Declassified Document Suggests Two 9/11 Hijackers Were CIA Recruits

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Declassified Document Suggests Two 9/11 Hijackers Were CIA Recruits


The New American
April 14, 2023


After all these years, the truth about 9/11 remains not only one of the most controversial topics in political discourse, but also one of the most impactful — for the ramifications of a 9/11 coverup are dark and disturbing.

It reveals something that students of the Deep State have long understood but most average citizens are afraid to believe: That, by and large, our government, and those who truly pull its strings, not only not care about us, but they hold us in contempt and want us dead.

This is the conclusion from shocking new evidence suggesting that at least some of the 9/11 hijackers were, in fact, agents of the Central Intelligence Agency — a federal institution supposed to be keeping American citizens safe, not slaughtering them en masse.

As the watchdog group Florida Bulldog notes, a sworn declaration by Donald Canestraro, an investigator for the Office of Military Commissions (part of the Department of Defense’s Military Commissions Defense Organization) reveals that the CIA refused to provide the FBI with knowledge that could have prevented the September 11, 2001 attack.

Canestraro is part of the defense team for Ammar al-Baluchi, a Pakistani and Guantanamo detainee who, along with four others, is awaiting trial for allegedly planning the 9/11 attack. Canestraro’s declaration is the product of interviews with 11 former FBI agents, two former CIA agents, a CNN journalist, former Deputy National Security Advisor Richard Clarke, and former Sen. Bob Graham (D-Fla.), who was the co-chair of Congress’ Joint Inquiry into 9/11.

Florida Bulldog reports:


It is nevertheless remarkable for its accounts supporting the veracity of long public, yet highly disturbing allegations that top CIA officials, including Director George Tenet, intentionally withheld vital intelligence from the FBI that might have prevented the Sept. 11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington. Specifically, that known operatives and future hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar had entered the U.S. in Los Angeles shortly after attending an al Qaeda summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in early January 2000.

The new accounts, mostly obtained during interviews in 2016 and 2018, flesh out that narrative. They also support the ominous theory, never fully explored by either the 9/11 Commission or Congress, that the CIA kept silent because it was secretly working hand in glove with its Saudi Arabian counterpart to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar as informants.


The 22-page declaration is marked “Controlled Unclassified Information,” or CUI for short. According to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, CUI is different from “confidential” and is defined as “government created or owned information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls consistent with applicable laws, regulations and government wide policies.”

Per the declaration, former NSA Deputy Clarke was one of several sources who said the CIA did not tell the FBI about Mihdhar and Hazmi because the agency was trying to recruit the two terrorists by means of a “false flag” operation.

“According to Mr. Clarke, this ‘false flag’ operation would have involved [Saudi intelligence officer Omar] Al-Bayoumi befriending the two hijackers by attempting to convince them that he was sympathetic to their cause,” wrote Canestraro.

Eventually, the CIA lost track of Mihdhar and Hazmi.

Furthermore, Canestraro found that the CIA dispatched an agent to the FBI field office in San Diego for the ostensible purpose of information-sharing, when in reality it was a way for the CIA to spy on the bureau.

And the declaration maintains that the FBI conducted its own coverup:


Ex-FBI agent CS-23 said that when the FBI became aware of Omar Bayoumi’s affiliation with Saudi Intelligence and the CIA’s recruitment operation through Bayoumi after 9/11, “senior FBI officials suppressed investigations into the above. CS-23 also told me that FBI agents testifying before (Congress’s) Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks were instructed not to reveal the full extent of Saudi involvement with Al-Qaeda,” Canestraro’s declaration says.​


The 9/11 attack was one of the most transformative events in American history; it provided the government with the justification it needed to create a surveillance state with the passage of the Patriot Act, destroying our constitutional rights and privacy in the process. It gave the government grounds to invade the Middle East, thrusting the country into costly and ultimately futile wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Given the “usefulness” which 9/11 has had for the Deep State, it is not illogical to believe it feasible that the government would have knowingly allowed or even orchestrated the attacks.

After all, if a close look at American history has taught us anything, it’s that the U.S. government is more than willing to sacrifice its own citizenry in false flags to get us into war. Just look at the sinkings of the Maine (Spanish-American War) and the Lusitania (World War I), and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

In The Wall, Pink Floyd famously asked, “Mother, should I trust the government?”

With everything we know about our government, the answer is self-evident.
 
“The World Trade Towers came down on 9-11. That’s not keeping us safe.” Donald Trump
 
Court filing reveals possible CIA involvement in 9/11 attacks

PDF file (declaration by Donald C. Canestraro):
See this post for videos referenced in the following Twitter thread.

https://twitter.com/LPMisesCaucus/status/1648262213214392320
[ThreadReader: https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1648262213214392320.html]
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Declassified Guantanamo Court Filing Suggests Some 9/11 Hijackers Were Possibly CIA Assets, Ex-FBI Agents Accuse Agency of Obstructing Investigations
https://wltreport.com/2023/04/17/de...-accuse-agency-of-obstructing-investigations/
daniel_g (17 April 2023)

A declassified court filing from the Guantanamo Military Commission, the court considering the cases of defendants accused of planning the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York City, suggests that two of the hijackers were being closely monitored and possibly recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) before the attacks on the World Trade Center.

According to reports, the court filing originally became public in July 2021 but was heavily redacted.

However, independent researchers reportedly obtained a “unexpurgated” copy that reveals further details of the declaration made by former DEA Special Agent Donald C. Canestraro.

From Florida Bulldog [see this post for full article - OB]:

Canestraro said in a brief interview with Florida Bulldog that he is part of the defense team for Guantanamo detainee Ammar al-Baluchi, a Pakistani citizen who is awaiting trial with four other men accused of planning the 9/11 attacks. His declaration includes the results of his interviews with 11 ex-FBI agents, 2 ex-CIA agents, a CNN investigative journalist, former deputy National Security Advisor Richard Clarke and former Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL), co-chair of Congress’s Joint Inquiry into 9/11.

The 22-page declaration, first obtained by the national security website Spytalk, is not confidential, but rather it’s marked CUI – Controlled Unclassified Information. The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency defines CUI as “government created or owned information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls consistent with applicable laws, regulations and government wide policies.”


“The document was originally published via a Guantanamo Bay court docket, but while public, it was completely redacted. Independent researchers obtained an unexpurgated copy. It is an account by the Commission’s lead investigator, DEA veteran Don Canestraro, of his personal probe of potential Saudi government involvement in the 9/11 attacks, conducted at the request of the defendants’ lawyers,” RT reports.

RT provided further background on the two men allegedly being monitored and possibly recruited by the CIA [see this post for full article - OB]:

Of the great many enduring mysteries of the 9/11 attacks still unresolved over two decades later, perhaps the biggest and gravest relate to the activities of Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in the 18 months leading up to that fateful day. The pair traveled to the US on multi-entry visas in January 2000, despite having repeatedly been flagged by the CIA and NSA previously as likely Al Qaeda terrorists.

Mere days before their arrival, they attended an Al Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, during which key details of the 9/11 attacks are likely to have been discussed and agreed. The meeting was secretly photographed and videotaped by Malaysian authorities at the direct request of the CIA’s Alec Station, a special unit set up to track Osama bin Laden, although oddly, no audio was captured.

Still, this background should’ve been sufficient to prevent Hazmi and Midhar from entering the US – or at least enough for the FBI to be informed of their presence in the country. As it was, they were admitted for a six-month period at Los Angeles International airport without incident, and Bureau representatives within Alec Station were blocked from sharing this information with their superiors by the CIA.

“We’ve got to tell the Bureau about this. These guys clearly are bad. One of them, at least, has a multiple-entry visa to the US. We’ve got to tell the FBI,” Mark Rossini, a member of Alec Station, has recalled discussing with his colleagues. “[But the CIA] said to me, ‘No, it’s not the FBI’s case, not the FBI’s jurisdiction.’”


The court filing suggests that the CIA obstructed official 9/11 investigations to conceal its infiltration of Al-Qaeda.

“During August of 2016, I interviewed a former FBI Special Agent whose identity is known to me. The former agent is herein referred to as CS-3,” Canestraro stated in the filing’s declaration.

“CS-3 stated that had the FBI been informed about the possible presence of the two Al-Qaeda operatives in the United States, the investigation would have ultimately been turned over to the New York field office sometime in 2000 for further action and possible disruption of the 9/11 plot,” the declaration added.

From the court filing:

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The declaration later stated: “information was not passed to the FBI as the CIA was running a ‘long term intelligence operation’ to penetrate Al-Qaeda.”

An investigation determined that no information was sent by the CIA to the FBI regarding the hijackers’ multiple entry visas into the United States.

CS-23, referred to in the filing as a former FBI Special Agent with extensive knowledge of counter terrorism and counter intelligence matters, said that “the attempt to recruit Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar was an operation directed by the Central Intelligence Agency.”

“CS-23 told me that the CIA used their relationship with the Saudi intelligence services to conduct an operation on U.S. soil,” the declaration added.

“CS-23 told me that the Saudis were used as a go between as the CIA is forbidden by law to conduct intelligence operations within the U.S.”

Read more below:

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Cont. from RT [see this post for full article - OB]:

This account was backed up by another FBI investigator, ‘CS-3,’ who further claims that Bayoumi setting up bank accounts and renting an apartment for the two hijackers in San Diego “was done at the behest of the CIA.” Any information provided to Bayoumi would then be fed back to Alec Station.

CS-3 felt it odd that this CIA unit, situated in the US and staffed by analysts, was involved in recruiting Al Qaeda operatives, as such work is typically the responsibility of case officers trained in covert operations based overseas. ‘CS-IO’ concurred that this arrangement was “highly unusual,” and made it “nearly impossible for [Alec] Station to develop informants inside of Al Qaeda from its base several thousand miles from the countries where Al Qaeda was suspected of operating.”

Despite such tantalizing leads, CS-23 claims senior FBI officials suppressed further investigations into the CIA’s relationship with Bayoumi and the recruitment of Hazmi and Midhar, and Bureau representatives testifying before the joint Senate and Congressional inquiry into 9/11 were instructed not to reveal the full extent of Saudi involvement with Al-Qaeda.

For their part, CS-3 stated that before they and their colleagues were interviewed by the joint inquiry, CIA officials within Alec Station told them not to cooperate fully with investigators and they were looking to “hang someone” for 9/11.

Canestraro does not make any conclusions as to why the CIA concealed vital information from the FBI prior to the attacks, which potentially could have prevented their execution, and why the Bureau subsequently played along with the Agency’s coverup. Although one answer is provided by the unusual nature of Alec Station’s setup.

Namely, that far from infiltrating an Al Qaeda cell to avert terrorism, the Agency was seeking to influence and direct its activities in order to cause terrorism, outside standard recruitment channels. Having stumbled upon such a monstrous connivance, the FBI would’ve known well to leave the entire subject well alone.


Florida Bulldog noted [see this post for full article - OB]:

While most criticism in the declaration is directed at the CIA, higher ups at the FBI were also targets of the FBI agents’ complaints.

An ex-agent in the bureau’s Washington Field Office referred to as CS-9, was part of a squad tasked with investigating leads developed after the attacks. CS-9 told Canestraro that “agents were told they were not permitted to interview Saudi nationals in support of their investigation. CS-9 stated that many of the leads developed during his/her investigation pointed toward the Saudi diplomats stationed in Washington, D.C.

Another former FBI agent, CS-4, who in the spring of 2002 supervised two other FBI agents assigned to the CIA’s UBL Station, stated that “CS-3 approached him/her and said, ‘Boss, something is bothering me big time…we [meaning the United States government] could have prevented the 9/11 attacks.” CS-3 then outlined the CIA intelligence that showed Hazmi and Mihdhar had attended the Malaysian al Qaeda meeting, that the CIA knew in January 2001 that both men had multiple entry visas to the U.S. and that his FBI colleague had written a report on the future hijackers that “was not distributed on orders from one of the analysts at UBL Station.”

CS-3 gave his supervisor a draft of the report. The supervisor, a male, asked who else knew about it. CS-3 said just him and the colleague who wrote it. The supervisor said he then contacted FBI deputy director for counterterrorism Pasquale D’Amuro saying he needed to meet right away. The supervisor hopped in his car and “at a high rate of speed” drove to FBI headquarters where he met with D’Amuro and gave him the secret UBL report on Hazmi and Mihdhar.

“D’Amuro read the cable then told CS-4, ‘I will take care of this,’ the declaration says. “CS-4 noted that D’Amuro never mentioned the cable’s existence” again.

A short time later, though, CS-4 was promoted out of UBL Station to a senior liaison position outside of the FBI. He hadn’t asked for a promotion and told Canestraro he felt he was moved away from UBL Station because he “knew about the existence” of the CIA’s secret report on Hazmi and Mihdhar. CS-4 added he believed he was moved to ensure he “kept silent.”


Read the full declaration by Donald C. Canestraro HERE [same as PDF link in OP - OB].
 
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Ex-FBI agents accuse top CIA, FBI officials of 9/11 coverup; CIA said to use Saudis, others for illegal domestic spy operations
https://www.floridabulldog.org/2023...i-officials-9-11-coverup-cia-domestic-spying/
Dan Christensen (09 April 2023)

Weeks before 9/11, an angry New York FBI agent nearly “came over the table” at CIA officials who were blocking him from obtaining intelligence about two al Qaeda terrorists who would soon take part in hijacking an American Airlines passenger jet and crashing it into the Pentagon.

“Someone is going to die,” the counterterrorism agent wrote in a bitter email shortly after the 2001 encounter.

That astonishing account, and many others, are contained in a sworn declaration by Donald Canestraro, an investigator for the Office of Military Commissions, part of the Department of Defense’s Military Commissions Defense Organization. It is dated July 20, 2021.

Canestraro said in a brief interview with Florida Bulldog that he is part of the defense team for Guantanamo detainee Ammar al-Baluchi, a Pakistani citizen who is awaiting trial with four other men accused of planning the 9/11 attacks. His declaration includes the results of his interviews with 11 ex-FBI agents, 2 ex-CIA agents, a CNN investigative journalist, former deputy National Security Advisor Richard Clarke and former Sen. Bob Graham (D-FL), co-chair of Congress’s Joint Inquiry into 9/11.

The 22-page declaration [same as PDF link in OP - OB], first obtained by the national security website Spytalk, is not confidential, but rather it’s marked CUI – Controlled Unclassified Information. The Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency defines CUI as “government created or owned information that requires safeguarding or dissemination controls consistent with applicable laws, regulations and government wide policies.”

A REMARKABLE DOCUMENT
 
It is nevertheless remarkable for its accounts supporting the veracity of long public, yet highly disturbing allegations that top CIA officials, including Director George Tenet, intentionally withheld vital intelligence from the FBI that might have prevented the Sept. 11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington. Specifically, that known operatives and future hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar had entered the U.S. in Los Angeles shortly after attending an al Qaeda summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in early January 2000.

The new accounts, mostly obtained during interviews in 2016 and 2018, flesh out that narrative. They also support the ominous theory, never fully explored by either the 9/11 Commission or Congress, that the CIA kept silent because it was secretly working hand in glove with its Saudi Arabian counterpart to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar as informants.

Except for Clarke and Graham, the people interviewed are not named or identified by gender because they spoke on condition of anonymity. Canestraro states that he knows who they are, and he declined to identify them to Florida Bulldog. Enough descriptive information is provided in the text, however, that it’s possible to identify several interviewees.

The un-redacted declaration is remarkable for another reason: it comes from litigation in the U.S. Military Court at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp – where government censors routinely scrub and/or withhold court filings and transcripts in the name of national security. Its disclosure raises questions about what other information about September 11th is being kept secret at Guantanamo – from the 9/11 families and the American public?

According to his declaration, Canestraro was a DEA agent for 21 years when he joined the Office of Military Commissions in April 2016. “During July of 2016 I began an investigation into the possible involvement of the Saudi Arabian Government and the Central Intelligence Agency in the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks.”

A REVIEW BEGINS
 
Canestraro’s initial review of discovery documents provided by the government to the defense focused on Omar al Bayoumi and Fahad al Thumairy. Bayoumi was an apparent Saudi intelligence officer who had numerous contacts with Hazmi and Mihdhar and helped them obtain an apartment in San Diego. Thumairy was a Saudi consular official in Los Angeles and a local religious leader.

Bayoumi, Thumairy and a third man, Musaed al Jarrah – deputy head of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi embassy in Washington — are named as “principal subjects” of the FBI’s Operation Encore, a once-secret FBI probe into Saudi government involvement first made public in an October 2012 FBI report obtained by Florida Bulldog amid Freedom of Information Act litigation in 2016. The report says Jarrah “tasked” Bayoumi and Thumairy with helping the hijackers.

In September 2021, President Biden issued an executive order directing the Department of Justice and other federal agencies to conduct declassification reviews of documents regarding Operation Encore, referred to in the order as a “subfile” of the FBI’s primary PENTTBOMB investigation, and to publicly release as many documents as possible. The FBI has released thousands of pages so far – including records previously declared to be “state secrets” that say Saudi government officials knowingly provided a support network for Hazmi and Mihdhar, the first two al Qaeda hijackers to enter the U.S.

Canestraro’s client Ammar al-Baluchi, also known as Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, is a nephew of and co-defendant with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged “mastermind” behind 9/11. Government documents allege that from banks in Dubai he transferred tens of thousands of dollars to a Suntrust Bank account in Florida jointly owned by 9/11 hijackers Marwan al-Shehhi and Mohammed Atta. Atta flew American Airlines Flight 11 into the North Tower of the World Trade Center. Shehhi was at the controls of United Airlines Flight 175 when the Boeing 767 crashed into the South Tower.

Baluchi, like Mohammed, was captured in Pakistan in 2003 and held by the CIA for three years at overseas “black sites” where he was reportedly tortured before being transferred to Guantanamo in 2006. He, Mohammed and three others – Walid Bin Attash, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi – all face capital charges, and the government has previously said it would seek the death penalty. No trial date has been set.

CIA SPIED ON THE FBI
 
The CIA’s lack of cooperation with the FBI is discussed in detail in the declaration. One ex-FBI agent who worked under CIA control at Usama Bin Laden (UBL) Station, also known as ALEC Station, discussed how a colleague had prepared a Central Intelligence Report “outlining the possible presence of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar in the U.S.,” but was not allowed to forward it to the FBI for action.

Two former FBI agents stated that the CIA even spied on the FBI as it investigated 9/11.

Canestraro’s declaration says that in the spring of 2021 a former agent with “extensive experience in terrorism and counterintelligence matters,” explained that after the attacks “it became impossible for the FBI to unilaterally conduct a terrorism or counterintelligence investigation without the tacit approval of the CIA. CS-22 further related that officers of the local CIA domestic station located in his/her office of assignment would frequently sit in the command centers of local FBI Field Offices while FBI agents conducted operations related to counter terrorism to monitor FBI activities. CS-22 told me that the above made it easy for CIA officers to monitor FBI activities.”

Another former FBI agent, known as CS-8, said that “immediately following the 9/11 attacks, an intelligence officer was detailed to the FBI’s San Diego Field Office. CS-8 recalled that the officer was supposed to be assigned to the San Diego office to further information sharing between the FBI and the CIA. However, CS-8 later learned the officer was actually examining FBI files in an attempt to blame the FBI for the intelligence failures that led to 9/11.”

The ex-New York FBI counterterrorism agent who tussled with the CIA, referred to in the declaration as CS-12, was assigned to work the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in the summer of 2001. That June, CS-12 was present during a meeting between CIA and FBI officials.

CIA LOSES TRACK OF HAZMI AND MIHDHAR
 
The CIA was said to have sought the meeting after being unable to locate some terrorist suspects. CIA officers showed three surveillance photos, didn’t say where or when they were taken, but asked if one was of Fahd Al-Quso, a suspect in the Cole bombing. CS-12 didn’t know. When FBI agents asked he CIA whether “stops” had been put in place to prevent those suspects from entering the U.S., frustrations grew.

CS-5, another former FBI special agent, said the New York agent “was so adamant” that the CIA provide information “for his/her investigation that he/she nearly ‘came over the table’ at CIA officials at a meeting with the FBI’s counter terrorism squad prior to 9/11,” the declaration says.

CS-12 later learned that two of the photos were of Hazmi and Mihdhar, the declaration says. Quso was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in 2012.

On Aug. 23, less than three weeks before the attacks, the New York FBI agent opened an EC, or electronic communication, from FBI headquarters about the photographs. It contained information “showing that Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar were in the United States.” The declaration does not say it, but it has long been reported that the photos were snapped at the Malaysian al Qaeda gathering.

The agent contacted an FBI analyst at headquarters. The conversation became “’heated’ when the analyst told CS-12 that he/she was not authorized to view the EC and that he/she was ordered to delete it immediately.” Why? Because the information had been obtained from intelligence sources and that the bureaucratic “wall” between intelligence and criminal investigations precluded the agent from seeing it.

The next day the agent, the analyst and the acting chief of the FBI’s (Usama) Bin Laden Unit met in a 45-minute conference call. “During the call, officials at FBI headquarters told CS-12 to ‘stand down’ and to cease looking for Khalid Al-Mihdhar” and that HQ was looking to open an intelligence gathering investigation of Mihdhar. The following day the agent emailed the analyst warning, “‘someone is going to die’ unless the case against Mihdhar was pursued further.”

FUEL FOR THE RECRUITMENT THEORY
 
Immediately after the attacks FBI HQ and the New York office met again. “It was during this call that CS-12 learned that Al-Mihdhar and Al-Hazmi were on the flight manifests of one of the planes that were used in the attacks. CS-12 recalls that the conference call then became quite heated between the New York agents and HQS personnel.”

On Sept. 14, CS-12 contacted the FBI analyst who produced a fourth photograph from the same surveillance operation. The photo was of Walid Bin Attash, who was readily identifiable due to his missing leg.

Had the New York agents been shown that photo earlier, CS-12 said, they would have “immediately linked Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar to Bin Attash, a prime suspect in the bombing of the USS Cole. As a result, the inquiry would have been able to devote the full resources of the FBI’s New York Field Office to efforts to find the two hijackers later in the summer of 2001.”

What happened fueled the theory that the CIA didn’t tell the FBI that two al Qaeda terrorists were in the U.S. to protect their secret plan to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar as informants.

One “former senior FBI official whose identity if known to me,” dubbed CS-16, told Canestraro, the FBI’s N.Y.C. office wasn’t told that Hazmi and Mihdhar were in the country until Aug. 26, 2001. “CS-16 stated that the CIA withheld the information that the two hijackers had had entered the country in 2000 from the FBI on orders from two CIA employees, Richard Blee and Tom Wilshire. CS-16 stated that it was his/her opinion that the information was withheld as the CIA was attempting to recruit Al Hazmi and/or Al Mihdhar as intelligence sources while they were in the U.S.”

Blee became the chief of UBL Station in 1999 and was in charge there on 9/11. Wilshire was Blee’s deputy.

FBI agent CS-5 said the CIA’s reluctance to tell the FBI about the two al Qaeda figures “didn’t make sense” to many New York agents and led CS-5 to conclude “that the CIA was running an intelligence operation targeting Al-Qaeda that somehow involved Hazmi and Mihdhar.” CS-5 believed the CIA operation “may have spun out of control” and they came to the FBI in June 2001 “with limited information in an attempt to locate the hijackers without revealing the true nature or extent of their operation against Al Qaeda.”

Yet another ex-FBI agent said to have “extensive knowledge” of counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters, stated in June 2021 that the effort to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar “was an operation directed by the Central Intelligence Agency. CS-23 told me that the CIA used their liaison relationship with the Saudi intelligence services to conduct an operation on U.S. soil. CS-23 told me that the Saudis were used as a go between as the CIA is forbidden by law to conduct intelligence operations within the U.S.” The CIA “has used its relationship with allied intelligence services to conduct operations inside the United States in the past,” the declaration says.

THE CIA’S ‘FALSE FLAG’ RECRUITMENT OPERATION
 
Former Deputy National Security Advisor Richard Clarke gave a similar account, adding that prior to the attacks Deputy CIA Director Cofer Black had told him the CIA had no human intelligence sources inside Al Qaeda and that he was determined to change that. Clarke also said neither he nor the FBI was told about Hazmi and Mihdhar because “the CIA was running a ‘false flag’ operation to recruit the hijackers.

“According to Mr. Clarke, this ‘false flag’ operation would have involved Al-Bayoumi befriending the two hijackers by attempting to convince them that he was sympathetic to their cause. At the same time, Al-Bayoumi would have been reporting on the hijackers’ activities to Saudi intelligence and, ultimately to the CIA. Mr. Clarke stated that when he proclaimed this belief publicly, he received an angry phone call from former director of the CIA George Tenet. Mr. Clarke noted, however, that Mr. Tenet did not deny the allegation made by Mr. Clarke.”

Both Clarke and former Sen. Graham were critical of the 9/11 Commission, saying it “did not investigate the Saudi connection to the 9/11 attacks completely.” Clarke added that the commission’s executive director, Philip Zelikow, “was selected by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to prevent damage to the Bush Administration by blocking the Commission’s line of inquiry into the Saudi connection.”

“Mr. Clarke told me that the operation to penetrate Al-Qaeda may have [been] organized by high level employees of the CIA. Mr. Clarke stated that he believed that most of the records of the CIA’s operation to penetrate Al-Qaeda through Al-Bayoumi were destroyed in an effort to cover up the operation,” the declaration says.

An ex-FBI agent, CS-3, working under CIA control at Usama Bin Laden (UBL) Station, also known by the code name ALEC Station after the son of its first chief, discussed how a colleague had prepared a Central Intelligence Report (CIR) “outlining the possible presence of Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar in the U.S.,” but was not allowed to forward it to the FBI for action.

“CS-3 stated that he/she believed at the time that the CIA prevented the distribution of the CIR as teh agency did not want the FBI interfering with a CIA operation that was being run domestically in violation of U.S. law,” the declaration says.

FBI COVERED UP, TOO
 
While most criticism in the declaration is directed at the CIA, higher ups at the FBI were also targets of the FBI agents’ complaints.

An ex-agent in the bureau’s Washington Field Office referred to as CS-9, was part of a squad tasked with investigating leads developed after the attacks. CS-9 told Canestraro that “agents were told they were not permitted to interview Saudi nationals in support of their investigation. CS-9 stated that many of the leads developed during his/her investigation pointed toward the Saudi diplomats stationed in Washington, D.C.

Another former FBI agent, CS-4, who in the spring of 2002 supervised two other FBI agents assigned to the CIA’s UBL Station, stated that “CS-3 approached him/her and said, ‘Boss, something is bothering me big time…we [meaning the United States government] could have prevented the 9/11 attacks.” CS-3 then outlined the CIA intelligence that showed Hazmi and Mihdhar had attended the Malaysian al Qaeda meeting, that the CIA knew in January 2001 that both men had multiple entry visas to the U.S. and that his FBI colleague had written a report on the future hijackers that “was not distributed on orders from one of the analysts at UBL Station.”

CS-3 gave his supervisor a draft of the report. The supervisor, a male, asked who else knew about it. CS-3 said just him and the colleague who wrote it. The supervisor said he then contacted FBI deputy director for counterterrorism Pasquale D’Amuro saying he needed to meet right away. The supervisor hopped in his car and “at a high rate of speed” drove to FBI headquarters where he met with D’Amuro and gave him the secret UBL report on Hazmi and Mihdhar.

“D’Amuro read the cable then told CS-4, ‘I will take care of this,’ the declaration says. “CS-4 noted that D’Amuro never mentioned the cable’s existence” again.

A short time later, though, CS-4 was promoted out of UBL Station to a senior liaison position outside of the FBI. He hadn’t asked for a promotion and told Canestraro he felt he was moved away from UBL Station because he “knew about the existence” of the CIA’s secret report on Hazmi and Mihdhar. CS-4 added he believed he was moved to ensure he “kept silent.”

Ex-FBI agent CS-23 said that when the FBI became aware of Omar Bayoumi’s affiliation with Saudi Intelligence and the CIA’s recruitment operation through Bayoumi after 9/11, “senior FBI officials suppressed investigations into the above. CS-23 also told me that FBI agents testifying before (Congress’s) Joint Inquiry into the 9/11 attacks were instructed not to reveal the full extent of Saudi involvement with Al-Qaeda,” Canestraro’s declaration says.

The declaration does not say who ordered FBI field agents investigating 9/11 not to interview Saudi nationals or other agents to lie to Congress – or why.
 
'Special' service: Declassified Guantanamo court filing suggests some 9/11 hijackers were CIA agents
What does the intelligence agency have to do with the suicide terrorist attack?
https://www.rt.com/news/574490-cia-dirty-deeds-nine-eleven/
Felix Livshitz (12 April 2023)

An explosive court filing [same as PDF link in OP - OB] from the Guantanamo Military Commission – a court considering the cases of defendants accused of carrying out the "9/11" terrorist attacks on New York – has seemingly confirmed the unthinkable.

The document was originally published via a Guantanamo Bay court docket, but while public, it was completely redacted. Independent researchers obtained an unexpurgated copy. It is an account by the Commission’s lead investigator, DEA veteran Don Canestraro, of his personal probe of potential Saudi government involvement in the 9/11 attacks, conducted at the request of the defendants’ lawyers.

Two of the hijackers were being closely monitored by the CIA and may, wittingly or not, have been recruited by Langley long before they flew planes into the World Trade Center buildings.

The story of two men
 
Of the great many enduring mysteries of the 9/11 attacks still unresolved over two decades later, perhaps the biggest and gravest relate to the activities of Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar in the 18 months leading up to that fateful day. The pair traveled to the US on multi-entry visas in January 2000, despite having repeatedly been flagged by the CIA and NSA previously as likely Al Qaeda terrorists.

Mere days before their arrival, they attended an Al Qaeda summit in Kuala Lumpur, during which key details of the 9/11 attacks are likely to have been discussed and agreed. The meeting was secretly photographed and videotaped by Malaysian authorities at the direct request of the CIA’s Alec Station, a special unit set up to track Osama bin Laden, although oddly, no audio was captured.

Still, this background should’ve been sufficient to prevent Hazmi and Midhar from entering the US – or at least enough for the FBI to be informed of their presence in the country. As it was, they were admitted for a six-month period at Los Angeles International airport without incident, and Bureau representatives within Alec Station were blocked from sharing this information with their superiors by the CIA.

“We’ve got to tell the Bureau about this. These guys clearly are bad. One of them, at least, has a multiple-entry visa to the US. We've got to tell the FBI,” Mark Rossini, a member of Alec Station, has recalled discussing with his colleagues. “[But the CIA] said to me, ‘No, it’s not the FBI’s case, not the FBI’s jurisdiction.’”

Immediately upon arrival, Hazmi and Midhar encountered a Saudi national residing in California named Omar al-Bayoumi in an airport restaurant. Over the next two weeks, he helped them find an apartment in San Diego, co-signed their lease, gave them $1,500 towards their rent, and introduced them to Anwar al-Awlaki, an imam at a local mosque. Al-Awlaki was killed in a US drone strike in Yemen in 2011.

In the wake of 9/11, Bayoumi unsurprisingly became a subject of interest in an FBI probe of potential Saudi involvement in the attacks, known as Operation Encore. In a 2003 interview with investigators in Riyadh, he claimed his meeting with Hazmi and Midhar was a coincidence – he heard them speaking Arabic, realized they couldn’t speak English, and decided to assist them out of charity.

The Bureau reached a very different conclusion – Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence operative and part of a wider militant Wahhabist network in the US, which handled a myriad of potential and actual terrorists, and monitored the activities of anti-Riyadh dissidents abroad. What’s more, Encore judged there to be a 50/50 chance he had advanced knowledge of the 9/11 attacks before they happened, and so did the Saudi government.

Why was it hidden?
 
Those bombshell facts remained hidden from public view until March 2022, when a trove of FBI documents was declassified at the request of the White House. The newly released Guantanamo Military Commission filing sheds even further light on Bayoumi’s contact with Hazmi and Midhar – and in turn, the CIA’s keen interest in them, their activities throughout their stay in the US, and refusal to disclose their presence to the FBI until late August 2001.

The filing is an account by the Commission’s lead investigator, DEA veteran Don Canestraro, of his personal probe of potential Saudi government involvement in the 9/11 attacks, conducted at the request of the defendants’ lawyers. Based on a review of classified information held by, and interviews with representatives of, the FBI and Pentagon, the content strongly suggests that the CIA obstructed official investigations to conceal its penetration of Al Qaeda.

That’s the judgment of four separate, unnamed FBI agents interviewed by Canestraro who worked on investigations into the 9/11 attacks. The most incendiary charges were leveled by a Bureau agent referred to in his report as ‘CS-23’, who had “extensive knowledge of counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters.”

CS-23 recounted how the CIA repeatedly lied and stonewalled the FBI in its investigations into Bayoumi. For example, while Agency officials claimed to possess no files on him when asked by Operation Encore representatives, CS-23 knew for a fact this was a “falsehood,” and the CIA maintained several operational files on Bayoumi, amounting to an extensive paper trail.

Furthermore, CS-23 was certain that the CIA used its liaison relationship with the Saudi intelligence services to attempt to recruit Hazmi and Midhar, and circumvent laws prohibiting the Agency from conducting spying operations on US soil, by using Riyadh as a go between.

This account was backed up by another FBI investigator, ‘CS-3,’ who further claims that Bayoumi setting up bank accounts and renting an apartment for the two hijackers in San Diego “was done at the behest of the CIA.” Any information provided to Bayoumi would then be fed back to Alec Station.

CS-3 felt it odd that this CIA unit, situated in the US and staffed by analysts, was involved in recruiting Al Qaeda operatives, as such work is typically the responsibility of case officers trained in covert operations based overseas. ‘CS-IO’ concurred that this arrangement was “highly unusual,” and made it “nearly impossible for [Alec] Station to develop informants inside of Al Qaeda from its base several thousand miles from the countries where Al Qaeda was suspected of operating.”

Despite such tantalizing leads, CS-23 claims senior FBI officials suppressed further investigations into the CIA’s relationship with Bayoumi and the recruitment of Hazmi and Midhar, and Bureau representatives testifying before the joint Senate and Congressional inquiry into 9/11 were instructed not to reveal the full extent of Saudi involvement with Al-Qaeda.

For their part, CS-3 stated that before they and their colleagues were interviewed by the joint inquiry, CIA officials within Alec Station told them not to cooperate fully with investigators and they were looking to “hang someone” for 9/11.

Canestraro does not make any conclusions as to why the CIA concealed vital information from the FBI prior to the attacks, which potentially could have prevented their execution, and why the Bureau subsequently played along with the Agency’s coverup. Although one answer is provided by the unusual nature of Alec Station’s setup.

Namely, that far from infiltrating an Al Qaeda cell to avert terrorism, the Agency was seeking to influence and direct its activities in order to cause terrorism, outside standard recruitment channels. Having stumbled upon such a monstrous connivance, the FBI would’ve known well to leave the entire subject well alone.
 
Videos referenced in the OP:

The Donald C Canestraro Declaration (Part 1)
Part 1 of a three part series, where i read from the public declaration of the former investigator for the Office of Military Commissions Defense Organization. In 2016, Donald C. Canestraro began an investigation into the possible involvement of the Saudi Arabian government and the Central Intelligence Agency in the events leading up to the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9Li3Wdq5gI


The Donald C Canestraro Declaration (Part 2)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zku3RTivZqg


The Donald C Canestraro Declaration (Part 3)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrrFrIKIyKo
 
I really hate being right about stuff like this.

Where are the emergency meetings in congress to stop any money going to this alphabet soup groups? CIA needs to go!!!
 
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Can you condense this into a paragraph summary? way too much info

Government, in regard to 9/11, LIHOP and then covered up the tracks and then cashed in on the crisis to crush our freedoms.

Oh, and invaded Afghanistan to start up the opium trade again.
 
Calling it now: Within 50 years the government will come clean about their involvement in 9/11. Unfortunately everybody who witnessed what happened with either be dead or too old to do anything about it.
 
Can you condense this into a paragraph summary? way too much info

The CIA who has zero accountability to anyone and pockets that never run dry had some operatives handling some of the suicide - murderer foreign non citizen terrorists.
 
Calling it now: Within 50 years the government will come clean about their involvement in 9/11. Unfortunately everybody who witnessed what happened with either be dead or too old to do anything about it.

They still haven't admitted to murdering JFK.
 
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