Former Weapons Inspector in Iraq Questions Claims Iran Is Hiding Nuclear Weapons Tests

[charrob]

History of Key Document in IAEA Probe Suggests Israeli Forgery:

The reason this is important is because it could destroy the nuclear deal with Iran and allow the neocons to go back on their warpath calling for war against that country . In addition to the following interview with former IAEA Chief Robert Kelly who discusses the ramifications of this being a forgery,

• Scott Horton has a good discussion with Gareth Porter about this here.
• And here is another article by Gareth Porter about this here.

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[jmdrake]

With all of the crap going on right now this seems like a blip on the radar. How often will we fall for the same stuff?

 

[charrob]

Nuclear Talks Extended to June 2015; Current U.S. Requirements List

Nuclear Talks Extended to June 2015; Current U.S. Requirements List:

In light of the talks that recently have been extended, I was curious exactly what the U.S. was asking Iran to do. This is an article with an attitude where almost every line can be disputed by actual facts from the U.S. Intelligence Community, however, it does include the itemized list of U.S. expectations that were discussed at the talks (which Iran apparently did not agree to). So just wanted to add the itemized list to this thread:

What the Obama Administration has been negotiating with the Iranians is that Iran must:

• Halt all enrichment above 5% and dismantle the technical connections required to enrich above 5%.
  
• Dilute below 5% or convert to a form not suitable for further enrichment its entire stockpile of near-20% enriched uranium before the end of the initial phase.
  
• Halt progress on its enrichment capacity by not installing additional centrifuges of any type or installing or using any next-generation centrifuges to enrich uranium.
  
• Leave inoperable about half of installed centrifuges at Natanz and three-quarters of installed centrifuges at Fordow, so they cannot be used to enrich uranium.
  
• Limit centrifuge production to those needed to replace damaged machines, so Iran cannot use the six months to stockpile centrifuges.
  
• Not construct additional enrichment facilities.
  
• Not increase its stockpile of 3.5% low enriched uranium, so that the amount is not greater at the end of the six months than it is at the beginning, and any newly enriched 3.5% enriched uranium is converted into oxide.
  
• Not commission or fuel the Arak reactor, halt the production of fuel for Arak, halt additional testing of fuel for Arak, not install any additional reactor components at Arak, and not transfer fuel and heavy water to the reactor site.
  
• Not construct a facility capable of reprocessing.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-wagner/time-is-running-out-for-i_b_6221798.html