Parallels of American and French economic disaster
I just came across this article from 2006 and was going to make a separate thread for it, but given the parallels of baking paper with land I think I'll post here instead (I didn't copy the entire article, just sections of it)
http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/casey/2006/1228.html
In 1789, on the eve of the French Revolution, the French government found itself in deep trouble with heavy debt loads and chronic deficits. A general lack of confidence in the business world had led to the decline of investment, and the economy was stagnating.
“Statesmanlike measures, careful watching and wise management would, doubtless, have ere long led to a return of confidence,” writes White, “a reappearance of money and a resumption of business; but these involved patience and self-denial, and, thus far in human history, these are the rarest products of political wisdom. Few nations have ever been able to exercise these virtues; and France was not then one of these few.”
Instead, as politicians tend to do,
France’s National Assembly looked for a shortcut to prosperity, and soon calls for the introduction of paper money were heard. Some prudent individuals, such as then-Minister of Finance Jacques Necker, urgently warned against it.
the government would confiscate the lands of the French Church—which then owned between one-fourth and one-third of all French real estate—and issue a total of no more than 400 million livres in large notes of 1,000, 300 and 200 livres, called assignats, that would be backed by a piece of land. Moreover, every note would bear 3% interest, to encourage holders to hoard them.
The influx of fresh money would give the French treasury “something to pay out immediately. . . relieve the national necessities. . . stimulate business. . . [and] give to all capitalists, large or small, the means for buying from the nation the ecclesiastical real estate.” From the proceeds, the nation would pay its debts and obtain new funds for new necessities—a bullet-proof proposal, or so it seemed.
At first, the results of issuing the assignats appeared to be a dream come true, says White: “the treasury was at once greatly relieved; a portion of the public debt was paid; creditors were encouraged; credit revived; ordinary expenses were met. . . trade increased and all difficulties seemed to vanish.”
Had the authorities stopped there, White suggests, the effects might actually have been beneficial. Regretfully, though,
“within five months after the issue of the four hundred million in assignats, the government had spent them and was again in distress.”
Immediately people throughout the country started to cry for another issue of notes. Paper critics cautioned that there’d be no stopping once the nation had stepped onto the slippery slope of inflation, but others dismissed the warning, saying “the people were now in control and that they could and would check these issues whenever they desired.”
By 1790, the paper-pushers had persuaded themselves that specie [precious metals, coins] was an outmoded form of currency… after all, what could be better than money backed by land that would only appreciate in value? It eerily reminds us of the U.S. housing boom and the easy, no-holds-barred mortgage deals that have been sold to sub-prime borrowers.
Or take the Comte de Mirabeau, one of the greatest paper advocates and demagogues, who at that time gave his powerful “Stay the Course” speech, concluding “We must accomplish that which we have begun.”
Or Pierre Paul Royer-Collard, who sounded disturbingly like Ben “Helicopter” Bernanke when he told the National Assembly, “If it is necessary to create five thousand millions, and more, of the paper, decree such a creation gladly.”
It was a done deal, and France began its slide into inflation.
And just like today’s Americans, who happily spend money they haven’t yet earned,
“Frenchmen now became desperate optimists, declaring that inflation is prosperity. . . The nation was becoming inebriated with paper money. The good feeling was that of a drunkard just after his draught; and. . . as draughts of paper money came faster, the successive periods of good feeling grew shorter.”
Yet more and more signs of the coming cataclysm started to appear. Even though the amount of paper money had increased, prosperity had faded.
Business became stagnant, and manufacturers starting laying off workers. In one town, 5,000 workmen were discharged from the cloth factories, but people still didn’t recognize the real cause. Exports were too cheap, they claimed, and heavy tariffs were placed on foreign goods.
A collapse in manufacturing and commerce was inevitable, says White, “just as it came at various periods in [France], Austria, Russia, America, and in all countries where men have tried to build up prosperity on irredeemable paper.”
Faced with the prospect of a continuing devaluation of paper money, the public began to see saving and caution as foolish, and the naturally thrifty French turned into a nation of gluttons and gamblers. People started to throw their money haphazardly at the stock market and “in the country at large there grew a dislike of steady labor and a contempt for moderate gains and simple living.”
One economic perversion bred the next. The Comte de Mirabeau’s previous claims that patriotism and enlightened self-interest of the people would maintain the value of the paper money couldn’t have been more wrong. In fact,
a vast debtor class, consisting mainly of those who had purchased the church lands from the government, proved to have a vested interest in the depreciation of the currency. Since only small down payments had been required, with the balance to be paid in deferred installments, land buyers were hoping for a devalued currency to diminish their debt.
“Before long, the debtor class became a powerful body extending through all ranks of society. . . all pressed vigorously for new issues of paper. . . apparently able to demonstrate to the people that in new issues of paper lay the only chance for national prosperity. . .
[While] every issue of paper money made matters worse, a superstition gained ground among the people at large that, if only enough paper money were issued and were more cunningly handled, the poor would be made rich. Henceforth, all opposition was futile.”
While the prices of all products had increased enormously, wages for the laboring classes stagnated. Paper issue followed paper issue, until the money in circulation reached 3 billion francs in 1793… and there was still no end in sight. Unrest in the general population grew, and more and more working-class people called for capital punishment for price gauging and a 400-million-franc tax on bread for the rich.
On February 28, 1793, a mob of men and women in disguise began looting 200 stores in Paris, seizing everything they could get their hands on. Order could only be restored by buying off the mob with a 7-million-franc grant.
The currency nightmare ended on February 18, 1796, when under a new government the machinery, plates and paper for printing assignats were ceremonially broken and burned on the Place Vendome in Paris. Final calculations determined that the overall amount of paper money in existence was 40 billion francs. In comparison, a gold louis d’or had climbed from a value of 920 paper francs in August 1795 to 15,000 francs less than one year later. One franc in gold was worth 600 francs in paper.
And
don’t make the mistake to think those French politicians were morons, warns Andrew Dickson White. “[The] men who had charge of French finance during the Reign of Terror and who made these experiments, which seem to us so monstrous. . . were universally recognized as among the most skillful and honest financiers in Europe. . . [which shows] how powerless are the most skillful masters of finance to stem the tide of fiat money calamity when once it is fairly under headway; and how useless are all enactments which they can devise against the underlying laws of nature.”