# Lifestyles & Discussion > Family, Parenting & Education > Books & Literature >  The reception of Molyneaux's Art of the Argument

## Superfluous Man

I haven't read any books by Molyneaux. On a few occasions I've sat through as much as I could stomach of one of his youtube soliloquies. But I came across this article on how Molyneaux's book, The Art of the Argument: Western Civilization's Last Stand, is being received by people who actually know stuff about argumentation. Since I know one or two folks here continue to parrot Molyneaux, I thought I'd share it.




> Molyneux loves to write click-bait titles, if you havent already guessed that from the thousands of videos that hes littered on YouTube. In fact, titles are his very best writing. In the old days, he made audio podcasts with 90 or more minutes of unfocused rambling and then give it a title that sounded great but was barely related to the contents.
> 
> Perhaps he was hoping that he could make a few more bucks from his uncritical followers but then something unexpected and magical happened
> 
> But titling this new volume The Art of the Argument turned out to be a bit of mistake. Perhaps Molyneux was simply hoping that he could make a few more bucks from his uncritical followers but then something unexpected and magical happened. You see, since abandoning all of his earlier principles to become a darling of the alt-right/white nationalist/mens rights crowd, hes become a bit of a YouTube personality. And he gave his book a title that would boldly place it smack dab in a tradition of writing on logic and rhetoricscholarly works, often with similar titlesthat stretches back for centuries.
> 
> And thats when the fun began. Because of Molyneuxs notoriety and the books title, actual professors and educated students of logic stumbled in and either bought the Kindle edition, got it free on Kindle unlimited, or read Part One with Amazons Read it now feature.
> 
> Understandably, they were stunned or befuddled or both.


Read the rest here:
http://www.fdrliberated.com/stefan-m...ly-humiliated/

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## CaptUSA

> As an instructor of logic for over 20 years. at many universities around the world, I have seen just about every logic and critical thinking text around. When I came across this book, I was concerned (because it is self-published, and the author does not have the requisite experience/track record one would expect from the author of such a text). But, I figured I’d give it a chance (as a good logician should). I am sorry to say that this book is one of the least edifying texts on these topics that I have had the displeasure to read. It is loaded with basic misunderstandings and confusions, and yet it is written in an over-confident and often strident tone. If you’re in the market for a logic/critical thinking text, do not waste your time on this one. There are plenty of freely available resources written by qualified people to be found on the internet these days.


Yep.  This seems like a pretty good description.

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## Natural Citizen

I've never understood the infatuation with Molyneux.

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## The Rebel Poet

> It is loaded with basic misunderstandings and conclusions, and yet it is written in an over-confident and often strident tone.


Perfect description of Molly himself.

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## dannno

> Yep.  This seems like a pretty good description.


You are so full of $#@!, you didn't read his book, you are just regurgitating bull$#@! from the establishment..




> Because of Molyneux’s notoriety and the book’s title, actual professors  and educated students of logic stumbled in and either bought the Kindle  edition, got it free on Kindle unlimited, or read Part One with Amazon’s  “Read it now” feature.
> 
> Understandably, they were stunned or befuddled or both.


Of course they were, these people have been propagandized retarded..

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## dannno

> I've never understood the infatuation with Molyneux.


What is there not to like? He puts out the most well researched videos on important topics and current events, he believes in small government/anarchy, he understands economics very well and he is a non-interventionist. 

What I don't understand is the people who say they don't like him. I haven't heard one good reason. Oh, you don't like the way he talks? Who cares? I complain about that stupid guy Jules likes to post with a fake Irish accent, but that is because the material is very poor.. If they put out good material, I could probably get over the fake Irish accent.. But Molyneux doesn't have a fake accent. You don't like his views on hitting children? Who cares? There are a million issues out there, if that's the only issue you have with him what is the big deal?

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## r3volution 3.0

> It is loaded with  basic misunderstandings and conclusions, and yet it is written in an  over-confident and often strident tone.
> 			
> 		
> 
> Perfect description of  Molly himself.


Indeed

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## heavenlyboy34

> What is there not to like? He puts out the most well researched videos on important topics and current events, he believes in small government/anarchy, he understands economics very well and he is a non-interventionist. 
> *
> What I don't understand is the people who say they don't like him.* I haven't heard one good reason. Oh, you don't like the way he talks? Who cares? I complain about that stupid guy Jules likes to post with a fake Irish accent, but that is because the material is very poor.. If they put out good material, I could probably get over the fake Irish accent.. But Molyneux doesn't have a fake accent. You don't like his views on hitting children? Who cares? There are a million issues out there, if that's the only issue you have with him what is the big deal?


His early work was okay. Then he got into ever shoddier logic and abandoned the big principles he started out with. Every reasonable anarchist on the webbernets has abandoned him nowadays, AFAIK.

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## r3volution 3.0

About another, earlier book of Molyneux's, "Universally Preferable Behavior":

http://www.fdrliberated.com/stefan-m...-story-part-1/




> *The Promise And Failure of UPB - The Inside Story (Part 1)
> *
> *At War With The Academics*
> 
> Stefan Molyneux wrote a book. 
> 
> It was supposed to be his crowning achievement, THE definitive answer  to “what is moral behavior?” The world’s first top-to-bottom system of  philosophy, something philosophers have been unable to even attempt for  the last 6,000 years.
> 
>  More important, it was suppose to establish Molyneux in the pantheon  of thinkers he had studied in college. A position he might have  established years earlier, if academia had not blindly rejected him.
> ...


The hilarity continues in part 2: http://www.fdrliberated.com/stefan-m...-story-part-2/

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## dannno

> His early work was okay. Then he got into ever shoddier logic and abandoned the big principles he started out with. Every reasonable anarchist on the webbernets has abandoned him nowadays, AFAIK.


I disagree with everything in the second and third sentence. 

You can disagree with Molyneux on a few points and still find a lot of value in listening to him, I know I do. I believe in astrology, I like to do psychadelics and herb. Molyneux thinks that is all really bad and completely insane. That's fine, I know where he is coming from, he has his arguments, I can't prove him wrong I just disagree with where he is coming from on those issues. Not to mention 9/11 truth.. I still find plenty of value in what he does anyway.

Anybody who abandoned him either over a minor disagreement or what they perceived to be a huge issue without trying to understand his position is not reasonable imo. That doesn't mean they need to listen to all his podcasts, but if they can't find anything worthwhile on his channel it's because they aren't looking.

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## dannno

> About another, earlier book of Molyneux's, "Universally Preferable Behavior":
> 
> http://www.fdrliberated.com/stefan-m...-story-part-1/
> 
> The hilarity continues in part 2: http://www.fdrliberated.com/stefan-m...-story-part-2/




What is your specific issue with UPB? It is a logically sound platform to start from.

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## Lamp

> What is your specific issue with UPB? It is a logically sound platform to start from.


You lost all credibility when you criticise someone using a link on "Rational"wiki.

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## Danke

My monthly donation is on Sunday.

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## r3volution 3.0

> What is your specific issue with UPB?


Well,  the entire project ("proving" ethics) is impossible in principle.  Categorical imperatives ("you should do x") cannot be true or false;  there is no fact from which any categorical imperative could conceivably  be deduced. Only hypothetical imperatives ("if you want to achieve Y,  you should do X") can be true or false; they can be deduced from facts.  In other words, you can't derive an "ought" from an "is." 

For a  specific example, he tries to Hoppe's argumentation ethics to prove some  categorical imperative (don't recall what it is). The problem is that  Hoppe's argumentation ethics doesn't work, at all. The basic idea is the  performative contradiction: i.e. a statement which must be false in  virtue of being made. "I am dead" is the classic performative  contradiction; it must be false in virtue of being spoken (dead men  can't speak). Hoppe (and Molyneux, in some fashion) try to apply this  perfectly sensible concept to _ethical_ statements, and that  doesn't work. There is no ethical statement that would have to be false  in virtue of being stated. In other words, an ethical statement's truth  cannot be a necessary condition for a physical event (someone speaking)  to occur. For instance, Hoppe tried to show that a statement such as "I  don't own my body" is a performative contradiction, by claiming that one  cannot make the statement if one doesn't own one's body; but this is  plainly wrong. One cannot make the statement "I don't own my body"  unless one _controls_ one's body (or at least one's mouth, etc), but _control is not ownership_. As soon you try to use performative contradiction to prove an ethical statement, whatever it is, you fail.




> It is a logically sound platform to start from.


What is, specifically?

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## dannno

> Well,  the entire project ("proving" ethics) is impossible in principle.  Categorical imperatives ("you should do x") cannot be true or false;  there is no fact from which any categorical imperative could conceivably  be deduced. Only hypothetical imperatives ("if you want to achieve Y,  you should do X") can be true or false; they can be deduced from facts.  In other words, you can't derive an "ought" from an "is." 
> 
> For a  specific example, he tries to Hoppe's argumentation ethics to prove some  categorical imperative (don't recall what it is). The problem is that  Hoppe's argumentation ethics doesn't work, at all. The basic idea is the  performative contradiction: i.e. a statement which must be false in  virtue of being made. "I am dead" is the classic performative  contradiction; it must be false in virtue of being spoken (dead men  can't speak). Hoppe (and Molyneux, in some fashion) try to apply this  perfectly sensible concept to _ethical_ statements, and that  doesn't work. There is no ethical statement that would have to be false  in virtue of being stated. In other words, an ethical statement's truth  cannot be a necessary condition for a physical event (someone speaking)  to occur. For instance, Hoppe tried to show that a statement such as "I  don't own my body" is a performative contradiction, by claiming that one  cannot make the statement if one doesn't own one's body; but this is  plainly wrong. One cannot make the statement "I don't own my body"  unless one _controls_ one's body (or at least one's mouth, etc), but _control is not ownership_. As soon you try to use performative contradiction to prove an ethical statement, whatever it is, you fail.
> 
> 
> 
> What is, specifically?


Control is the ultimate ownership.. nobody can force you to say anything against your will, and if they did then I guess they would own you. I don't see any issue with that.

But UPB is more of a platform rather than some ultimate philosophical truth, although I think there is at least _some_ philosophical truth to UPB.. and you didn't do anything to debunk it.

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## r3volution 3.0

> Control is the ultimate ownership..


No, control is not ownership. If it were, there would be no such thing as theft.

i.e. the thief who takes control of your car would thereby own it




> nobody can force you to say anything against your will, and if they did then I guess they would own you. I don't see any issue with that.


I don't think you understand the problem with argumentation ethics that I explained.

My physical ability to move my vocal cords and speak does not depend on the proposition "I own my body" being true.

Similarly, my physical ability drive a certain car doesn't depend on the proposition "I own this car" being true. 




> But UPB is more of a platform rather than some ultimate philosophical truth


Which says what?




> although I think there is at least _some_ philosophical truth to UPB..


Which would be what?




> and you didn't do anything to debunk it.


Actually I did, see above.

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## r3volution 3.0

Going through the review of the latest masterpiece, which apparently begins with the following lines:




> _The Argument_ is everything. _The Argument_ is civilization; _The Argument_  is peace; _The Argument_ is love; _The Argument_ is truth and beauty; _The  Argument_ is, in fact, life itself.


Sort of like how the Universally Preferable Behavior was "the proof that human beings have been waiting for  thousands of years," right? _Right?_




> He properly distinguishes deductive from inductive arguments,  provides the standard example of the former ((1) “All men are mortal”  (2) “Socrates is a man” (3) “Therefore Socrates is mortal”), and then  delivers this cringeworthy explanation: “Given that premises one and two  are valid, the conclusion – three – is inescapable.”
> 
> Ouch!
> 
> Molyneux has just confused truth and validity! Statements are true or false. They are _never_  valid or invalid. Deductive arguments are valid or invalid; they are  never true or false. Validity is a function of deductive structure, not  content (the information in premises and conclusion). Getting students  to grasp this difference is every logic instructor’s first challenge. If  a deductive argument has a valid structure and true premises, moreover,  it is called _sound_. Following a foray into premature attacks  on relativism and socialism – premature because the groundwork for such  arguments has not yet been laid – Molyneux botches soundness as well:  “If I say (1) All men are immortal, (2) Socrates is a man, (3) Therefore  Socrates is immortal; then the structure remains logically sound.” This  is actually a good example of an _unsound_ argument, because it has a valid structure but a false premise.
> 
> In other words, Molyneux does not appear to grasp the difference  between validity and soundness. This is in a section entitled “The  Difference between ‘Logical’ and ‘True.’”


https://lostgenerationphilosopher.wo...viewed-on-lgp/



That's like a guy writing a book on grammar and not knowing the difference between nouns and verbs. 

Preposterous

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## AZJoe

> I've never understood the infatuation with Molyneux.


I find the infatuation strongest on those with the obsessive contempt for the man. What I've never understood is the negative emotional infatuation some have for Molyneux, especially those who pretend to promote liberty but get so emotional over him expressing his views.

He makes reasoned arguments and analogies. I am no fan of his style simply because I just don't like sitting through what for me is a long drawn out monologue soliloguy style. But that is just a personal preference, not because I despise the man. Others like listening to that style. If so, good for them if they get enjoyment or learning out of it. I don't always agree with him, but offers commentary that is better reasoned than most on contemporary talk radio or tv [although that's not a particularly high standard], and overall favors liberty and small government and is a veritable anarchist compared to most contemporary politicians or celebrities. 

For the life of me I cannot fathom why anyone, especially someone who professes to support liberty, would have any rational criticism of that absent some ulterior underlying emotional issue.

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## Jamesiv1

> What I don't understand is the people who say they don't like him. I haven't heard one good reason.


He has Sagging R Mouth.

Some might say "Oh, get over it. Just don't look at him", but that is impossible. It comes at you relentlessly, like a ghoulish horde of the undead.

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## AZJoe

The author to the "review" is completely anonymous. The "review" author's entire website is nothing but a online psychotic emotional stalking obsession with Molyneux. Very bizarre. Why SF or anyone would promote it is also bizarre. 

The "review" is anything but a rational argument. Rather the so called "review" nothing but a rag tag neurotic and sensational conglomeration of  ad hominem insults of Molyneux, insults of anyone that would listen to him, ludicrous armchair psychoanalysis of Maolyneux, fantastical mind-reading tom impute motives and desires to Moleynus, and bald conclusion statements strung together  The bulk of the so called book "review" has absolutely nothing to do with the content of the book.

For instance from the so called "review" [comments in brackets]:

Molyneux’s temporary band of rabid fans … [Brilliance!!]

Self-publishing is great for …  church cookbooks. Or 55-year-old insurance salesmen …
For years, he desperately yearned for a legitimate publisher to show an interest in him. …
Stefan _never_ tires of telling everyone just how broad his appeal is. … 

Make no mistake, Molyneux is _aching_ to follow in the footsteps of Ayn Rand … as he has bitterly complained, no publisher saw his brilliance; … He was also rejected by academia. …  Molyneux’s writing career was dead as a door-nail. [Let’s make up some mind reading and throw in some tainted history to show the author is such a big loser with no significance – so why again does anonymous reviewer devote an entire website to obsessing over Molyneux?]

And so he was forced to turn away from lovers of fiction or philosophy to embrace an entirely new audience—the gullible. [OMG. What insightful intellectual discourse by his “reviewer”; “Nya Nya – you guys are gullible nya nya”] …

publicly criticizing it any further actually makes you feel a little bad inside, perhaps the same way you’d feel after bullying the mentally challenged. [Oh what brilliant analysis.]

Gordon [gave his prior book a bad review] which wounded Molyneux more than most people realize …

Few understand how the charge of having “facile intelligence” insulted and infuriated Molyneux. Stefan wants his followers to believe that his mind has been rigorously developed through years of concentrated scholarship, exacting logical analysis and, yes, hard labor. … [a little mind reading and psychoanalysis by Mr. “reviewer”]

A facile mind can take a few facts, a few inventions, and a glib delivery to create the illusion of erudition. [That kind of sounds just like this so called “review”] It’s the skill of snake-oil salesmen, hustlers, and religious hucksters. It’s the exact opposite of what Molyneux presents himself as and, of course, exactly what he is. … [Thow in another health dosing of pure ad hominem -- My what reasoned analysis by Mr. “reviewer.”]

Molyneux loves to write click-bait titles … titles are his very best writing. In the old days, he made audio podcasts with 90 or more minutes of unfocused rambling and then give it a title that sounded great …

Perhaps Molyneux was simply hoping that he could make a few more bucks from his uncritical followers but then something unexpected and magical happened. …  since abandoning all of his earlier principles to become a darling of the alt-right/white nationalist/men’s rights crowd, he’s become a bit of a YouTube personality. And he gave his book a title [OMG he gave his book a title. Who could have imagined. What kind of title dear “reviewer”] that would boldly place it smack dab in a tradition of writing on logic and rhetoric—scholarly works, often with similar titles—that stretches back for centuries.

[Wow, who would have thought such a simple title as “Art of Argument” would be so significant , and also so great a reason to criticize a book. Who knew that such a simple title is so important a reason to hate a book. Thanks dear “reviewer” for explaining that so logically and rationally for us]

And that’s when the fun began. Because of Molyneux’s notoriety and the book’s title, _actual_ professors and educated students of logic stumbled in and either bought the Kindle edition, got it free on Kindle unlimited, or read Part One with Amazon’s “Read it now” feature. [Because “stumbling” is the only way a professor or logic student can find a book. It must be so. The “Reviewer” proclaims it.]

Understandably, they were stunned or befuddled or both. [Yes, I the omniscient “reviewer” have polled them all, and can tell you their emotions and thoughts, although I still have told you one think about the actual book’s content.”]

Like Gordon, they suddenly realized they were dealing with an author who literally had no background in his self-proclaimed area of “expertise.” [“Again I the omniscient reviewer have read all ther readers minds.”]

A philosopher who makes up his own terms … and invents his own definitions for existing terms [oh the crime. But please don’t expect any examples from the “reviewer”. Nothing but unsupported accusations and conclusions in this “review”]. That would be because his arrogant and, yes, _facile_ mind presumes he’ll get it right. [More of the “reviewer’s” magical mind reading.]

[And now I will finish my “review” by quoting verbatim someone else’s review form Amazon, and then just caution you that all the positive reviews are fake, and any of the negative reviews are legitimate.]

My what a thorough, logical review, where the only actual content from the book the “reviewer” even remotely touched, was the title. – That’s it!
This book could totally suck, or it could totally rock. However this particular reviewer has not given any insight into the content whatsoever, other than state the book’s title.

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## Natural Citizen

It comes down to responsibility, joe. Liberty-Responsibility. Two words that should never be spoken or written absent insertion of the other in fundamental principle. 

Personally, you'll likely never see me mention the guy's name. He's a burden more than an asset. 

As always, however, people are free to get together and form a voluntary society. Libertarianism permits for it so long as you've renounced force. 

Go for it. Otherwise it's just a bunch of noise.

Check back in and let us know how it goes.




> I find the infatuation strongest on those with the obsessive contempt for the man. What I've never understood is the negative emotional infatuation some have for Molyneux, especially those who pretend to promote liberty but get so emotional over him expressing his views.
> 
> He makes reasoned arguments and analogies. I am no fan of his style simply because I just don't like sitting through what for me is a long drawn out monologue soliloguy style. But that is just a personal preference, not because I despise the man. Others like listening to that style. If so, good for them if they get enjoyment or learning out of it. I don't always agree with him, but offers commentary that is better reasoned than most on contemporary talk radio or tv [although that's not a particularly high standard], and overall favors liberty and small government and is a veritable anarchist compared to most contemporary politicians or celebrities. 
> 
> For the life of me I cannot fathom why anyone, especially someone who professes to support liberty, would have any rational criticism of that absent some ulterior underlying emotional issue.

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## Origanalist



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## dannno

> I find the infatuation strongest on those with the obsessive contempt for the man. What I've never understood is the negative emotional infatuation some have for Molyneux, especially those who pretend to promote liberty but get so emotional over him expressing his views.
> 
> He makes reasoned arguments and analogies. I am no fan of his style simply because I just don't like sitting through what for me is a long drawn out monologue soliloguy style. But that is just a personal preference, not because I despise the man. Others like listening to that style. If so, good for them if they get enjoyment or learning out of it. I don't always agree with him, but offers commentary that is better reasoned than most on contemporary talk radio or tv [although that's not a particularly high standard], and overall favors liberty and small government and is a veritable anarchist compared to most contemporary politicians or celebrities. 
> 
> For the life of me I cannot fathom why anyone, especially someone who professes to support liberty, would have any rational criticism of that absent some ulterior underlying emotional issue.


THIS..

And Rev has yet to debunk UPB.. he makes a bunch of statements that don't have anything to do with UPB. Disprove it by showing you understand it, then show where the flaws are. All of his debunkings are off things that are unrelated to the argument.

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## Natural Citizen

> THIS..
> 
>  All of his debunkings are off things that are unrelated to the argument.


It's simple. 

Libertine is not libertarian. 

You lose. 

lol. 

Pass the blunt.

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## dannno

> It's simple. 
> 
> Libertine is not libertarian. 
> 
> You lose. 
> 
> lol. 
> 
> Pass the blunt.


Molyneux is not a libertine.. he is a highly K-selected individual.

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## Meritocrat

I could probably rip this book just based on the introduction. I don't think his fiction is great.   And I have a personal issue with him.  He could have acknowledged me publicly for something I did for the show but chose not to.  But I have to give him his due, from where he came from and what he has created, the people he has helped are undeniable.  There is a bit of appeal to authority fallacy in some of these remarks.  Like a so-called self published book automatically has less merit than something that passed the gate keeps, like you need to have a doctorate in philosophy to put forth a revolutionary theory.  Is this really how you want it?  It doesn't matter, that world is falling away.  There was also an appeal to popularity fallacy 'every rational anarchist has abandoned him," to paraphrase. As a philosopher I think he is second to none right now, at least who I have read and come across.  He is a modern day Socrates.  The podcast is probably the best I've ever listened to and I listened to many.  I read the FDR liberated page and was not moved.  If FDR is a cult lets have more of the kind and more members.  The world will be a better place.  If you want a better book on the subject check out Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric by Kahane.

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## r3volution 3.0

> I could probably rip this book just based on the introduction. I don't think his fiction is great.   And I have a personal issue with him.  He could have acknowledged me publicly for something I did for the show but chose not to.  But I have to give him his due, from where he came from and what he has created, the people he has helped are undeniable.  There is a bit of appeal to authority fallacy in some of these remarks.  Like a so-called self published book automatically has less merit than something that passed the gate keeps, like you need to have a doctorate in philosophy to put forth a revolutionary theory.  Is this really how you want it?  It doesn't matter, that world is falling away.  There was also an appeal to popularity fallacy 'every rational anarchist has abandoned him," to paraphrase. As a philosopher I think he is second to none right now, at least who I have read and come across.  He is a modern day Socrates.  The podcast is probably the best I've ever listened to and I listened to many.  I read the FDR liberated page and was not moved.  If FDR is a cult lets have more of the kind and more members.  The world will be a better place.  If you want a better book on the subject check out Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric by Kahane.


Would you reproduce, in your own words, an argument of his which you find compelling?

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## dannno

> *I find the infatuation strongest on those with the obsessive contempt for the man. What I've never understood is the negative emotional infatuation some have for Molyneux, especially those who pretend to promote liberty but get so emotional over him expressing his views.*
> 
> *He makes reasoned arguments and analogies.* I am no fan of his style simply because I just don't like sitting through what for me is a long drawn out monologue soliloguy style. But that is just a personal preference, not because I despise the man. Others like listening to that style. If so, good for them if they get enjoyment or learning out of it. *I don't always agree with him, but offers commentary that is better reasoned than most on contemporary talk radio or tv [although that's not a particularly high standard], and overall favors liberty and small government and is a veritable anarchist compared to most contemporary politicians or celebrities.* 
> 
> *For the life of me I cannot fathom why anyone, especially someone who professes to support liberty, would have any rational criticism of that absent some ulterior underlying emotional issue.*


Ya look, there are dozens of public figures out there in the liberty movement and what you have on this forum is a handful of trolls who want to bring all of them down, they pretend to enjoy one or two obscure people in the liberty movement just so they can pretend they like liberty. 

If they really like liberty, then they would realize that there is a broad spectrum of people out there who need to be introduced to liberty, thus we need a broad spectrum of people out there attracting people to liberty. 

But these are not real liberty folks, they are tools for the establishment.

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## undergroundrr

I enjoyed Molyneux as one of a number of liberty voices that had some interesting ideas worth checking in on from time to time. So he's generated multiple blogs and Youtube channels of dedicated commentary on his output? Mind-boggling. Good for him.

In 2016 as I listened to Molyneux from time to time pretty much everything I heard from was some pretzel logic rationalization of something anti-liberty. His ethical standard had turned from reason to manliness or K-ness or something. 

Today the regime Molyneux so passionately advocated with hundreds of hours of programming  invaded 100 7-11s and arrested a bunch of businessmen. I guess the liberty movement has officially moved past its Ayn Rand phase.

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## Meritocrat

I find UPB compelling though not entirely original.  Henry Hazlitt said much of the same in The Foundations of Morality.  And Hazlitt was building on Herbert Spencer... My major point of agreement with SM is that reason has to be the first principle.  We have to be cautious of confirmation bias and challenge ideas that might seem to threaten our belief in liberty.  I came across the research on race and IQ over a decade ago, (The Bell Curve, Race Evolution and Behavior, et al) and thought what good came come from this?  I wanted to believe that all people no matter the race had the same potential for peaceful and productive behavior.  I was all in on egalitarian libertarianism.  Today, with whites and Asians increasingly being unfairly scapegoated, it seems worth investigating and discussing.  Why can I spend a day in Tokyo, a city more than twice as crowded as NYC and see hardly any police officers and feel safe and I spend a day in NYC and see officers in military gear and not feel safe? Can it possibly have something to do with immigration policy.  There has always been left and right divide within libertarianism and they move in waves and many of the thinkers we respect, such as Murray Rothbard, HL Mencken even Ron Paul, have themselves fluctuated.  I respect that SM is taking on these difficult questions.

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## r3volution 3.0

> I find UPB compelling though not entirely original.


Can you summarize in your own words what you understand the argument of UPB to be?

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## Meritocrat

> Can you summarize in your own words what you understand the argument of UPB to be?


I've achieved more than SM as a writer why would I take time to reproduce his theory in my own words?  I already wrote that I found it in line with Hazlitt's Foundations of Morality. I will use a line from that book which I have often quoted.  "The attitude and actions that best promote the happiness and well being of the individual in the long run tend to coincide with the actions and attitudes that best promote the happiness and well being of society as a whole."

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## Conza88

> Well, the entire project ("proving" ethics) is impossible in principle.  Categorical imperatives ("you should do x") cannot be true or false;  there is no fact from which any categorical imperative could conceivably  be deduced. Only hypothetical imperatives ("if you want to achieve Y,  you should do X") can be true or false; they can be deduced from facts.  In other words, you can't derive an "ought" from an "is."


Classic. This showcases you don't know what Hoppe's A priori of argumentation (APoA) actually is. 
_
“Second, there is the logical gap between “is-” and “ought-statements” which natural rights proponents have failed to bridge successfully—except for advancing some general critical remarks regarding the ultimate validity of the fact-value dichotomy. Here the praxeological proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a completely value-free justification of private property. It remains entirely in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an “ought” from an “is.”

The structure of the argument is this:

    (a) justification is propositional justification—a priori true is-statement;
    (b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and
    (c) then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement.

The proof also offers a key to an understanding of the nature of the fact-value dichotomy: Ought-statements cannot be derived from is-statements. They belong to different logical realms. It is also clear, however, that one cannot even state that there are facts and values if no propositional exchanges exist, and that this practice of propositional exchanges in turn presupposes the acceptance of the private property ethic as valid. In other words, cognition and truth-seeking as such have a normative foundation, and the normative foundation on which cognition and truth rest is the recognition of private property rights.”

          — Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economics and Ethics of Private Property_

*Pro tip:*




> “One of the ways that the APoA [a priori of argumentation]  approach “transcends” the is/ought gap, as Rothbard put it, is that  “norms” are being addressed using “is” rather than “ought” statements.  This makes it possible for norms to be established as _justifiable_—and possibly, though more controversially, also _justified_—regardless  of whether any particular actor chooses to acknowledge this or to  follow such norms. Hoppe uses the example of a simple math problem to  draw out this distinction between logical proof and practical action:  
> 
> “Why should the proof that 1+1=2 make any difference? One certainly can  still act on the belief that 1+1=3” (2006, 407). With this distinction in mind, how does the APoA establish the _justifiability_ and possibly also the _justification_  of the NAP? Hoppe begins to summarize this as follows with the  requirement of the right to control one’s own body, which is often  described as self-ownership:
> 
> 
> 
> …it must be noted that  argumentation does not consist of free-floating propositions but is a  form of action requiring the employment of scarce means; and that the  means which a person demonstrates as preferring by engaging in  propositional exchanges are those of private property. For one thing, no  one could possibly propose anything, and no one could become convinced  of any proposition by argumentative means, if a person’s right to make  exclusive use of his physical body were not already presupposed. (2006,  342)
> 
> Hoppe next presents further logical links from self-ownership to the first-appropriation principle  and therefore property in things and locations (343–44). The  commonality between self-ownership and ownership of objects and  locations is the question, in each case, as to who has the _better_  claim in a given case. The status of self-ownership claims is more  obvious due to the unique, inimitable, and non-transferrable capability  of direct self-control. There is little question as to who has the  better claim to oneself—oneself or some other person? However, this _better claim_  criterion also logically applies in the same way to other objects and  locations, which, unlike ones own body, must be acquired or homesteaded…”
> ...


...




> For a  specific example, he tries to Hoppe's argumentation ethics to prove some  categorical imperative (don't recall what it is). The problem is that  Hoppe's argumentation ethics doesn't work, at all. The basic idea is the  performative contradiction: i.e. a statement which must be false in  virtue of being made. "I am dead" is the classic performative  contradiction; it must be false in virtue of being spoken (dead men  can't speak). Hoppe (and Molyneux, in some fashion) try to apply this  perfectly sensible concept to _ethical_ statements, and that  doesn't work. There is no ethical statement that would have to be false  in virtue of being stated. In other words, an ethical statement's truth  cannot be a necessary condition for a physical event (someone speaking)  to occur.


Completely miss the boat here. See:




> "Since considerations such as these are irrelevant in order to judge the validity of a mathematical proof, for instance, so are they beside the point here. In the same way as the validity of a mathematical proof is not restricted to the moment of proving it, so is the validity of the libertarian property theory not limited to instances of argumentation. If correct, the argument demonstrates its universal justification. (Of all utilitarian critics only Steele takes up the challenge that I had posed for them: that the assignment of property rights cannot be dependent on any later outcome because in this case no one could ever know before the outcome what he was or was not justified to do; and that in advocating a consequentialist position utilitarianism is [strictly speaking] no ethic at all if it fails to answer the all decisive question “what am I justified to do now?” Steele solves this problem in the same way as he proceeds throughout his comment: by misunderstanding what it is.  
> 
> He misconceives my argument as subject to empirical testing and misrepresents it as claiming to show that “I favor a libertarian ethic” follows from “I am saying something,” while in fact it claims that entirely independent of whatever people happen to favor or utter “the libertarian ethic can be given an ultimate propositional justification” follows from “I claim such and such to be valid, i.e., capable of propositional justification.” His response to the consequentialist problem is yet another stroke of genius: No, says Steele, consequentialism must not involve a praxeologically absurd waiting-for-the-outcome ethic. His example: Certain rules are advocated first, then implemented, and later adjusted depending on outcomes. While this is indeed an example of consequentialism, I fail to see how it should provide an answer to “what are we justified in doing now?” and so escape the absurdities of a waiting- for-the-outcome ethic.
> 
> The starting point is unjustified [Which rules? Not only the outcome depends on this!]; and the consequentialist procedure is unjustified, too. [Why not adopt rules and stick to them regardless of the outcome?] Steele’s answer to the question “what am I justified in doing?” is “that depends on whatever rules you start out with, then on the outcome of whatever this leads to, and finally on whether or not you care about such an outcome.” Whatever this is, it is no ethic.) 
> — Hoppe, EEPP, pg 406-407


Further:

"Arguing is an activity and requires a person’s exclusive control over scarce resources (one’s brain, vocal cords, etc.). More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual  recognition of each other’s exclusive control over such resources. It is this which explains the unique feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. (Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the  right of self-ownership. He errs. Whatever [the law of contradiction, for instance] must be presupposed insofar as one argues cannot be meaningfully disputed because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt;  hence, it must be regarded as indisputable or a priori valid. In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything must be a self-owner. It is a self-contradictory absurdity to ask for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact. 
— Hoppe, EEPP, Appendix: Four Critical Replies




> For instance, Hoppe tried to show that a statement such as "I  don't own my body" is a performative contradiction, by claiming that one  cannot make the statement if one doesn't own one's body; but this is  plainly wrong. One cannot make the statement "I don't own my body"  unless one _controls_ one's body (or at least one's mouth, etc), but _control is not ownership_. As soon you try to use performative contradiction to prove an ethical statement, whatever it is, you fail.


Piss poor paraphrasing isn't valid. Hoppe didn't try to do any such thing. What he did do:

Argumentation Ethics: Summarised

“Argumentation  Ethics states that no moral (or I argue more specifically legal; it is  about property rights and the justifiability of aggression, after all)  argument against the NAP _can be successfully justified in discourse_ without performative contradiction in the act  of doing so. The above looks like just another typical failure to  understand AE followed by a straw man attack on things that no one  actually claims. Of course, a person is capable of running around  shouting about how they cannot run and shout but in that case it is  harder to find people to take them seriously. So in summary, AE shows  certain minimal conditions under which claims about rights can or cannot  possibly be successful as valid arguments according to the laws of  logic (non-contradiction). It never claims that people are incapable of  making invalid and internally contradictory arguments. They certainly  are known to do so regularly.”
          — Konrad Graf

Further:




> Conflating Use with Ownership
> 
> In spite of the fact that this critique seems definitive, a closer look will reveal to us its flaws. Contrary to the claim of Callahan and Murphy, the argument by performative contradiction does not conflate _use_ with _ownership_. The illusion of this conflation comes from the fact that when they are applied to the body of an intentional agent, “use” and “ownership” simply overlap. However, “use” and “ownership” can be distinguished on logical grounds. Clearly, from the very fact that one sits on a chair it is impossible to infer that she is its owner. To determine the ownership, one has to find out who decides upon its use. This distinction between “use” and “ownership” is commonly illustrated by the difference in a firm between manager and owner. The function accomplished by a manager who takes all the current decisions concerning the use of resources in a firm is different from the function of an owner who decides as a last resort. 
> 
> The last resort decision is epitomized by the fact that the owner _can_ decide to fire the manager. In fact, the owner decides who should make the current decisions in a firm. Besides this distinction, the crucial question in ethics is: “Who has the legitimate ownership?” A different formulation may be: “Who has the right to own a specific resource?” Of course, from an ethical point of view an owner, i.e., a person who effectively control as a last resort a specific good, is not necessarily its legitimate owner. Here it is an obvious question to ask: am I the legitimate owner of the chair on which I am sitting right now?
> 
> Let us now apply this idea to self-ownership. If one can lose the ultimate control of a firm by selling it, she can _never_  lose control of her body. The difference consists on the fact that contrary to the ownership on land,  the ownership on the body cannot be denied or abandoned. It is conceivable  that a person does not own a piece of land. But it is inconceivable that a  person does not own herself. By definition, self-ownership can be withdrawn only by  cancelling the agent’s intentionality (free-will and conscience), i.e.,  by transforming her into a zombie or robot. For most of the scholars, this  is the common way to understand self-ownership. “Man can neither be inherited,  nor sold, nor given; he can be no one’s property” (Fichte, [1793] 1996,  124). Now it appears clearly why the “use of the body” and the “self-ownership” (even though  they are logically distinct) have the same extension. While it is possible to  sit on a chair without being its owner, it is impossible to use a body and not  being its owner. This is the case because, one cannot not use her own body and  one cannot not decide as a last resort of the action of her own body.
> 
> While the ownership in her own body cannot be alienated, one can be nonetheless coerced to act otherwise than she would have wished. This is the case of slaves, prisoners, victims of occasional robberies, etc. The master does not own a slave as one may own a piece of land. An owner of slaves does not own bodies but can coerce the self-owners to use their own bodies according to her wishes. Since land can be acquired, sold or stalled, the question to ask from an ethical standpoint is: am I the legitimate owner of the land? Obviously, the body cannot be acquired, sold or stalled but it can be aggressed. 
> ...

----------


## r3volution 3.0

> I've achieved more than SM as a writer why would I take time to reproduce his theory in my own words?  I already wrote that I found it in line with Hazlitt's Foundations of Morality. I will use a line from that book which I have often quoted.  "The attitude and actions that best promote the happiness and well being of the individual in the long run tend to coincide with the actions and attitudes that best promote the happiness and well being of society as a whole."


I asked you to reproduce one of the arguments of this "modern day Socrates" in your own words because I find that Molyneux fans tend to respond to any criticism of The Master by accusing the critic of not understanding what He meant. To date, I don't think any Molyneux fan has ever taken me up on my offer, presumably because, when his arguments are plainly stated, sans rhetoric and platitudes (ala "reason is important" ), their absurdity becomes obvious. O well. Let me know if you change your mind.

----------


## r3volution 3.0

> _The structure of the argument is this:
> 
>     (a) justification is propositional justification—a priori true is-statement;
>     (b) argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the homesteading principle—a priori true is-statement; and
>     (c) then, no deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true is-statement._


It doesn't. As I already explained, Hoppe is conflating control and ownership (is and ought). 

Arguing requires control over one's body: e.g. it is physically impossible for one to speak without controlling one's vocal cords.

 Ownership has nothing to do with it. _





			
				“Argumentation  Ethics states that no moral (or I argue more  specifically legal; it is  about property rights and the justifiability  of aggression, after all)  argument against the NAP can be successfully justified in discourse  without performative contradiction in the act  of doing so. The above  looks like just another typical failure to  understand AE followed by a  straw man attack on things that no one  actually claims. Of course, a  person is capable of running around  shouting about how they cannot run  and shout but in that case it is  harder to find people to take them  seriously. So in summary, AE shows  certain minimal conditions under  which claims about rights can or cannot  possibly be successful as valid  arguments according to the laws of  logic (non-contradiction). It never  claims that people are incapable of  making invalid and internally  contradictory arguments. They certainly  are known to do so regularly.”
			
		

_Once again, he is conflating control and ownership.There is a performative contradiction in saying "I do not control my vocal cords."

There is no performative contradiction is saying "I do not own my vocal cords."




> In spite of the fact that this critique seems definitive, a closer look  will reveal to us its flaws. Contrary to the claim of Callahan and  Murphy, the argument by performative contradiction does not conflate _use_ with _ownership_.  The illusion of this conflation comes from the fact that when they are  applied to the body of an intentional agent, “use” and “ownership”  simply overlap.


That is not a fact but an ethical statement, and the very one he's is trying to prove. 

The argument is not only not objective (because it has an ethical statement as a premise), but circular (since the conclusion is a premise).

----------


## dannno

> There is a performative contradiction in saying "I do not control my vocal cords."
> 
> There is no performative contradiction is saying "I do not own my vocal cords."


Ok, so for argument's sake, I guess you wouldn't mind if somebody came and cut them out of your throat.

Ironically, this gets into why you don't understand UPB.

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## r3volution 3.0

> Ok, so for argument's sake, I guess you wouldn't mind if somebody came and cut them out of your throat.


You seem not to understand the nature of the disagreement. 

It's not that Hoppe is saying "people own themselves," and I'm saying "no they don't."

It's that Hoppe is saying "I've devised a _proof_ that people own themselves," and I'm saying "no you haven't, that's impossible."

----------


## dannno

> You seem not to understand the nature of the disagreement. 
> 
> It's not that Hoppe is saying "people own themselves," and I'm saying "no they don't."
> 
> It's that Hoppe is saying "I've devised a _proof_ that people own themselves," and I'm saying "no you haven't, that's impossible."


Ok, so for arguments sake, I guess you would be ok with someone kidnapping and raping you. 

Ironically, this is why you don't understand UPB.

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## r3volution 3.0

> Ok, so for arguments sake, I guess you would be ok with someone kidnapping and raping you.


...?




> You seem not to _clearly don't_ understand the nature of the disagreement. 
> 
> It's not that Hoppe is saying "people own themselves," and I'm saying "no they don't."
> 
> It's that Hoppe is saying "I've devised a _proof_ that people own themselves," and I'm saying "no you haven't, that's impossible."

----------


## dannno

> ...?


If YOU don't own your body, then you have no say in what other people do to it. That is why you do, in fact, have ownership of your body.

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## r3volution 3.0

> If YOU don't own your body, then you have no say in what other people do to it. That is why you do, in fact, have ownership of your body.


If you mean that my ability to object to someone trying to murder me (for instance) demonstrates that I own my body, no, it doesn't. 

That's attempting to derive an ought from an is.

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## dannno

> If you mean that my ability to object to someone trying to murder me (for instance) demonstrates that I own my body, no, it doesn't. 
> 
> That's attempting to derive an ought from an is.


Well you couldn't object to someone trying to murder you from moral grounds if you don't own your body. Certainly you could perform the action to protect yourself, but there would be no reason to say you were right to do so.

Do you own a car or a house or your computer or something? Why, because you paid for it? Well, ya, that payment transferred the ownership rights to you, but also because you have made an attempt to maintain ownership over your property. But the point is, unlike property, you own you, you don't need to pay for yourself, nobody can transfer ownership of you to anybody else or you could be enslaved from a moral standpoint. 

Again, the fact you don't understand these basic concepts through some sort of anti-logical training you have been put through, well, that makes it kinda difficult for you to understand rational arguments like UPB.

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## r3volution 3.0

> you couldn't object to someone trying to murder you from moral grounds if you don't own your body


No, you couldn't object to someone trying to murder you on moral grounds if you didn't _control_ your own body.

----------


## dannno

> No, you couldn't object to someone trying to murder you on moral grounds if you didn't _control_ your own body.


Lol, dude, your whole brain is wired backwards...

You couldn't object to someone trying to murder you in the physical realm if you didn't control your own body.

You couldn't object to someone trying to murder you on moral grounds if you didn't own your own body.

----------


## r3volution 3.0

> Lol, dude, your whole brain is wired backwards...
> 
> You couldn't object to someone trying to murder you in the physical realm if you didn't control your own body.
> 
> You couldn't object to someone trying to murder you on moral grounds if you didn't own your own body.


What you mean to say is that a person who objects to being murdered on moral grounds must _believe_ that he owns his own body. 

...but that's isn't true either. 

There are any number of ethical theories on the basis of which one could offer an ethical objection to being murdered. 

...but that's not even the most damning problem.

Even if everyone did believe that they own their bodies, such that for them to deny it in argument would be a contradiction, it doesn't follow that they believe that _others_ own_ their_ bodies.

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## dannno

> Even if everyone did believe that they own their bodies, such that for them to deny it in argument would be a contradiction, it doesn't follow that they believe that _others_ own_ their_ bodies.


Well they could but that would be a logical contradiction.

Again, you have trained your brain to be illogical which makes it difficult for you to understand arguments like UPB (or just about anything Molyneux says for that matter)

----------


## dannno

> What you mean to say is that a person who objects to being murdered on moral grounds must _believe_ that he owns his own body.


No, no, no..

A person who objects to being murdered on moral grounds - to perform the action of objecting they must believe they own their own body - but to be morally correct in their action of objecting they must own their own body.

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## r3volution 3.0

> Well they could but that would be a logical contradiction.


No, you're confusing consistency and universality. 

Consider the following ethical statement:

"Everyone has the right to do whatever he wants."

This is inconsistent. There is a conflict of rights, because people will want to do mutually exclusive things (e.g. eat the same apple).

Compare to this:

"Bob has the right to do whatever he wants; everyone else has no rights."

This is perfectly consistent; there can be no conflict of rights. It just isn't universal. 

There's no logical contradiction in claiming that you own yourself, while denying that others own themselves.

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## dannno

> There's no logical contradiction in claiming that you own yourself, while denying that others own themselves.


Did this come from your Monarchy training school?

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## r3volution 3.0

I guess that's the end of the discussion...

I'll leave you with a recommendation: in lieu of Molyneux's gibbering, pick up a cheap used copy of a logic textbook.

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## dannno

> I'll leave you with a recommendation: in lieu of Molyneux's gibbering, pick up a cheap used copy of a logic textbook.


I got an A in my University level logic class. 

I'm not sure how you can logically claim that you own yourself, but nobody else owns themself unless without citing some information that differentiates you from everybody else... unless you come from Monarchy training school and think you are king of the world. That doesn't seem logical to me.

----------


## heavenlyboy34

> I guess that's the end of the discussion...
> 
> I'll leave you with a recommendation: in lieu of Molyneux's gibbering, pick up a cheap used copy of a logic textbook.





> You must spread some Reputation around before giving it to r3volution 3.0 again.


Despite all our disagreements over the years, I strongly agree on this one. UPB is $#@! philosophy no serious philosopher-anarchist or otherwise-would consider legitimate.

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## dannno

> Despite all our disagreements over the years, I strongly agree on this one. UPB is $#@! philosophy no serious philosopher-anarchist or otherwise-would consider legitimate.


You shouldn't +rep people for using $#@! logic against what you believe is $#@! philosophy, that doesn't further anything at all.

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## heavenlyboy34

> You shouldn't +rep people for using $#@! logic against what you believe is $#@! philosophy, that doesn't further anything at all.


Let me refer you to David Gordon's (a real philosopher with credentials and a track record of publications to prove it) review of Stefan's previous book, "Universally Preferable Behavior" so you can learn some things: https://mises.org/library/molyneux-problem

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## dannno

> Let me refer you to David Gordon's (a real philosopher with credentials and a track record of publications to prove it) review of Stefan's previous book, "Universally Preferable Behavior" so you can learn some things: https://mises.org/library/molyneux-problem


From the article:




> Although I have so far been critical of Molyneux, I am happy to give him credit for an excellent idea.




What is the idea that is so excellent?

UPB, as I understand it, in a nutshell. That is the "idea" that he is so excited about. That is precisely the "idea" that I have been discussing here with Rev3.  

The rest of the article doesn't argue against UPB, it argues against some other things he says in the book which he seems to not fully understand the reasoning.

----------


## heavenlyboy34

> From the article:
> 
> 
> 
> What is the idea that is so excellent?
> 
> UPB, as I understand it, in a nutshell. That is the "idea" that he is so excited about. That is precisely the "idea" that I have been discussing here with Rev3.  
> 
> The rest of the article doesn't argue against UPB, it argues against some other things he says in the book which he seems to not fully understand the reasoning. [/FONT][/COLOR]


Certainly. Also from the article,




> Should he succeed, he would not only have achieved something of  monumental importance; he would also have rendered a great service to  libertarianism. Molyneux's system of morality has resolutely libertarian  implications. If he is right, surely a time for rejoicing is at hand.It  would be cruel to arouse false expectations, so I had better say at  once that Molyneux does not succeed in his noble goal. *He fails, and  fails miserably. His arguments are often preposterously bad.*


He actually does argue against UPB. He takes it apart like a philosopher. (i.e. Stef's "moral rules")

----------


## dannno

> Certainly. Also from the article,
> 
> 
> 
> He actually does argue against UPB. He takes it apart like a philosopher. (i.e. Stef's "moral rules")


No, what he did was get a bunch of people riled up in the beginning by saying what he said in that portion you quoted, then he tried to take apart a few of the things Molyneux said in his book (I don't think he did a very good job, seemed pretty irrelevant), then he praised what is actually the primary argument of UPB, then he said that Molyneux is actually a really smart guy at the end. 

But it seems you just read the first paragraph or two and said, "wow this guy doesn't like Stef too, this article is great"

Ironically the part that he praised tears apart the arguments made by Rev3 who you +rep'd...

----------


## undergroundrr

Currently enjoying the follow-up: 

https://mises.org/library/mr-molyneux-responds

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## r3volution 3.0

@dannno

Are you giving money to Molyneaux?

----------


## dannno

> @dannno
> 
> Are you giving money to Molyneaux?



Ya, I gave him some btc back in the day which is now worth a $#@! ton and I give him a little monthly stipend.

I've given Rand more $$ but if he accepted btc back in the day and was able to HODL it he would be ahead.

----------


## Conza88

> It doesn't. As I already explained, Hoppe is conflating control and ownership (is and ought).


Embarrassing. He is not, and he literally stated the opposite carte blanche. I mean; you have nothing to object to given his statement that _Ought-statements cannot be derived from is-statements. They belong to different logical realms_.
Hopefully this helps: 

*Separate natures of justification and acting*

We now address further the question of whether the APoA [a priori of argumentation]  and its grounding of the NAP and property theory are part of ethics  in a normative sense or can be considered a purely descriptive account  that can be placed within praxeology as an is science. Hoppes  normative formulations of the APoA as applied to the NAP are a priori  is statements made with regard to certain norms. However, these  particular norms are inescapable implications of propositional discourse  itself. These a priori normative statements are therefore not in the  form of the ought statements commonly associated with the normative  sphere of ethics. Rather, they delimit the sphere of is-level  conceptual _possibility.

_That Hoppes formulations take the form of is statements_ regarding_ _justifiable norms_  explains both the magnitude of this innovation and the challenge of  interpreting these arguments with conventional categories. A primary  Hoppean APoA is statement is that the NAP _can be justified_ in propositional discourse, while any conceivable contradictory alternative to the NAP _cannot be justified_  without performative contradiction. This gains additional significance  because propositional discourse is the only method through which  justification can be accomplished. Therefore, if one wants to justify a  norm with regard to the issues addressed by property rights, there is _only one_ possibility, the NAP. Hoppe writes:

The praxeological proof of libertarianism has the advantage of offering a  completely value-free justification of private property. It remains  entirely in the realm of is-statements and never tries to derive an  ought from an is. The structure of the argument is this: (a)  justification is propositional justificationa priori true is-statement;  (b) argumentation presupposes property in ones body and the  homesteading principlea priori true is-statement; and © then, no  deviation from this ethic can be argumentatively justifieda priori true  is-statement. The proof also offers a key to an understanding of the  nature of the fact-value dichotomy: Ought-statements cannot be derived  from is statements. They belong to different logical realms. It is also  clear, however, that one cannot even state that there are facts and  values if no propositional exchanges exist, and that this practice of  propositional exchanges in turn presupposes the acceptance of the  private property ethic as valid. In other words, cognition and  truth-seeking as such have a normative foundation, and the normative  foundation on which cognition and truth rest is the recognition of  private property rights. (2006, 345)

In claiming that the is/ought gap has been transcended in Rothbards  words, there remains a risk of overstatement, to assuming that an  ought has actually been derived from an is. While it may nearly  appear that it has, this is not claimed. What has been done, in my view,  is subtler. Praxeology has delimited a sphere of _possibility_  for the category of justification with regard to property norms. With no  recourse to oughts, praxeology arrives at a somewhat surprising  conclusion: there is _only one_ set of norms at the level of  property theory that are compatible with the requirements of  justification itselfand these are the NAP-based norms.

Praxeology  has thus done most of the work when it comes to property theory,  leaving ethics itself, understood as an ought discipline, with a  simple yea-or-nay taskto respect the NAP or not to in action. Only one  additional step is required to conclude that the sole property norm that  CAN be justified, also IS justified based on additional criteria. Among  them, Hoppe argues that the NAP is universalizable, prevents conflicts,  can in theory be applied without contradiction from the beginning of  mankind onward, and promotes wealth, peace, social harmony, well-being,  and character development.

It is  important in this context to separate justification as such from any  particular act of either following or not following a justified norm.  Action implies ends aimed at and requires a choice of ends. Ethics is  concerned with choosing endssome rather than others. Yet  justifiability, and possibly also justification itself, can exist  independently from any particular action or choice. As Hoppe writes,  There is and remains a difference between establishing a truth claim  and instilling a desire to act upon the truthwith ought or without  it (2006, 408).

A clearer distinction  can be drawn using the action categories of ends and means themselves.  When we consider ends, we speak of the goals or objectives of action,  what is sought. This is the realm of teleology, one that can include  oughts. When we consider means, however, we turn to the realm of  causality, that is, cause and effect in a descriptive, empirical sense.  Ends are not only chosen, but _must_ involve choice: This or that? Whether to actually respect the NAP or violate it _in action_  will always be a specific choice by an acting person. However, this is  an entirely separate matter from justifiability and justification.
           Konrad Graf

What do you not understand?




> Arguing requires control over one's body: e.g. it is physically impossible for one to speak without controlling one's vocal cords. Ownership has nothing to do with it.


_Ownership  exclusive right to control. It has everything to do with it. FYI _ You can communicate without using one's vocal cords. Besides the point though. _

_


> Once again, he is conflating control and ownership.There is a performative contradiction in saying "I do not control my vocal cords."
> 
> There is no performative contradiction is saying "I do not own my vocal cords."



The answer to the question what makes  my body mine lies in the obvious fact that this is not merely an  assertion but that, for everyone to see, this is indeed the case. Why do  we say this is my body? For this a twofold requirement exists.

On the one hand it must be the case that the body called mine must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable  way) express or objectify my will. Proof of this, as far as my body  is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I will  now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever else) and  these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then this shows  that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated by my will.  If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic relation to  my bodys actual behavior, then the proposition this is my body would  have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded assertion; and  likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect if following my  announcement not my arm would rise but always that of Müller, Meier, or  Schulze (in which case one would more likely be inclined to consider  Müllers, Meiers, or Schulzes body mine).On the other hand,  apart from demonstrating that my will has been objectified in the  body called mine, it must be demonstrated that my appropriation has  priority as compared to the possible appropriation of the same body by  another person.

As far as bodies are concerned, it is also  easy to prove this. We demonstrate it by showing that it is under my  direct control, while every other person can objectify (express) itself  in my body only indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and  direct control must obviously have logical-temporal priority  (precedence) as compared to any indirect control. *The latter simply  follows from the fact that any indirect control of a good by a person  presupposes the direct control of this person regarding his own body;  thus, in order for a scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the  appropriation of ones directly controlled own body must already be  presupposed as justified.*

*It thus follows: If the justice of an  appropriation by means of direct control must be presupposed by any  further-reaching indirect appropriation, and if only I have direct  control of my body, then no one except me can ever justifiably own my  body (or, put differently, then property in/of my body cannot be  transferred onto another person), and every attempt of an indirect  control of my body by another person must, unless I have explicitly  agreed to it, be regarded as unjust(ified).*
 Informal translation  from Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Eigentum, Anarchie und Staat (Manuscriptum  Verlag, 2005, pp. 98-100; originally published in 1985).




> That is not a fact but an ethical statement, and the very one he's is trying to prove. 
> 
> The argument is not only not objective (because it has an ethical statement as a premise), but circular (since the conclusion is a premise).


Not an "ethical" (ought) claim at all. Crystal clear you have literally no proper understanding of what APoA is. 

What about following no property norm at all?

To begin with, this is a self-contradictory norm of following no norm. It _is_  a proposed norm, and thus fails as impossible merely by being stated.  Hoppe also makes clear that every alternative to the NAP implies _some_ property norm. The difference among possible property norms is the specific criteria for _who_  shall be deemed to justifiably control what. All variants of statism  claim that the people own certain resources described as public via  the state, but since this is impossible, it masks the fact that specific  people actually control these various resources, only in a less just,  less efficient and more arbitrary way than under the NAP, a way  dominated by political skills rather than skills in employing scarce  resources so as to better satisfy demand (Hoppe 2010, Chapter 3).

In  sum, this interpretation of the Hoppean APoA alters what ought ethics  faces in the realm of property theory. Instead of facing a thorny  question of _which_ property norms are justified, ethics itself is faced only with the question of whether a person should _follow_  the only justifiable norms with regard to property. The APoA  establishes that there is no justifiable alternative to the NAP and  therefore little choice to be made with regard to it except, as Ayn Rand  would say, the choice to either acknowledge it or to mentally evade it.  The APoA at once does not violate the is/ought gap problem and  simultaneously does show that is possibility criteria can dramatically inform and delimit what can be justified, particularly when it comes to  property norms.

Categories such as  ethics and law, normative and descriptive, have evolved to denote fields  of interest and investigation. Reality and its understanding must take  priority. Resort to field classifications and thought aids such as  branches of knowledge must always serve this end, not vice versa. It  is not our conclusions that must be modified in light of existing field  classifications, but our field classifications that, if necessary, must  bend to the emerging contours of our understanding of reality.

None  of the foregoing should leave the impression that the normative field  of ethics in relation to ends is unimportant or uncomplicated at levels _beyond_  basic property norms. In Part IV, we shall return to the relationship  between property norms, law, rules, and ethics to examine the role of  ethics within an action framework and in relation to law. I will argue  that the above division between the is and ought elements of the  APoA-based NAP remains in place and takes on additional importance at  higher levels.

           Konrad Graf

----------


## Conza88

Yo rev-3.0,

What are you thoughts on the action axiom?



“The attempt to disprove the action-axiom would itself be an _action_ aimed at a _goal_, requiring _means_, excluding other courses of _action_, incurring_ costs_, subjecting the actor to the possibility of achieving or not achieving the desired goal and so leading to a _profit_ or a_ loss_.

And  the very possession of such knowledge then can never be disputed, and  the validity of these concepts can never be falsified by any contingent  experience, for disputing or falsifying anything would already have  presupposed their very existence. As a matter of fact, a situation in  which these categories of action would cease to have a real existence  could itself never be observed, for making an observation, too, is an  action.” 
   — Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method

----------


## r3volution 3.0

> The structure of the argument is this: (a)  justification is  propositional justification—a priori true is-statement;  (b)  argumentation presupposes property in one’s body and the  homesteading  principle—a priori true is-statement; and © then, no  deviation from  this ethic can be argumentatively justified—a priori true  is-statement.


For the Nth time, the underlined is false. 

There is no performative contradiction in denying that one own's oneself, let alone that others own themselves. 




> On the one hand it must be the case that the body called “mine” must indeed (in an intersubjectively ascertainable   way) express or “objectify” my will. Proof of this, as far as my body   is concerned, is easy enough to demonstrate: When I announce that I  will  now lift my arm, turn my head, relax in my chair (or whatever  else) and  these announcements then become true (are fulfilled), then  this shows  that the body which does this has been indeed appropriated  by my will.  If, to the contrary, my announcements showed no systematic  relation to  my body’s actual behavior, then the proposition “this is my  body” would  have to be considered as an empty, objectively unfounded  assertion; and  likewise this proposition would be rejected as incorrect  if following my  announcement not my arm would rise but always that of  Müller, Meier, or  Schulze (in which case one would more likely be  inclined to consider  Müller’s, Meier’s, or Schulze’s body “mine”).On  the other hand,  apart from demonstrating that my will has been  “objectified” in the  body called “mine,” *it must be demonstrated that  my appropriation has  priority as compared to the possible appropriation  of the same body by  another person*.


 i.e. ownership must be demonstrated (contra mere control), which is precisely what Hoppe fails to do




> As far as bodies are concerned, it is also  easy to prove this. We  demonstrate it by showing that it is under my  direct control, while  every other person can objectify (express) itself  in my body only  indirectly, i.e., by means of their own bodies, and  direct control must  obviously have logical-temporal priority  (precedence) as compared to  any indirect control. The latter simply  follows from the fact that  any indirect control of a good by a person  presupposes the direct  control of this person regarding his own body;  *thus, in order for a  scarce good to become justifiably appropriated, the  appropriation of  one’s directly controlled “own” body must already be  presupposed as  justified*.


His argument is that we must accept self-ownership, because libertarian homesteading theory doesn't work without it (one can't homestead things using a body one doesn't own). The obvious problem with this argument is that it presupposes libertarian homesteading theory (an ethical claim). If someone rejects libertarian homesteading theory, he has no reason to accept self-ownership. Hoppe might as well argue that libertarianism in general requires self-ownership, therefore self-ownership is justified (obviously not going convince anyone who isn't already a libertarian). 




> thoughts on the action axiom?


The statement "I am not acting [or "no one acts," or the like]" is a performative contradiction, ala "I am dead."

----------


## Sola_Fide

I haven't read the book and won't do it.  It is not possible to derive a standard of ought from what is, which is all empirical atheistic worldviews have to build from.   You can't derive prescriptions from descriptive premises.  End of story.

----------


## r3volution 3.0

> I haven't read the book and won't do it.  It is not possible to derive a standard of ought from what is, which is all empirical atheistic worldviews have to build from.   You can't derive prescriptions from descriptive premises.  End of story.


It's certainly impossible to "prove" ethics, but this applies also to theistic ethics.

The logical problem is the same regardless of the subject matter.

----------


## Sola_Fide

> It's certainly impossible to "prove" ethics, but this applies also to theistic ethics.
> 
> The logical problem is the same regardless of the subject matter.


How do you say?

----------


## r3volution 3.0

> How do you say?


Well, if the premises are all is-statements, then the argument is invalid (is --/--> ought).

If at least one of the premises is an ought-statement, then the argument might be valid, but the conclusion cannot be proved true.

----------


## Conza88

> For the Nth time, the underlined is false. 
> 
> There is no performative contradiction in denying that one own's oneself, let alone that others own themselves. 
> 
>  i.e. ownership must be demonstrated (contra mere control), which is precisely what Hoppe fails to do.


Yes, there bloody well is. Own = exclusive right to control. 

WHO has a better claim to your body, than yourself? FFS. You are demonstrating it right now. 




> His argument is that we must accept self-ownership, because libertarian homesteading theory doesn't work without it (one can't homestead things using a body one doesn't own). The obvious problem with this argument is that it presupposes libertarian homesteading theory (an ethical claim). If someone rejects libertarian homesteading theory, he has no reason to accept self-ownership. Hoppe might as well argue that libertarianism in general requires self-ownership, therefore self-ownership is justified (obviously not going convince anyone who isn't already a libertarian).


Nope. Lmao. You still don't get it. *You literally have it ass backwards.* Here it is. Real simple:


*Self-ownership and Original Appropriation*

“In  general, I am moving in the direction of a one-step argument in which  self-ownership is not treated separately from homesteading, but as a  special example of homesteading such that there is a single unified  justification of both “self-ownership” and homesteading of external  resources. I think the key to resolving this issue more clearly is once  again better applying the subject/object distinction, in this case to  the precise meaning of “self.”

In this view, the act of  making use of one’s own physical body before anyone else does as part of  the natural process of human development is simply the prototype of a  first-appropriation (“homesteading”) act. The whole body is a "relevant  technological unit” in Rothbard’s sense, a natural unity for  appropriation by an actor (Let’s say you are hunting and kill a deer. If  a stranger shows up and tries to arbitrarily claim a section of it,  which part of the deer is yours? The whole deer; not just the patch  where the arrow struck! That would be another application of the RTU  idea).

Now, in the idea of self-ownership, who is doing the  appropriating of the “self”? Can the “self” appropriate the “self?” What  does that mean? This is where this literature has sometimes gotten  confusing. The answer is there, but it’s not always clarified as well as  I think it could be.

Much of the confusion stems from a double  meaning attached to “self” (sorting this out is also a resolution path  for the larger “mind-body problem” controversy, as Ken Wilber has  suggested). To unpack this, I define the “self” as the subject, the  actor. That subject can claim the physical body associated with itself,  which is the “self” as an object, that is, “empirically” measurable in  the physical world. Thus, the human being considered as an acting person  is a SUBJECT and not any kind of physical “object.” An acting person is  not just a body, not just an empirical object, like a kidney or a stone  (or a kidney stone…). A subject as contrasted with a physical object is  not measurable or claimable as property at all. This (subject) “self”  is an intangible like an idea (the basis of anti-IP thought too, is that  ideas are not scarce objects and can therefore not be properly owned).  The acting person has a physically observable aspect, but is not _reducible to_ physical substance. We are subjects-and-objects by nature.

This  is why I try to bring in Ken Wilber to re-emphasize the importance of  better refining our differentiation of the interior perspective of a  subject (an acting person) and the exterior perspective of an object,  which can be a non-bodily external “object” or a bodily “object” such as  a particular part of the body in just the same sense. *AE [Argumentation  Ethics] is talking about subjects making statements and the nature of  justifiability of claims so made. It bridges subject/object in that it  treats claim-making as a physical action, which it is, rather than a  disembodied one, which is impossible. It depicts a subject making use of  physical resources (objects) to make propositional claims. Such  resources include the acting person’s physical body, etc. In contrast to  this necessary dualism, two flavors of reductionism will get you either  “an object making claims” (an internal contradiction) or “a subject  making claims without any physical means for making them” (an  absurdity).*

Actually appropriating physical objects through a  process of action and claiming is a different layer from having a  consciousness capable of acting/claiming. The prototype of  appropriation, as I said, is using and claiming one’s own physical body.  It may already be evident from the above that I am working to develop  this into a one-step argument, whereas Hoppe’s presentations have been  multi-step, in that self-ownership is given first and then the  justifiability of other appropriations are based on it in step two.  However, if we maintain a clear subject-object duality of personhood the  whole way through, “self-ownership” (meaning an acting subject’s  ownership of its own physical body) is not any different from any other  case of homesteading scarce physical resources; it is just another  result of the acquisition _by an actor/subject_ of a physical  resource, in this case, the acting subject making use of the physical  body that is associated with that subject in “a subject/object duality  pair” (that is, “a person” ☺). This has also been harder to see, because  relative to the case of a truly external resource such as an apple, a  subject is uniquely positioned to make use of and claim the physical  body uniquely associated with itself, the alternative being some kind of  fantastic neurobiological remote control system (although guardianship  of someone incapable of acting, as below, is a more realistic  alternative).

*So we actually embody methodological dualism because we are more or less integrated subject/**objects.*  Yet in theorizing, we always have to go back to asking which  perspective we are talking about or taking. We may have been missing  that self(own-body)-appropriation is just another case of homesteading,  simply because it is so obvious that it is hard to even reflect on it.  The physical body is one case of first appropriation in which it is  basically impossible for it to be otherwise. (I say, “basically”  because, in extremis, one could imagine a hypothetical human who was  born, but never developed in such a way as to be able to discernibly act  or make choices. Such a person would never develop the ability to “take  over” the reigns of their own life from their initial caretakers and  would presumably remain a ward of a parent or guardian).“

          — Konrad Graf
Whether it is convincing or not to anyone is utterly irrelevant to whether it is true or not. 





> The statement "I am not acting [or "no one acts," or the like]" is a performative contradiction, ala "I am dead."


Argumentation Ethics: Summarised

“Argumentation  Ethics states that no moral (or I argue more specifically legal; it is  about property rights and the justifiability of aggression, after all)  argument against the NAP _can be successfully justified in discourse_ without performative contradiction in the act  of doing so. *The above looks like just another typical failure to  understand AE followed by a straw man attack on things that no one  actually claims. Of course, a person is capable of running around  shouting about how they cannot run and shout but in that case it is  harder to find people to take them seriously.* So in summary, AE shows  certain minimal conditions under which claims about rights can or cannot  possibly be successful as valid arguments according to the laws of  logic (non-contradiction). *It never claims that people are incapable of  making invalid and internally contradictory arguments. They certainly  are known to do so regularly.”*

          — Konrad Graf

----------


## r3volution 3.0

> Originally Posted by r3volution 3.0
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  Originally Posted by You Quoting Hoppe
> ...


Yes, ownership is the exclusive _right_ to control, in contrast to the mere _fact_ of exclusive control. 

A car thief who in fact has exclusive control of your car does not thereby own it. 

That I am typing demonstrates that I have exclusive control of my body, not that I own it. 




> “Argumentation  Ethics states that no moral...argument against the NAP _can be successfully justified in discourse_ without performative contradiction in the act  of doing so.


...which is false, for reasons repeatedly explained.

----------


## Conza88

> Yes, ownership is the exclusive _right_ to control, in contrast to the mere _fact_ of exclusive control.


*Conflating Use with Ownership*

In spite of the fact that this critique seems definitive, a closer look will reveal to us its flaws. Contrary to the claim of Callahan and Murphy, the argument by performative contradiction does not conflate use with ownership. The illusion of this conflation comes from the fact that when they are applied to the body of an intentional agent, “use” and “ownership” simply overlap. However, “use” and “ownership” can be distinguished on logical grounds. Clearly, from the very fact that one sits on a chair it is impossible to infer that she is its owner. To determine the ownership, one has to find out who decides upon its use. This distinction between “use” and “ownership” is commonly illustrated by the difference in a firm between manager and owner. The function accomplished by a manager who takes all the current decisions concerning the use of resources in a firm is different from the function of an owner who decides as a last resort.

The last resort decision is epitomized by the fact that the owner can decide to fire the manager. In fact, the owner decides who should make the current decisions in a firm. Besides this distinction, the crucial question in ethics is: “Who has the legitimate ownership?” A different formulation may be: “Who has the right to own a specific resource?” Of course, from an ethical point of view an owner, i.e., a person who effectively control as a last resort a specific good, is not necessarily its legitimate owner. Here it is an obvious question to ask: am I the legitimate owner of the chair on which I am sitting right now?

Let us now apply this idea to self-ownership. If one can lose the ultimate control of a firm by selling it, she can never lose control of her body. The difference consists on the fact that contrary to the ownership on land, the ownership on the body cannot be denied or abandoned. It is conceivable that a person does not own a piece of land. But it is inconceivable that a person does not own herself. By definition, self-ownership can be withdrawn only by cancelling the agent’s intentionality (free-will and conscience), i.e., by transforming her into a zombie or robot. For most of the scholars, this is the common way to understand self-ownership. “Man can neither be inherited, nor sold, nor given; he can be no one’s property” (Fichte, [1793] 1996, 124). Now it appears clearly why the “use of the body” and the “self-ownership” (even though they are logically distinct) have the same extension. While it is possible to sit on a chair without being its owner, it is impossible to use a body and not being its owner. This is the case because, one cannot not use her own body and one cannot not decide as a last resort of the action of her own body.

While the ownership in her own body cannot be alienated, one can be nonetheless coerced to act otherwise than she would have wished. This is the case of slaves, prisoners, victims of occasional robberies, etc. The master does not own a slave as one may own a piece of land. An owner of slaves does not own bodies but can coerce the self-owners to use their own bodies according to her wishes. Since land can be acquired, sold or stalled, the question to ask from an ethical standpoint is: am I the legitimate owner of the land? Obviously, the body cannot be acquired, sold or stalled but it can be aggressed.

Therefore, the right to self-ownership means the right to be free from coercion. As we have seen since the beginning of this article, this is precisely the sense of the self-ownership axiom. From this point of view, slaves should be considered coerced self-owners. The slaves have as a last resort the ultimate choice to obey their master or to revolt against her.
— Marian Eabrasu





> A car thief who in fact has exclusive control of your car does not thereby own it. 
> 
> That I am typing demonstrates that I have exclusive control of my body, not that I own it.


Of course; because you have a better claim. It might in fact been his vehicle to begin with, that was stolen and you purchased the same vehicle unknowingly. 

He has a better claim to it.

In any case; what you don't get is self-ownership. 

WHO HAS A BETTER CLAIM TO YOUR BODY THAN YOU DO? YOU DEMONSTRATE THAT OWNERSHIP BY ACTING, EVERY TIME.

_After all, a property right is simply the exclusive right to control a scarce resource. Property rights specify which persons own - that is, have the right to control - various scarce resources in a given region or jurisdiction. Yet everyone and every political theory advance some theory of property. None of the various forms of socialism deny property rights; each version will specify an owner for every scarce resource. If the state nationalizes an industry, it is asserting ownership of these means of production. If the state taxes you, it is implicitly asserting ownership of the funds taken. If my land is transferred to a private developer by eminent domain statutes, the developer is now the owner. If the law allows a recipient of racial discrimination to sue his employer for a sum of money, he is the owner of the money.

Protection of and respect for property rights is thus not unique to libertarianism. What is distinctive about libertarianism is its particular property assignment rules: its view concerning who is the owner of each contestable resource, and how to determine this.[…]

The libertarian seeks property assignment rules because he values or accepts various grundnorms such as justice, peace, prosperity, cooperation, conflict-avoidance, and civilization. The libertarian view is that self-ownership is the only property assignment rule compatible with these grundorms; it is implied by them.
— Stephan Kinsella, What Libertarianism Is_

----------


## Feeding the Abscess

> From the article:
> 
> 
> 
> What is the idea that is so excellent?
> 
> UPB, as I understand it, in a nutshell. That is the "idea" that he is so excited about. That is precisely the "idea" that I have been discussing here with Rev3.  
> 
> The rest of the article doesn't argue against UPB, it argues against some other things he says in the book which he seems to not fully understand the reasoning. [/FONT][/COLOR]


The idea that Gordon describes as excellent, as shown by the very next sentence after the quote you provided:




> Although I have so far been critical of Molyneux, I am happy to give him credit for an excellent idea. *He suggests that a good test for a moral theory is its ability to arrive at the correct result for obvious cases, like rape, murder, and theft. If a theory cannot show that a rule that purported to make such conduct obligatory is ill-formed, the theory should be rejected.* Molyneux thinks he can show exactly this for his own account of universally preferable behavior.

----------


## r3volution 3.0

> *Conflating Use with Ownership*...


You already posted that and I already addressed it. 




> WHO HAS A BETTER CLAIM TO YOUR BODY THAN YOU DO?


Your assertion that the possessor of a thing has the best claim on it presupposes the very point in contention. 




> YOU DEMONSTRATE THAT OWNERSHIP BY ACTING, EVERY TIME.


Once again, no, my action demonstrates only that I control my body, not that I own it.

_



			
				After all, a property right is simply the exclusive right to control a scarce resource. Property rights specify which persons own - that is, have the right to control - various scarce resources in a given region or jurisdiction. Yet everyone and every political theory advance some theory of property. None of the various forms of socialism deny property rights; each version will specify an owner for every scarce resource. If the state nationalizes an industry, it is asserting ownership of these means of production. If the state taxes you, it is implicitly asserting ownership of the funds taken. If my land is transferred to a private developer by eminent domain statutes, the developer is now the owner. If the law allows a recipient of racial discrimination to sue his employer for a sum of money, he is the owner of the money.

Protection of and respect for property rights is thus not unique to libertarianism. What is distinctive about libertarianism is its particular property assignment rules: its view concerning who is the owner of each contestable resource, and how to determine this.[…]

The libertarian seeks property assignment rules because he values or accepts various grundnorms such as justice, peace, prosperity, cooperation, conflict-avoidance, and civilization. The libertarian view is that self-ownership is the only property assignment rule compatible with these grundorms; it is implied by them.
— Stephan Kinsella, What Libertarianism Is
			
		

_

That has no bearing on argumentation ethics.

...how about making your argument in your own words, rather than trying to bury me in repetitive/irrelevant quotes?

----------


## Conza88

> You already posted that and I already addressed it.


Pettifogging isn't addressing it. 




> Your assertion that the possessor of a thing has the best claim on it presupposes the very point in contention.


It's not merely an assertion when your actions confirm it to be true. That is why it is an axiom. You're just utterly blind to it;

“In order to do so, Mises notices in accordance  with the strictures traditionally formulated by rationalist  philosophers, economic propositions must fulfill two requirements:

First,  it must be possible to demonstrate that they are not derived from  observational evidence, for observational evidence can only reveal  things as they happen to be; there is no thing in it that would indicate  why things must be the way they are. Instead, economic propositions must be shown to be grounded in reflective cognition, in our understanding of ourselves as knowing subjects.And secondly, this reflective understanding must yield certain propositions as self-evident material axioms.  Not in the sense that such axioms would have to be self-evident in a  psychological sense, that is, that one would have to be immediately  aware of them or that their truth depends on a psychological feeling of  conviction. 

On the contrary like Kant before him, Mises very  much stresses the fact that it is usually much more pain staking to  discover such axioms than it is to discover some observational truth  such as that the leaves of trees are green or that I am 6 foot 2  inches.”
          — Hans-Hermann Hoppe

Specifically like the human action axiom:

“The attempt to disprove the action-axiom would itself be an _action_ aimed at a _goal_, requiring _means_, excluding other courses of _action_, incurring_ costs_, subjecting the actor to the possibility of achieving or not achieving the desired goal and so leading to a _profit_ or a_ loss_.

And  the very possession of such knowledge then can never be disputed, and  the validity of these concepts can never be falsified by any contingent  experience, for disputing or falsifying anything would already have  presupposed their very existence. *As a matter of fact, a situation in  which these categories of action would cease to have a real existence  could itself never be observed, for making an observation, too, is an  action.*” 
   — Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method




> Once again, no, my action demonstrates only that I control my body, not that I own it.


Once again, you have a better claim to anyone else — given ownership is established from first principles... *The relevant axioms, in the sense of irrefutable starting places, are non-contradiction, action, and argumentation.*


Arguing is an activity and requires a person’s exclusive control over scarce resources (one’s brain, vocal cords, etc.). More specifically, as long as there is argumentation, there is a mutual  recognition of each other’s exclusive control over such resources. It is this which explains the unique feature of communication: that while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to independently agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. (Lomasky does not seem to dispute this. 

He claims, however, that it merely proves the fact of mutually exclusive domains of control, not the  right of self-ownership. He errs. Whatever [the law of contradiction, for instance] must be presupposed insofar as one argues cannot be meaningfully disputed because it is the very precondition of meaningful doubt;  hence, it must be regarded as indisputable or a priori valid. 

In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological precondition of argumentation. Anyone trying to prove or disprove anything must be a self-owner. It is a self-contradictory absurdity to ask for any further-reaching justification for this fact. Required, of necessity, by all meaningful argumentation, self-ownership is an absolutely and ultimately justified fact. 
— Hoppe, EEPP, Appendix: Four Critical Replies - http://mises.org/books/economicsethics.pdf)



> That has no bearing on argumentation ethics.


This has everything to do with it... and the fact that you have no response makes your cluelessness even more clear. 




> ...how about making your argument in your own words, rather than trying to bury me in repetitive/irrelevant quotes?


Your objections are old hat and nothing origional, why should I waste my time recreating the wheel - when it's already been made? 

Direct source material is far more apt than piss poor paraphrasing I've seen above which sets up strawmen as the standard modus operandi.

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## r3volution 3.0

The action axiom is not a moral statement, it is a statement of fact; the one has nothing to do with the other. 

As for the rest, you're repeating yourself again and ignoring/not understanding my criticism. 

Though, in your defense, you're no more confused that Hoppe himself:




> In the same vein, the fact of self-ownership is a praxeological  precondition of argumentation.


Moral concepts (like ownership) are not _facts_, not matter how many times one may insist that they are.

It is simply a category mistake, like referring to saltiness as a color: gibberish.

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## Conza88

> The action axiom is not a moral statement, it is a statement of fact; *the one has nothing to do with the other.*


*Wrong.* They have everything to do with each other.

Praxeology and Epistemology: 

“…It  is not difficult to detect that both a priori axioms—of action and  argumentation—are intimately related. On the one hand, actions are more  fundamental than argumentations with whose existence the idea of  validity emerges, as argumentation is only a subclass of action. On the  other hand, to recognize what has just been recognized regarding action  and argumentation and their relation to each other requires  argumentation, and so, in this sense, argumentation must be considered  more fundamental than action: without argumentation nothing could be  said to be-known about action. But then, as it is in argumentation that  the insight is revealed that—while it might not be known to be so prior  to any argumentation—in fact the possibility of argumentation  presupposes action in that validity claims can only be explicitly  discussed in the course of an argumentation if the individuals doing so  already know what it means to act and to have knowledge implied in  action—both the meaning of action in general and argumentation in  particular must be thought of as logically necessary interwoven strands  of a priori knowledge.

What  this insight into the interrelation between the a priori of action and  the a priori of argumentation suggests is the following:

Traditionally,  the task of epistemology has been conceived of as that of formulating  what can be known to be true a priori and also what can be known a  priori not to be the subject of a priori knowledge. Recognizing, as we  have just done, that knowledge claims are raised and decided upon in the  course of argumentation and that this is undeniably so, one can now  reconstruct the task of epistemology more precisely as that of  formulating those propositions which are argumentatively indisputable in  that their truth is already implied in the very fact of making one’s  argument and so cannot be denied argumentatively; and to delineate the  range of such a priori knowledge from the realm of propositions whose  validity cannot be established in this way but require additional,  contingent in formation for their validation, or that cannot be  validated at all and so are mere metaphysical statements in the  pejorative sense of the term metaphysical.

Yet what is  implied in the very fact of arguing? It is to this question that our  insight into the inextricable interconnection between the a priori of  argumentation and that of action provides an answer:

On a  very general level, it cannot be denied argumentatively that  argumentation presupposes action and that arguments, and the knowledge  embodied in them, are those of actors. And more specifically it cannot  then be denied that knowledge itself is a category of action; that the  structure of knowledge must be constrained by the peculiar function  which knowledge fulfills with in the framework of action categories; and  that the existence of such structural constraints can never be  disproved by any knowledge whatsoever.

It is in this sense  that the insights contained in praxeology must be regarded as providing  the foundations of epistemology. Knowledge is a category quite distinct  from those that I have explained earlier—from  ends and means. The ends which we strive to attain through our actions,  and the means which we employ in order to do so, are both scarce  values. The values attached to our goals are subject to consumption and  are exterminated and destroyed in consumption and thus must forever be  produced a new. And the means employed must be economized, too. Not so,  however, with respect to knowledge—regardless  of whether one considers it a means or an end in itself. Of course, the  acquisition of knowledge requires scarce means—at  least one’s body and time. Yet once knowledge is acquired, it is no  longer scarce. It can neither be consumed, no rare the services that it  can render as a means subject to depletion. Once there, it is an  inexhaustible resource and incorporates an everlasting value provided  that it is not simply forgotten. Yet knowledge is not a free good in the  same sense that air, under normal circumstances, is a free good.  Instead, it is a category of action.

It is not only a mental  ingredient of each and every action, quite unlike air, but more  importantly; knowledge, and not air, is subject to validation, which is  to say that it must prove to fulfill a positive function for an actor  within the invariant constraints of the categorical framework of  actions. It is the task of epistemology to clarify what these  constraints are and what one can thus know about the structure of  knowledge as such.
While such recognition of the praxeological  constraints on the structure of knowledge might not immediately strike  one as in itself of great significance, it does have some highly  important implications.”
          — Hans-Hermann Hoppe





> As for the rest, you're repeating yourself again and ignoring/not understanding my criticism. 
> 
> Though, in your defense, you're no more confused that Hoppe himself:
> 
> Moral concepts (like ownership) are not _facts_, not matter how many times one may insist that they are.
> 
> It is simply a category mistake, like referring to saltiness as a color: gibberish.


Ownership *is not* a _moral_ concept you neophyte. It relates to legal theory / property theory. It is about *IS* statements, *not* _OUGHT_.

What part of this do you not understand? 

Disentangling Law & Ethics

“It is becoming clearer and clearer to me that ethical and legal theory need to be completely disentangled  and that at the essence of what libertarianism is we find a legal  position rather than an ethical position (sure, the legal position can  and is combined with various ethical positions, but this does not make  the two identical in content).

*Understanding what rights are  (legal) is different than deciding how, whether and in what ways to  actually respect them or not in action (ethical).*

Now when I look  back at Rothbard, I am seeing that he effectively was already doing this  (some passages above and elsewhere, even in Power and Market), but was  still bogged down in the use of the _word_ "ethics” in the effort  to distinguish what he was talking about from economic theory (and this  usage continues in Hoppe, with the word “ethics” subbing in for what I  think is actually “property theory.”).

Yet in looking at what they  are actually presenting rather than some labels, it is much much more  about legal content (definition of property rights), rather than whether  or not one _ought to_ violate or respect such rights (knowing what they _are_ being a separate question) on ethical grounds.“
          — Konrad Graf
Further:

Deductive   legal  theory,  when  properly  applied  in  a  given  context,  objectively and descriptively defines the parameters of _what justice is_  in relation to questions of property rights, contracts, torts, and  other legal matters. This yields  a  deeper-than-expected  foundation   for  the  traditional  libertarian insistence  on  not  mixing  law   with  morality  and  the  corollary  opposition  to “legislating   morality.”  Legal  theory  is  a  discrete  field  that,  like  Mises’s  conception of economic theory, can provide descriptive, categorical  input for use in “ought” considerations, even as legal theory and ethics  remain distinct in foundations, scope, and method.

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## r3volution 3.0

> Ownership *is not* a _moral_ concept you neophyte. It relates to legal theory / property theory. It is about *IS* statements, *not* _OUGHT_.


No, ownership is most definitely a moral concept; this is elementary. 

"Bob owns X" is not a statement of fact; it is an ought statement directed to others ("you all ought not interfere with Bob's use of X," etc). 

That you can't understand/refuse to recognize this is astonishing. 

I don't know what else to tell you.

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## Conza88

> No, ownership is most definitely a moral concept; this is elementary. 
> 
> "Bob owns X" is not a statement of fact; it is an ought statement  directed to others ("you all ought not interfere with Bob's use of X,"  etc).


Lmao. What a woefully ignorant strawman / red herring... no, actually it is a _claim. 

_Whether Bob does or not involves a variety of individual specifics to the case. See:

Action-based   legal  theory  provides  tools  to  take  into  each  case.  It  supplies some of the underlying questions to which case-specific details  shape answers.  Legal  principles  guide  inquiry  into  specifics   while  emerging  details suggest  the  most  relevant  set  of  legal   principles  to  apply.  Justice  may  be found at the meeting theory and  practice—of deduction, institutions, and the details of specific cases.  Sound theory functions as a service to legal practitioners, enabling  them do  their jobs more easily and reliably. […]


Legal practice  should always be on trial in the court of legal theory, while legal  theory should be recognized as insufficient to do justice in any real  case. Legal theory and legal practice must therefore  persist  in  a   challenging  but  necessary  marriage  between  distinctive partners   if  they  are  to  produce  the  offspring  of  justice.  Used   properly, praxeological  legal  concepts  not  only  boost  the   clarity  of  legal  theorizing from  “the  armchair,”  they  also   enhance  the  ability  of  practitioners  to  parse specific cases from  “the bench.”

Further:

Clearly, while “objective” (external, observable) criteria must play  an important role in the determination of ownership and aggression, such  criteria are not sufficient. In particular, defining aggression  “objectivistically” as “overt physical invasion” appears deficient  because it excludes entrapment, incitement and failed attempts, for  instance. Both the establishment of property rights and their violation  spring from actions: acts of appropriation and expropriation.


However,  in addition to a physical appearance, actions also have an internal,  subjective aspect. This aspect cannot be observed by our sense organs.  Instead, it must be ascertained by means of understanding (verstehen).  The task of the judge cannot-by the nature of things-be reduced to a  simple decision rule based on a quasi-mechanical model of causation.  Judges must observe the facts and understand the actors and actions  involved in order to determine fault and liability.

— Hoppe, EEPP




*Understanding what rights are  (legal) is different than deciding  how, whether and in what ways to  actually respect them or not in action  (ethical).*

Do you understand the distinction? Do you even acknowledge it exists? Why conflate the two?





> That you can't understand/refuse to recognize this is astonishing. 
> 
> I don't know what else to tell you.



What about following no property norm at all?

“To begin with, this is a self-contradictory “norm of following no norm.” It _is_  a proposed norm, and thus fails as impossible merely by being stated.  Hoppe also makes clear that every alternative to the NAP implies _some_ property norm. The difference among possible property norms is the specific criteria for _who_  shall be deemed to justifiably control what. All variants of statism  claim that “the people” own certain resources described as “public” via  the state, but since this is impossible, it masks the fact that specific  people actually control these various resources, only in a less just,  less efficient and more arbitrary way than under the NAP, a way  dominated by “political” skills rather than skills in employing scarce  resources so as to better satisfy demand (Hoppe 2010, Chapter 3).


*In  sum, this interpretation of the Hoppean APoA alters what “ought” ethics  faces in the realm of property theory. Instead of facing a thorny  question of which property norms are justified, ethics itself is faced only with the question of whether a person should follow  the only justifiable norms with regard to property.* The APoA  establishes that there is no justifiable alternative to the NAP and  therefore little choice to be made with regard to it except, as Ayn Rand  would say, the choice to either acknowledge it or to mentally evade it.  The APoA at once does not violate the is/ought gap problem and  simultaneously does show that “is” possibility criteria can dramatically  inform and delimit what can be justified, particularly when it comes to  property norms.


Categories such as  ethics and law, normative and descriptive, have evolved to denote fields  of interest and investigation. Reality and its understanding must take  priority. Resort to field classifications and thought aids such as  “branches” of knowledge must always serve this end, not vice versa.* It  is not our conclusions that must be modified in light of existing field  classifications, but our field classifications that, if necessary, must  bend to the emerging contours of our understanding of reality.
*

None  of the foregoing should leave the impression that the normative field  of ethics in relation to ends is unimportant or uncomplicated at levels _beyond_  basic property norms. In Part IV, we shall return to the relationship  between property norms, law, rules, and ethics to examine the role of  ethics within an action framework and in relation to law. I will argue  that the above division between the “is” and “ought” elements of the  APoA-based NAP remains in place and takes on additional importance at  higher levels.”

          — Konrad Graf

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## The Rebel Poet

It's wierd that you guys can't understand what Rev is saying. There is no need to delve deep into argumentation ethics or legal theory: use is not an adequate proof of ownership.

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## r3volution 3.0

> Lmao. What a woefully ignorant strawman / red herring... no, actually it is a claim.


Yes, an _ethical_ claim, contra a _factual_ claim. A  factual claim is a claim about something existing in empirical reality,  something which can be empirically verified. "Look," I say while  pointing to the dog in front of us, "the dog has four legs." I am  referring to something existing in empirical reality, which you can  verify with your own eyes. Not so with "Look at that car, Bob owns it." _Look at what?_ All  that's there is a car. There is nothing about the car which indicates who owns  it. No one can empirically verify who owns it. Ownership is a _concept_, not a property of physical things. 

As  for your several excerpts about the nature of law, they are entirely  beside the point. Whether law is imposed from above, from the armchair,  out of pure theory, or emerges from below, ala the common law, it  consists of ethical statements ("someone _should_ or _should not_ do this or that"), not statements of fact ("something _is_ or _is not_  the case"). Likewise, however the specific legal rules are formulated  (purely mechanistically or otherwise), they remain ethical not factual  statements. 

As for Hoppe's claim that all ethical systems are  sets of rules governing property rights, it is, once again, both true and  totally irrelevant. The point is that argumentation ethics fails,  contrary to all of your/Hoppe's assertions, to prove that only  libertarian property rules can be advanced in argument without  contradiction.

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