What Do We Do About Themme?

[osan]

As many of you are aware, I use terms like "Theye", "Themme", and "Theire" to denote the often mist-shrouded characters who wield ultimate political power across the globe. It is about the apparent work of those people I ask the question of what do we do about them?

Consider the so-called "pandemic". As the bullshit and lies of the recent past have begun to give way to leaking truth, we see that indeed and in fact we have been bullshitted and fed hideous lies. We can debate the precise nature of those lies, the truths about covid and the non-vaccine "vaccines" until the cows come home, but with respect to a more immediate issue none of that really matters.

The more immediate question revolves around the clear fact that we are being made war upon. What was once hidden from public view is now blatantly rubbed in our faces through the agency of organizations such as WEF who proudly profess their positions on world human population and what needs to be do be about it, carrying forth on the deeply tacit assumption that anything in fact needs doing.

Theye are clear on their messages and none of it bodes well for Johnny Average. That would be YOU, and make no mistake on that point. They want YOU dead. And me. And most of us all. We are the "useless eaters" of whom Kissinger made his infamous reference.

I've posited several speculative scenarios in these forums, some of them a bit wild when beaten against our normalcy bias, and some rather disturbingly plausible. It matters no whit how likely any such notion may prove.

What matters is the indisputable fact that Theye are in possession and control of technologies capable of making such scenarios real. I further submit with high confidence that the "pandemic" was a case in point. It is now come out that CIA officially recognizes and acknowledges that the pandemic was almost certainly the result of the release of the pathogen from the bioweapons facility located in Wuhan, China. This admission is bigger than perhaps most people realize. Furthermore, the implications of this are potentially staggering: if Theye could do it once, they can do it again, and the question of whether it was done intentionally stands utterly irrelevant to the fact that is had happened and may happen again.

And so we come to the real issue: what do we do about this? The facts are clear and cannot be validly disputed. The facilities exist and pathogens can escape control, whether by design or by accident. Furthermore, those facilities harbor agents far and away worse than SARS covid-2 viruses. Further still, it is now acknowledged that so-called "gain of function" research is being carried out at these facilities. There are about 100 known such facilities on the planet on every continent save, maybe, Antarctica. There are potentially several hundreds more facilities such as dual-use institutions, as well as those that are just too black to make any reasonable assessments.

Let us just assume 100 facilities. ONE HUNDRED bioweapons research facilities sprinkled around the entire planet. If this does not make your hair stand straight up in alarm, then you are not even remotely sane. I guaRONtee that every last one of those installations are under Theire control. Theye may have factions. There may be internecine squabbles between those factions, both facts of which should only add fuel to the fire of one's concern. Why so many? Have you asked yourself that question and pondered with care the possibilities there? if not, I strongly suggest you begin. Now.

And so back to the question at hand. What do we do about these facts? We are made war upon by Themme and they no longer hide that fact, save bi the flimsiest of means that no intelligent and self-respecting human being would regard as anything other than that. Nor does the intelligent and decent human being accept it as so much as tolerable, and yet here we are, tolerating our asses off. WEF is one of the mouthpieces, as is the UN, peddling their sky-is-falling marketing campaign about how we are destroying the planet and how Malthus was right about human population. Scarier still is the fact that a very disturbingly high percentage of the "first-world" human population is buying this great steaming pile.

As for the rest of us the question becomes quite literally existential in nature. There exists a cadre of like-minded, wealthy, and apparently very determined human beings set to the task of culling global human populations; to whittle them down to what appears to my eyes to be approximately 1/16th of the current load. Imagine that fifteen of every sixteen people you see on a typical day gone in what I have to assume is a fairly foreshortened timeframe, judging on my reading of the UN's Agenda 21 document.

Theye are serious and are playing for keeps. Theye are quite literally warring against every human being on the planet. The question is not whether we ought do something against Themme, but rather what. How does one fight against such danger in the face of the fact that the moment we stand in threat, Theye can simply unleash apocalyptic doom upon us all? This is the corner into which we have allowed ourselves to be painted. Is there no resort?

Well?

 

[CaptUSA]

 

[TheTexan]

I dunno what you guys are gonna do about it but I'm not gonna do a damn thing

I suspect none of you will either

Shrug

It is what it is

 

[Occam's Banana]

I dunno what you guys are gonna do about it but I'm not gonna do a damn thing

I suspect none of you will either

Shrug

It is what it is

Yeah, well, I signed a petition, once - and I even seriously considered voting. But I forgot to, that's all (I was pretty busy with some other stuff - but I really did consider it, and it might have probably happened, if I had remembered).

So I guess that shows how much you know about it, Negative Nancy.

Stop being such a Debbie Downer.

 

[TheTexan]

Yeah, well, I signed a petition, once - and I even seriously considered voting. But I forgot to, that's all (I was pretty busy with some other stuff - but I really did consider it, and it might have probably happened, if I had remembered).

So I guess that shows how much you know about it, Negative Nancy.

Stop being such a Debbie Downer.

Well, for whatever burden on your conscience it may present, just remember, if you had voted, maybe we wouldn't be in this mess we are now.

May God have mercy on your non-voting soul.

 

[Occam's Banana]

Well, for whatever burden on your conscience it may present, just remember, if you had voted, maybe we wouldn't be in this mess we are now.

May God have mercy on your non-voting soul.

My Call of Duty team needed me.

You should be thanking me for my service.

(Nazi zombies aren't going to kill themselves, after all.)

 

[CCTelander]

My Call of Duty team needed me.

You should be thanking me for my service.

(Nazi zombies aren't going to kill themselves, after all.)

Thank you for your service, comrade.

Voting is for suckers anyway.

 

[TheTexan]

If you don't vote, you can't complain.

Both of you are hereby prohibited from complaining.

 

[Two.L]

Your only hope, and your children's, is to survive. You will do nothing about themme. They will do something about you. Don't like it? Shouldn't have let them obtain complete control of information (not that you had a choice to begin with). Of course, a prerequisite to that survival is passing through the evolutionary window that was the covid vax (not taking it like a tool).

 

[Swordsmyth]

If you want to break their grip on society then you expose their most powerful secret tool.

More at: https://www.americanstasi.com/

 

[TheTexan]

If you want to break their grip on society then you expose their most powerful secret tool.

More at: https://www.americanstasi.com/

Am I gonna get a virus if I click on that

 

[Swordsmyth]

Am I gonna get a virus if I click on that

No.

 

[Occam's Banana]

Am I gonna get a virus if I click on that

Just get vaccinated, and then you won't have to worry about it.

 

[TheTexan]

Just get vaccinated, and then you won't have to worry about it.

Yea, I'll just give my computer a small virus so that it won't get a bigger virus later

God, scientists are dumb.

 

[jmdrake]

Gain of function research is the single biggest threat to humanity. Fauci has been backing this crap openly since before 2012.



https://undark.org/2024/12/11/unleashed-gain-of-function-regulation/

n early 2012, federal officials summoned Michael Imperiale from his home in Ann Arbor, Michigan, to a large conference room in Bethesda, Maryland. There, they handed the virologist drafts of two scientific papers. A foreign government had deemed one draft’s contents so risky that it could not be sent via the postal service or attached to an email.


UNLEASHED
Living in the Age of Risky Science: An Undark Special Series.

The drafts detailed attempts to alter a lethal avian influenza virus, potentially granting it the ability to spread among humans. Such work, according to the U.S. officials who had funded it, was vital for preparing for a potential flu pandemic. But some scientists wondered whether the research itself could spark a cataclysm. Might someone read the papers, which contained details of how the pathogens had been engineered, and use them as blueprints for bioterrorism?

Months before, Imperiale and more than a dozen colleagues had recommended that earlier drafts of the papers be published with some details redacted. But that halfway option wasn’t going to fly. Now they needed to make a choice: Was it worthwhile to publish the papers in full? Or should the manuscripts, with their potential for misuse, not be published at all?

The meeting helped launch a new era of debate over pathogen research. In the ensuing years, the field would be forced to reckon with fundamental questions about virology experiments that enhance pathogens so they become more deadly or more transmissible. The risks of the work, which is sometimes called gain of function, are difficult to calculate, and scientists have mixed views about its potential benefits.

Those debates have grown more public — and more bitter — since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, which many experts acknowledge might have resulted from an accident at a Chinese laboratory with a history of biosafety issues. The lab’s researchers conducted experiments on coronaviruses, though whether any of their work constituted gain-of-function research is a matter of debate. (Virologists use the term to describe a broad range of experiments, many of which are low-risk, so some experts prefer to use terms like “gain-of-function research of concern” or “enhanced potential pandemic pathogen” research to refer to the riskiest subset of such work.)

The controversy has affected the field of virology writ large, scientists told Undark. Even before Covid-19, changing policies had cast a wide net, delaying or discouraging even lower-risk influenza and coronavirus studies. And for those whose work might be considered gain of function, the current review system is slow, opaque, and restrictive.

Policymakers, one biosecurity expert argued, are fretting about research that poses far less danger than the viruses evolving all around us in “nature’s gigantic lab.”

Concerns about Covid-19’s origins have brought calls for additional oversight of U.S. labs. That effort seems misplaced to some researchers, effectively hamstringing U.S. science in response to alleged biosafety lapses thousands of miles away. If additional rules are not carefully calibrated, they say, the country could wind up less prepared to fight future pandemics. Gigi Gronvall, a biosecurity expert at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, characterized the backlash as a situation of muddled priorities: policymakers, she argued, are fretting about research that poses far less danger than the viruses evolving all around us in “nature’s gigantic lab.”

Still, other experts remain deeply skeptical of the status quo. Among them, some view the handling of Covid origins as exhibit A: Not only was there an unwarranted rush to rule out a lab leak, they say, but the nation’s top scientific leaders overstepped their roles by secretly intervening in the debate, possibly minimizing concerns about laboratory safety.

Amid lingering concerns about Covid’s origins, the Biden administration put forth a new policy in May 2024 to strengthen oversight of high-risk biological research. Congress, meanwhile, has weighed in with a bill that would strip the National Institutes of Health of its authority to fund gain-of-function research and transfer that power to an independent review panel, appointed by the president. The legislation passed out of committee with bipartisan support in late September. It is now awaiting a vote on the Senate floor. The incoming Donald Trump administration, some experts predict, is likely to support the bill.


Rep. Jim Jordan speaks alongside Rep. Steve Scalise and Rep. James Comer during a Republican-led forum on the origins of the Covid-19 virus in June 2021. Concerns about Covid-19’s origins have brought calls for additional oversight of U.S. labs, and the controversy has affected the field of virology writ large. Visual: Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images
Such efforts have brought new public attention to some of the basic questions Imperiale and his colleagues agonized over in that conference room 12 years ago: How should society weigh the costs of engineering pathogens in the pursuit of public health goals?

That day, a number of high-ranking people, including then-NIH director Francis Collins and then-senior NIH official Anthony Fauci, whose office had funded the research, argued in favor of publishing the papers. Imperiale remembers listening intently and weighing the questions: Would publishing the papers really pose a risk? Would the data help public health officials monitor for dangerous pathogens out in nature?

Ultimately, the group voted to publish both papers.

Imperiale said he found the public health argument behind sharing the information from the studies compelling. Still, the decision took a toll. “I remember going back to the airport and just being totally exhausted,” he said during a recent conversation. He found an empty area of the terminal, sat down, and experienced a kind of emotional crash. “It just felt like such a monumental decision. Because you think, what if something bad does happen?”

To prevent the spread of microbes, researchers in U.S. laboratories follow extensive biosafety protocols. They’re also required to perform background checks on laboratory workers and employ other security measures before handling certain pathogens. Just a small number of laboratories perform gain-of-function research of concern, said Imperiale, perhaps a dozen worldwide and a handful in the U.S., where it has historically been funded by the National Institutes of Health.

The same year of Imperiale’s trip to Bethesda, the U.S. government released new rules for government-funded dual-use research of concern, meaning it could cause harm if misapplied.

Despite those protocols, some scientists remained uneasy. Lone Simonsen, director of the PandemiX Center in Denmark, was working in the U.S. when news about the gain-of-function studies started to spread. She was immediately concerned. Scientists like to think of themselves as the good guys, she said. “But are we really?” she wondered. “What’s our field exactly producing out of all this?”

Around the same time, Marc Lipsitch, an epidemiologist at the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health, began to question whether the risks of such research outweighed the benefits. He was preparing a lecture on a drug-resistant flu virus that had swept across the globe a few years prior. As it happened, said Lipsitch, that fast-spreading flu virus contained a mutation that virologists had previously studied in the lab. When the virologists inserted that mutation into a common flu strain, the mutation crippled the virus. But as that common flu strain continued to evolve out in the world, the single mutation that had weakened the lab virus came to confer an advantage in nature.


A colorized electron microscope image of H1N1 influenza virus particles. When a drug-resistant H1N1 flu virus emerged in the late 2000s, virologists found the virus contained a mutation that had previously been studied in a lab. Visual: NIAID/NIH
There’s no guarantee that a mutation that behaves one way in one flu strain will behave the same way in a different flu strain, said Lipsitch. And because influenza viruses evolve quickly, any laboratory findings may be obsolete, or even misleading, by the time they are published.

In his view, this had implications for gain-of-function studies. Not only did they risk sparking a devastating pandemic — their purported benefits were uncertain.

In 2014, Lipsitch co-authored a paper in PLOS Medicine, using data on how often laboratory pathogens sicken the people who work with them. With each study, there is a small but real risk that an exposure could “initiate a chain of transmission,” the authors wrote, and perhaps even spark a pandemic. The paper laid out alternative approaches that, according to the authors, could be used to obtain the information that scientists wanted.

Some prominent virologists argued that Lipsitch and his collaborator had misinterpreted the infection data, and, in the process, overstated the research’s risks. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, one of the scientists behind the controversial avian influenza studies, said that this work had already provided actionable data by, among other things, demonstrating that countries should maintain stockpiles of avian influenza vaccines. He also disputed the notion that alternative approaches were sufficient.

Lipsitch was undeterred. In July of that year, he helped organize a gathering in Cambridge, Massachusetts, of roughly 20 people, most of them academics, to discuss biosafety and advocate for change.

Scientists like to think of themselves as the good guys, Lone Simonsen said. “But are we really?”

The timing was good. In June, dozens of employees at a U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention laboratory had been potentially exposed to anthrax. Then, on July 1, six vials of the virus that causes smallpox were discovered in an unsecured storage room on the NIH campus. Soon after that, news broke that the CDC had accidentally shipped out a dangerous flu virus. These incidents “raise serious and troubling questions,” said the then-CDC director at a July 11 press conference.

As all this was unfolding, the longest-serving members of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, which had made the decision to publish the avian influenza papers, received unexpected emails announcing that they were being relieved of their duties.

A “huge luck element” helped put a spotlight on the Cambridge meeting, said Arturo Casadevall, a physician and microbiologist at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health who was among those cut from the NSABB. In an interview with Undark, he described reporters calling during the meeting, trying to figure out what had just happened.

That day, the group discussed what could be done. Some people wanted to call on the U.S. government to issue a moratorium on gain-of-function experiments. Others thought this was too anti-experimental and wanted to simply request that all future research undergo a rigorous risk-benefit analysis. In the end, the language in the two-paragraph consensus statement centered the need for risk-benefit assessment. Hundreds of scientists signed on.​

 

[Occam's Banana]

Yea, I'll just give my computer a small virus so that it won't get a bigger virus later

God, scientists are dumb.

In modern America, computer runs anti-virus scan on you! /Yakov-Smirnoff-voice

[...] At the forefront of this innovation is the development of personalised cancer vaccines, a possibility unveiled during the launch of the Stargate Project at the White House recently. Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to create personalised cancer vaccines for individuals within 48 hours, tech firm Oracle’s chairman Larry Ellison stated.

Speaking at the event, he highlighted that AI would soon enable the development of customised mRNA vaccines, tailored to combat cancer for specific patients, which could then be produced using robotic systems.

[...]