Peter Dow
Member
- Joined
- Mar 2, 2010
- Messages
- 35
To win a war it helps to have a good defence and a good offence.
This topic explains the problems in our defences in Afghanistan and proposes solutions.
YouTube - U.S. funds our enemy Taliban's Afghan war
So our defence is so poor, we are funding the enemy's offence against us!
What can be done is that NATO-ISAF and the Afghans can secure our supply routes with a proper plan and a force to implement that plan.
Secure supply route border defences plan diagram
I have revised this plan to defend against anticipated indirect fire as well. This has involved widening the security border either side of the supply route to keep enemy mortar and rocket launcher teams out of range of the supply line.
Apparently, the Taliban are being supplied indirect fire weapons from Iran so defenders need to be prepared to expect attacks using weapons such as 120 mm heavy mortars, with a range of 6200 metres and 107 mm rocket launchers with a range of 8500 metres.
So regretfully there is no avoiding the requirement for compulsory purchase of land and eviction of occupiers along a 19 kilometre or 12 mile wide corridor, the whole length of the supply route.
More aggressively NATO might like to consider long-range missile attacks against Iranian weapons productions facilities in Iran to dissuade the Iranians from supplying the Taliban.
Secure border for a supply route - 19 kilometres or 12 miles wide

Secure supply route border defences plan diagram (large - 960 x 1374 pixels)
As can be seen in the diagram, the border perimeter defences are much the same whether you are securing a railway or a road.
Diagram features. Explained for secure Afghanistan supply routes.
Railway plan for Afghanistan
Right, I knocked this railway map up in 20 minutes so don't think I am making any pretensions to be the new Isambard Kingdom Brunel but here it is anyway - see what you think. Just a suggestion - open to amendment or your better plans if you have any.

Map of proposed new railways in Afghanistan (large 1378 x 1480 pixels)
So that is a plan for about 1500 miles or 2400 km of new railway.
To secure this railway from attack by Taliban, warlord, terrorist or insurgent attack, fortified defensive machine gun nests or pillboxes would be needed every 1000 metres on each of the two borders along the railway route, closer than 1000 m where the terrain makes it easier for the enemy to sneak up close - bridges and cuttings or other cover - where you need more defensive firing angles to spot and then to stop an advance.
I propose using a dedicated Afghan railway & road supply route protection force to man the defensive machine gun positions which force would be part of the Afghan army.
I have figures for the number of Afghan army to staff the railway & road supply route protection force for a 2400km railway.
At 2 defensive positions - fortified machine gun nests or pillboxes - per kilometre - this would be a total of 4,800 defensive positions to man.
For additional security, additional fortified machine gun nests or pillboxes can be constructed which are normally unmanned. The purpose of empty defensive positions is to confuse an attacker who then may be firing at an unmanned position.
For example, if additional defensive positions are constructed, say every 200 metres, yet only 1 in 5 positions are manned then an attacker only has a 1 in 5 chance of firing at a manned position first of all.
Then 4 out 5 first attacks would miss the defenders altogether yet alert the defenders in the nearby manned positions which negates any advantage of surprise the attacker has initially.
Such additional security measures can be implemented at locations along the route where it is considered that attacks are more likely.
Such extra defensive positions can also be occupied when mobile forces arrive to respond to a sustained attack at that location.
I am assuming a 3 man team to man a defensive machine gun position at any time and to serve as lookouts.
So 3 x 4,800 = a staff of 14,400 to man the guns. Including officers to supervise, I estimate a total of 16,000 army staff on duty manning the guns at any one time.
At 3 x 8 hour shifts that is a total force of 48,000 army to defend the railway for 24 hours, 7 days a week. The off-duty staff would form a mobile reserve to respond to any sustained attacks at any point on the route and they would be best equipped with armoured vehicles to bring more fire-power to particular points on demand.
There should be enforced an exclusion border either side of the supply route which prevents anyone getting close enough to fire a rocket propelled grenade at the defensive machine gun positions. Some claim the range of an RPG can be as far as 1000 metres in the hands of a trained person, though sources vary on this question it would be cautious design to assume the need for a wider exclusion border, say 1100m on either side of the railway.
Barbed wire can help to remind civilians where not to go unless they wish to risk being shot.
For public crossing points, to cross from one side of the supply route to the other or to use a railway station, we would need to build fortified police check-points where those wanting to cross get permission from the police which is radioed to the army in the machine-gun nests when an authorised party has permission to cross.
For the crossing points, and railway stations, the police check-points would be manned by a reliable Afghan police force.
I have not calculated the numbers of Afghan police required. That depends on how many stations and crossing points you have and how busy they are, how many people need to be screened and so on and I don't have an estimate of those numbers as yet.
Now that is a lot of work for the Afghans to get busy on but better doing that than growing poppies or serving with the Taliban or warlords, demanding pay-offs to allow our supplies through, planting IEDs or becoming suicide bombers.
This is war and in war conscription is allowed. In WW2 the British men had the choice of armed service or work down the mines. The Afghan government at our demand needs to give the Afghans, especially in poppy-growing and strong Taliban-recruiting areas, where the insurgency is strong, similar war-time choices.
All with the agreement of the Afghan president of course. So we would need a Afghan president who would agree to those kind of tough measures to fix Afghanistan and if not and he was happy with poppies, IEDs, suicide bombers, civilian and military casualties then obviously such an Afghan president is siding with the Taliban enemy is violating constitutional understandings about what NATO-ISAF are demanding from Afghanistan and such an enemy president needs arresting, impeachment, removal by NATO-ISAF and there would have to be a new election for president. Hopefully it won't come to that and agreements can be reached to end this drift and chaos of supply attempted across ground controlled by the warlords and the Taliban.
After 9 years of being in Afghanistan, the US-British-led coalition, NATO-ISAF instead of having a railway and roads and secure supply routes constructed, we have 300 British dead and 1000 American dead and not much to show for it.
I prefer a more purposeful plan such as this compared to the drift we have been getting so far from the Afghan government. It seems to me we need NATO-ISAF vision and purpose and a coherent military plan to save this Afghanistan intervention from disaster.
This topic explains the problems in our defences in Afghanistan and proposes solutions.
YouTube - U.S. funds our enemy Taliban's Afghan war
U.S. Tax Dollars Fueling Afghan Insurgency
House Investigation: Private Contractors Paying Warlords, Criminals to Get Supplies to U.S. and NATO Bases
Lara Logan reports for CBS Evening News
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/21/eveningnews/main6604606.shtml
(CBS) Billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars are fuelling corruption in Afghanistan and funding the insurgency, according to a six-month investigation by the House subcommittee on National Security and Foreign affairs.
The committee's chairman, Rep. John F. Tierney, D-Mass., told CBS News: "the business is war and the war is business and you've got 'Warlord Inc.' going on over there."
Committee investigators found that private contractors in Afghanistan have been paying local warlords, criminals, government officials and a list of others for security on Afghanistan's roads, to get much needed supplies to U.S and NATO bases. But even worse, anecdotal evidence indicates that U.S. tax dollars are also going into the hands of the Taliban, who own many of the roads and areas through which the trucking convoys have to pass, reports CBS News chief foreign correspondent Lara Logan.
That would mean that the U.S. is literally funding the enemy, as violence escalates daily in Afghanistan and more U.S soldiers and Marines are dying than ever before in this war.
"This is the tip of the iceberg," Tierney said in an interview with CBS News. "There are other contracts over there, whether they are cell phone contracts or base security, and if you're paying the wrong people to do that and fuelling corruption, then it's not really going to speak well for the reason we sent our men and women there and the reason they're sacrificing their lives".
It also means that while the U.S. has been publicly pointing fingers at the Afghan government and President Hamid Karzai for not cleaning up corruption in his government, in fact the U.S. is a huge part of the corruption problem - and until now, has done nothing about it or even acknowledged that fact.
"We can't be putting that kind of money into a situation where it's going to be corruptive ... we have to get rules in place, implement them, oversee them, get it done right, and then we can demand with much more authority and credibility that the Afghan government do the same," Tierney said.
It's also widely known and accepted in many areas, that to carry out any reconstruction projects or U.S. funded counter-insurgency efforts requires large payoffs to the Taliban.
So our defence is so poor, we are funding the enemy's offence against us!
What can be done is that NATO-ISAF and the Afghans can secure our supply routes with a proper plan and a force to implement that plan.
Secure supply route border defences plan diagram
I have revised this plan to defend against anticipated indirect fire as well. This has involved widening the security border either side of the supply route to keep enemy mortar and rocket launcher teams out of range of the supply line.
Apparently, the Taliban are being supplied indirect fire weapons from Iran so defenders need to be prepared to expect attacks using weapons such as 120 mm heavy mortars, with a range of 6200 metres and 107 mm rocket launchers with a range of 8500 metres.
Iranian weapons getting through to Taliban
Heavy weapons are continuing to stream across the Afghan border from Iran despite Barack Obama's attempts to enlist Tehran's help in fighting the insurgency, officials have said.
So regretfully there is no avoiding the requirement for compulsory purchase of land and eviction of occupiers along a 19 kilometre or 12 mile wide corridor, the whole length of the supply route.
More aggressively NATO might like to consider long-range missile attacks against Iranian weapons productions facilities in Iran to dissuade the Iranians from supplying the Taliban.
Secure border for a supply route - 19 kilometres or 12 miles wide


Secure supply route border defences plan diagram (large - 960 x 1374 pixels)
As can be seen in the diagram, the border perimeter defences are much the same whether you are securing a railway or a road.
Diagram features. Explained for secure Afghanistan supply routes.
- Dangerous ground Enemy forces such as the Taliban, Afghan warlords or Iranian proxies may be attacking the supply route from here
- Vehicle barrier - deep trench / giant boulders / steep slope - so that truck bombs cannot be driven onto the route
- STOP - Police check-point - police check civilians are unarmed and those in police or military uniform are genuine. Needs to be very robust so as to survive an enemy truck bomb.
- Barbed wire - enough to keep out people and larger animals - so more than a horse can jump or cattle can trample over
- No Pedestrians! Cleared ground Target zone for the machine gunners. A hostile intent should be assumed if an intruder is seen here and the intruder should be shot. The ground needs to be cleared of cover so that intruders can be easily spotted and cannot sneak their way past the machine gunners.
- GUN - Fortified machine gun nests / pillboxes 3 man crew. Armour should be able to withstand an RPG hit and contains one machine gun with an effective range to 1000 metres, such as PKM or better. One every 1000 metres on both borders should be manned 24/7. Binoculars, automatic rifles such as AK47 and night vision for 3. Two or more other gun positions per 1000 m on each border are normally unmanned and don't need the expense of real guns sitting there all the time. Such extra positions confuse attackers and serve as firing positions for mobile reaction teams to occupy in emergencies and who can bring additional weapons with them.
Which machine gun? said:For the on-duty-shift manned pillboxes, I suppose the better (longer effective range, heavier the bullet) a machine gun the better. At a minimum the plan needs a machine gun with a 1000 metre effective range to keep Taliban RPG out of range of the pillbox.
Ideally I suppose a heavy machine gun (say 12.7 mm ammo, 1800 metres effective range) with its longer range would be best for stopping an advance of the enemy and would give enemy snipers and heavy machine guns at long ranges something to worry about though I think the plan would work well with a medium machine gun (say 7.6 mm ammo, 1500 metres effective range).
The disadvantage about the heavy machine gun is it is a more difficult 2-man carry when the team decide to move it to another pillbox to confuse the enemy but the extra range and fire-power of a heavy machine gun may well be worth the carry.
I am very keen to suggest armoured sights which allow the machine-gunner to fire accurately despite incoming sniper or machine gun fire intended to suppress the pillbox.
If a tank-crew machine-gunner can fire from inside his tank by virtue of armoured sights, without being suppressed, so should a well designed pillbox, in my opinion.
Squad automatic weapons or light machine guns (say, 5.56 mm ammo, 900 metres effective range) would be better stored in the APC to be quickly carried into the empty pillboxes to defend an emergency attack and such lighter machine guns are also useful in the APC for responding to an attack anywhere in the secure corridor. - Access road Where authorised traffic and people can access or leave the supply route.
- Mortar teams' ground Defender mortar teams arriving from mobile response depots should set up somewhere here to fire at the enemy in the dangerous ground. The mortar teams' ground should have features to help to win mortar duels with the enemy such as observation points on higher ground or tall structures to serve as observation towers.
- Safe building ground Somewhere relatively safe to build a heliport, runway, supply store or other facility or base.
- Supply route The road and / or railway we are defending
- Crossing Where the access road crosses a supply route railway
- Station - Railway station to load and unload supplies and people onto and off the supply trains.
- Cross-roads - A four-way junction where the access road crosses the supply road.
- Mobile reaction depot - contains single armoured fighting vehicle. This is also where the off-duty mess is so that soldiers are available to react to sustained attacks anywhere along the supply route. One every 2km. Contains additional infantry weapons and ammunition such as additional machine guns, automatic rifles, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars and the rest.
- Armoured personnel carrier Such as an up-armoured humvee. Most mobile reaction depots have one of those. To transport soldiers to the proximity of the enemy attack where soldiers dismount to fight.
- Infantry fighting vehicle or armoured combat vehicle. With stronger armour and able to fire on the enemy from enhanced weapons mounted to the vehicle, as well as able to perform the soldier transport role of the APC. Ideally the defenders would prefer the more powerful IFVs to the battle taxi APCs but fewer mobile reaction depots house IFVs because IFVs cost more and so fewer are available to the defenders than the lower performing APCs.
Railway plan for Afghanistan
Right, I knocked this railway map up in 20 minutes so don't think I am making any pretensions to be the new Isambard Kingdom Brunel but here it is anyway - see what you think. Just a suggestion - open to amendment or your better plans if you have any.

Map of proposed new railways in Afghanistan (large 1378 x 1480 pixels)
So that is a plan for about 1500 miles or 2400 km of new railway.
To secure this railway from attack by Taliban, warlord, terrorist or insurgent attack, fortified defensive machine gun nests or pillboxes would be needed every 1000 metres on each of the two borders along the railway route, closer than 1000 m where the terrain makes it easier for the enemy to sneak up close - bridges and cuttings or other cover - where you need more defensive firing angles to spot and then to stop an advance.
I propose using a dedicated Afghan railway & road supply route protection force to man the defensive machine gun positions which force would be part of the Afghan army.
I have figures for the number of Afghan army to staff the railway & road supply route protection force for a 2400km railway.
At 2 defensive positions - fortified machine gun nests or pillboxes - per kilometre - this would be a total of 4,800 defensive positions to man.
For additional security, additional fortified machine gun nests or pillboxes can be constructed which are normally unmanned. The purpose of empty defensive positions is to confuse an attacker who then may be firing at an unmanned position.
For example, if additional defensive positions are constructed, say every 200 metres, yet only 1 in 5 positions are manned then an attacker only has a 1 in 5 chance of firing at a manned position first of all.
Then 4 out 5 first attacks would miss the defenders altogether yet alert the defenders in the nearby manned positions which negates any advantage of surprise the attacker has initially.
Such additional security measures can be implemented at locations along the route where it is considered that attacks are more likely.
Such extra defensive positions can also be occupied when mobile forces arrive to respond to a sustained attack at that location.
I am assuming a 3 man team to man a defensive machine gun position at any time and to serve as lookouts.
So 3 x 4,800 = a staff of 14,400 to man the guns. Including officers to supervise, I estimate a total of 16,000 army staff on duty manning the guns at any one time.
At 3 x 8 hour shifts that is a total force of 48,000 army to defend the railway for 24 hours, 7 days a week. The off-duty staff would form a mobile reserve to respond to any sustained attacks at any point on the route and they would be best equipped with armoured vehicles to bring more fire-power to particular points on demand.
There should be enforced an exclusion border either side of the supply route which prevents anyone getting close enough to fire a rocket propelled grenade at the defensive machine gun positions. Some claim the range of an RPG can be as far as 1000 metres in the hands of a trained person, though sources vary on this question it would be cautious design to assume the need for a wider exclusion border, say 1100m on either side of the railway.
Barbed wire can help to remind civilians where not to go unless they wish to risk being shot.
For public crossing points, to cross from one side of the supply route to the other or to use a railway station, we would need to build fortified police check-points where those wanting to cross get permission from the police which is radioed to the army in the machine-gun nests when an authorised party has permission to cross.
For the crossing points, and railway stations, the police check-points would be manned by a reliable Afghan police force.
I have not calculated the numbers of Afghan police required. That depends on how many stations and crossing points you have and how busy they are, how many people need to be screened and so on and I don't have an estimate of those numbers as yet.
Now that is a lot of work for the Afghans to get busy on but better doing that than growing poppies or serving with the Taliban or warlords, demanding pay-offs to allow our supplies through, planting IEDs or becoming suicide bombers.
This is war and in war conscription is allowed. In WW2 the British men had the choice of armed service or work down the mines. The Afghan government at our demand needs to give the Afghans, especially in poppy-growing and strong Taliban-recruiting areas, where the insurgency is strong, similar war-time choices.
All with the agreement of the Afghan president of course. So we would need a Afghan president who would agree to those kind of tough measures to fix Afghanistan and if not and he was happy with poppies, IEDs, suicide bombers, civilian and military casualties then obviously such an Afghan president is siding with the Taliban enemy is violating constitutional understandings about what NATO-ISAF are demanding from Afghanistan and such an enemy president needs arresting, impeachment, removal by NATO-ISAF and there would have to be a new election for president. Hopefully it won't come to that and agreements can be reached to end this drift and chaos of supply attempted across ground controlled by the warlords and the Taliban.
After 9 years of being in Afghanistan, the US-British-led coalition, NATO-ISAF instead of having a railway and roads and secure supply routes constructed, we have 300 British dead and 1000 American dead and not much to show for it.
I prefer a more purposeful plan such as this compared to the drift we have been getting so far from the Afghan government. It seems to me we need NATO-ISAF vision and purpose and a coherent military plan to save this Afghanistan intervention from disaster.
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