insemination (using a physician, with a contract) and anonymous donation, where the donor would be protected from claims for support.
In the most recent case to consider this issue, the existence and terms of the contract between the recipient mother and sperm donor proved critical and led to a rather startling result. In Paternity of M.F. and C.F. (Indiana 2010), a man agreed to provide semen to a friend and her life partner for the friend to conceive a child. The parties signed a contract relieving the donor of all parental rights and responsibilities. The insemination was successful, resulting in the birth of M.F. Seven years later, mother had a second child, C.F., who was also the biological child of the donor. The mother’s relationship with her partner subsequently ended, and she sought public assistance. The County then filed an action of her behalf against the sperm provider to establish paternity and support. Although Indiana does not have an AI statute, the court looked to the UPA for guidance and held that the contract relieving the donor of parental rights and responsibilities was valid if the semen had been provided to physician and if the parties had executed a sufficiently thorough and formalized written contract. In this case, the lengthy and sophisticated contract, which had been drafted by an attorney, was sufficient to be enforceable. The parties disputed the manner of insemination, but the court placed the burden on the party seeking to avoid contract—the mother. She failed to prove that the insemination occurred by intercourse and without a physician, so the court found the contract was enforceable. However, the contract was entered into shortly before the birth of the first child and only referenced that child. The parties did not execute another agreement before the birth of the second child. In the absence of a contract governing the second child, the sperm provider would be considered a father and liable for child support. Hence he was a donor to one child and a father to the other!
His actions may have been necessary for insemination to take place but he had no "personal responsibility"; no possession claim or ownership claim (the enforcability of the contract is of course in question) at conception. Take for example.. had the lesbians moved to another country and kept his boys on ice for a decade before implanting. Could it be said he still had possession, ownership, or personal responsibility for his sperm?
Yes, when the insemination took place is irrelevant. He had ultimate control and is responsible for the consequences.
Yes, when the insemination took place is irrelevant. He had ultimate control and is responsible for the consequences.
or god forbid, she shares the sperm with 1000 other ladies
So a gun salesmen is responsible for what a customer does?
So a gun salesmen is responsible for what a customer does?
So a gun salesmen is responsible for what a customer does?
Subsection (5), the definition, then excludes five categories of lawsuits from coverage under S. 1805:
(i) an action brought against a transferor convicted under section 924(h) of title 18, United States Code, or a comparable or identical State felony law, by a party directly harmed by the conduct of which the transferee is so convicted.
In other words, we don't exempt that. We exclude these categories from that definition so you can still go to court, you can still gain redress from that.
The second one is:
(ii) an action brought against a seller for negligent entrustment or negligence per se.
Negligent entrustment is defined:
. . . the supplying of a qualified product by a seller for use by another person when the seller knows, or should know, the person to whom the product supplied is likely to, or does, use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person or others.
In other words, if the seller knows that this is going to be used for criminal intent or for misuse, then of course that provision is exempt from the protection under 1806.
Third:
(iii) an action in which a manufacturer or seller of a qualified product [knowingly and willfully] violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which the relief is sought. . . .
Again, the courthouse door is open to that.
(iv) an action for breach of contract or warranty in connection with the purchase of the product.
That is available.
(v) an action for physical injuries or property damage resulting directly from a defect in design or manufacture of the product, when used as intended or in a manner that is reasonably foreseeable.
Those are really the key points here that we do not in any way exempt. What we are doing in S. 1805 is very simple. We are trying to reinforce centuries of legal precedent, based on individual responsibilities, not responsible for actions of third parties. In other words, once again the trial bar is trying to suggest that a criminal act is the responsibility of the person who manufactured the product that the criminal may use in that act.
We have never allowed that to stand in our courts, and now we are trying to assure that a very small industry in this country can be protected from the kinds of frivolous lawsuits filed that are draining them of their very livelihood.
I took a plus rep for that last post which noted...
Would he be responsible for all of them?
How do you know those lesbians are not complete hogs and he actually naturally inseminated the pregnant lesbian? Also what do you mean by "getting caught"? I dont think he was hiding from anyone.
Good question. how about this: could what is done ONLY be done due to actions by that gun salesman?
Yes, when the insemination took place is irrelevant. He had ultimate control and is responsible for the consequences.
So a gun salesmen is responsible for what a customer does?
Good question. how about this: could what is done ONLY be done due to actions by that gun salesman?