CPUd
Member
- Joined
- May 12, 2012
- Messages
- 22,978
http://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2016/3/9/11186314/trump-voters-identitiesDonald Trump attracts poor voters with multiple Republican social identities
Updated by Lilliana Mason and Nicholas Davis on March 9, 2016, 2:20 p.m. ET
Donald Trump's early electoral success has exceeded the expectations of virtually everyone. His success among a number of constituencies with varying interests invites the question: How does someone known to clearly switch his positions within an hour-long debate, who has virtually no political experience, and who brags about the size of his biological features gain this much traction with voters?
A number of explanations have been proposed. Individuals who score high on authoritarianism, a personality trait that indicates a psychological preference for order and a fear of outsiders, helps explain Trump support. So, too, does white identity. Hostility toward out-groups, coupled with the perception that government is increasingly discriminatory toward whites, offers considerable insight into individual voting intentions.
These explanations all hold merit but, on their own, may be incomplete. Instead, our research predicts that as individuals' social and political identities converge (or become "sorted"), support for someone like Donald Trump is predictable — particularly when you consider that most Republicans are not orthodox ideologues. In fact, given what we know about the structure of belief systems, namely that the average voter holds a considerable number of policy preferences that are paradoxical, this social sorting offers an explanation for Trump's support that draws on the power of group attachments.
...
Social psychology research has found that when most of the members of one social group are also members of another social group, those who identify with both groups are more likely to view outsiders with intolerance and to see them as very different from themselves. Once people feel so isolated from outsiders, for example, they are more sensitive to threats from these potential enemies, and they are more easily angered by threats from anyone who is not in the group.
In other words, the more our identities are aligned, the more foreign any outsider will seem, regardless of logical reasoning (or, perhaps, policy preferences). These sentiments are familiar from Trump's supporters, and the effect of combining these identities may fit perfectly with a Trump candidacy, as he speaks directly to the anger and intolerance that are results of this type of social sorting.
These angry and intolerant responses, however, should be the most concentrated among those who are in a perpetual state of feeling like their status is being threatened. This is because social identities provide people with a sense of esteem that they may not be capable of getting from their own individual lives. When their group wins, they feel like winners, even if they are not winners on their own.
In order to examine this feature of the groundswell of Trump support, we split the sample into "poor" (the people facing the most status threat in their lives in general, coded as the bottom fifth of self-reported income distribution within the ANES sample) and "not poor."
Pretty interesting stuff. This one looks to have found a way to map these voters geographically, but with low precision:
Does Social Connectedness Explain Trump’s Appeal?
by Michael Barone March 29, 2016 12:00 AM
How can one make sense of the electoral divisions in this year’s Republican primaries and caucuses? The contours of Donald Trump’s support and opposition don’t fall on traditional lines. There’s not a regional division, for example. Trump’s best states have been Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Arizona. We’re not seeing the divide between evangelical Christians and others apparent in the 2008 race between Mike Huckabee and John McCain. We’re not seeing the suburbs/countryside division of 2012, when in crucial primaries Mitt Romney carried million-plus metro areas and Rick Santorum carried almost all other counties. Trump carried metro Detroit and Chicago — Romney country last time — but lost to Ted Cruz in Raleigh-Durham and Kansas City.
So what factor distinguishes Trump and non-Trump voters? My answer is social connectedness or, to use Robert Putnam’s term in Bowling Alone, social capital. Socially connected people have strong family ties and wide circles of friends, are active in churches and voluntary organizations, and work steadily.
Putnam’s thesis is that social connectedness has declined sharply since the 1950s. But as Charles Murray notes in Coming Apart, that decline is uneven. Whites in the top third of income and education scales still have plenty of social capital. But there’s been a precipitous decline among whites in the lowest fifth of those scales. They work less steadily, attend church less often, and participate very little in voluntary organizations.
...
All remaining contests but one are in states with high social connectedness (Colorado, Oregon, Washington, the Dakotas, Nebraska) or medium social connectedness (the Northeast, New Mexico, California). Many states choose most delegates by congressional districts, and there are no sufficiently granular metrics of social connectedness for precise forecasting. Still, social connectedness strikes me as the most useful explanation I’ve seen yet of the variations in Trump’s appeal. It’s plausible that people with few social connections, who are inclined to blame elites for their problems, might see in Donald Trump, who promises single-handedly to make things great again, “a sense of collective identity,” as Clare Malone of FiveThirtyEight.com writes.
So it remains unclear whether a socially unconnected minority will be able to impose their leader on the Republican party and the nation, or whether the socially connected will rally to reject him.
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/433334/donald-trump-2016-supporters-less-socially-connected
